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General Budget Support (GBS) has been an 
important part of Dutch development coopera-
tion to Nicaragua over the years 2005-2008, 
representing about one-third of total bilateral aid 
to Nicaragua. This report aims to asess whether 
the outcomes of General Budget Support to 
Nicaragua have been in line with the expectati-
ons for this aid modality. It is the first publication 
of a new serie of IOB evaluations on General 
Budget Support. 
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Preface
During the past decade donors and recipient countries have shifted increasingly from a 
project approach to general and sector budget support. The expectation was that budget 
support, by contributing to the overall national development strategy and sector strategies, 
would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of development cooperation. 
General Budget Support (GBS) is financial aid that is not earmarked to specific projects or 
sectors and directly channelled to partner government’s national budget. The Netherlands 
has been providing GBS since 1998. In 2009 GBS was directly provided in ten countries. 
GBS is not without controversy and its impact on poverty reduction has frequently been 
questioned in Dutch parliament and in the press. 
The growth of budget support created the need to evaluate its effectiveness. Proponents and 
opponents seem to hold strong views about the effectiveness of budget support, but these 
views are not necessarily supported by (rigorous) evidence. 
A joint evaluation, by 24 donors and 7 governments was carried out in 2005 to evaluate the 
effectiveness of GBS in the 1994-2004 period. IOB actively participated in this evaluation. 
IOB is currently involved in a multidonor initiative to realize a new serie evaluations on the 
impact of budget support. Ongoing evaluations are carried out in Zambia and Mali. The 
evaluation of GBS to Nicaragua is the first publication of this new serie of evaluations on 
general budget support. The GBS evaluation to Nicaragua forms part of a broader country-
evaluation of the Netherlands development cooperation to Nicaragua (published in Spanish 
as “Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa a Nicaragua 2005-2008”).  
Nico van Niekerk of IOB was responsible for the evaluation. Geske Dijkstra (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam) and Arturo Grigsby (Nitlapan, Universidad Centroamericana) were 
the consultants for this evaluation and are the authors of this report. Kirsten Mastwijk has 
been responsible for the editing of this report. A reference group consisting of staff 
members of the relevant policy departments of the ministry of Foreign Affairs and external 
members provided comments and advice on the report. The study greatly benefited from 
support provided by the Netherlands Embassy in Managua and informants as mentioned in  
annexe 3.   
IOB bears responsibility for the contents of this report. 
Henri Jorritsma
Acting Director IOB
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Summary and conclusions
General Budget Support (GBS) has been an important part of Dutch development cooperation 
to Nicaragua over the years 2005-2008, representing about one-third of total bilateral aid to 
Nicaragua. The amount involved has been EUR 9 million in 2005, EUR 10 million in 2006, EUR 
11 million in 2007 and EUR 6 million in 2008.1  These funds were disbursed in the context of the 
Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA), a multi-donor arrangement with the government of 
Nicaragua on the provision of budget support. In May 2005, nine donors signed the Joint 
Financing Arrangement (JFA). The Netherlands was the third donor and the largest bilateral 
donor of budget support, with a 16.4% share in the total. This multi-donor cooperation 
implies that the evaluation cannot just look at the impact of Dutch budget support, but must 
include the budget support from the other involved donors as well.  Between 2005-2008 total 
budget support amounted to USD 300 millions and it represented 12.3% of total aid. On 
average, budget support represented 5.9% of total expenditure. 
In line with the expectations for GBS, four evaluation questions (EQs) have been formulated:
1.  Has General Budget Support (GBS) been implemented in such a way that it fostered aid 
effectiveness in line with the Paris and Accra declarations; in particular has it contributed 
to harmonization, ownership, alignment, and predictability? 
2.  Have the donors in general, and the Netherlands Embassy in particular, through GBS been 
able to influence policies and institutions? If the answer is yes, then how and what are 
the concrete results?
3.  Has GBS been able to strengthen national systems, to reduce estimated transaction costs, 
to increase allocative efficiency of government expenditure and to strengthen domestic 
accountability?
4.  Have government policies and institutions, supported by GBS money and possibly 
changed by donor influence through the GBS policy dialogue, become more effective in 
fostering economic growth and in reducing poverty?
Table 0.1 (page 14) gives a summary of the answers to these questions, indicating the section 
of this report where these findings are discussed. 
Most of the Paris Declaration principles have been implemented (EQ 1), at least to an 
important degree. Virtually all budget support resources were fully aligned with the 
national budget and other national systems, but there were some problems with the 
predictability of resources.  The exception is ownership, but this could be expected, as 
ownership is to a large degree incompatible with donors attempts to exert influence (EQ 2). 
Donors have had some influence on the elements of the Performance Asessement Matrix 
(policies and quantitative indicators) and in some cases compliance with these policies and 
indicators was also achieved. But compliance was often more formal than real. Poverty 
expenditure was maintained but poverty was not reduced. With long delays, donors 
1 Due to the exclusion of two opposition parties from the November 2008 municipal elections, the 
amount committed for 2008 was halved.
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managed to have external budget audits carried out and a Judicial Career Law approved, but 
this did not lead to more effective control of government expenditure or to improved 
functioning of the judiciary.
GBS has led to some positive intermediate effects in Nicaragua (EQ 3). Compared to project 
aid, it involved lower transaction costs and led to higher allocative efficiency of government 
expenditure. It also helped strengthening some government systems and there were some 
positive effects on domestic accountability under the Bolaños government. The most likely 
macro-economic use of GBS has been the repayment of domestic debts, thus contributing 
to macro-economic stability.
The final evaluation question (EQ 4) regards the ultimate effect of GBS on economic growth 
and poverty reduction. In this area, we can only examine the effects of government policies 
supported by GBS money and possibly changed in the GBS dialogue. In this area the results 
are limited. The limited growth of the first years under president Bolaños (2001-2006) did 
not trickle down to the poor, and poor targeting and poor efficiency of government 
expenditure hampered progress on social indicators. The policy dialogue around budget 
support has done little to change the intended policies of this government. Although 
donors have raised attention for improved poverty spending, the priorities were clearly 
elsewhere: most pressure has been exerted in order to guarantee macro-economic stability 
(in 2005), and a good “second” priority were governance issues. 
In this context it is important to analyze the motivations for donors to start GBS. The most 
important motivation for starting budget support was the expectation of higher aid 
effectiveness, in line with the Paris Declaration. A second motivation was the intention to 
support the Bolaños government in its efforts to modernize the state in issues such as 
improving public finance management and transparency, building career perspectives in 
civil service and improving the rule of law. In general, the donors had confidence in the 
Bolaños’ government, in particular in its policy priorities (economic growth and macro-
economic stability), in its willingness to fight corruption - evidenced from the jailing of 
former President Alemán - , and its attempts to improve the country’s governance.
This evaluation concludes that heavy risks could be identified at the start of the process. 
First, the Bolaños government had no support in Parliament, so it was unlikely to carry out 
its governance modernization agenda that pleased the donors so much. Donors were 
over-optimistic in thinking that by talking to and supporting this executive they could 
change deep institutional and political structures in the country. Second, the donors had a 
far too rosy picture of the intentions of the Bolaños government itself. It was clear that this 
government did not give priority to investing in poverty reduction, and the results in this 
area confirm this.
After the change in government in 2007, new risks appeared. The Ortega government was 
far more interested in implementing policies that benefit the poor, but its main priority 
proved to be to consolidate its power - breaching liberal democratic principles, if 
considered necessary. While bilateral donors continued budget support in the first period, 
Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua 2005-2008
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with the main purpose to improve the country’s governance, they stopped disbursing budget 
support in the second because of a deterioration in governance. This means that in both periods 
improving governance seems to have been the most important objective for budget 
support. This was based on the policy assumption, dominant at the time, that improving 
governance (in the direction of bringing about developed-country like institutions) is a 
necessary condition for growth and poverty reduction. However, recent empirical evidence 
leads to questioning this assumption. Not all elements of the good governance agenda are 
equally necessary for growth and poverty reduction - although they may be objectives in 
itself, especially in sofar as democracy and human rights are concerned. This reveals a 
difficult trade-off between political and socio-economic human rights as international 
cooperation objectives. Whatever the judgement is, fact is that the Ortega government’s 
efforts - admittedly, politicized and perhaps not always effective - to increase productive 
capacities of the poor and to improve access of the poor to social services are no longer 
supported by GBS from bilateral donors.
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Table 0.1      Summary of findings on the four Evaluation Questions (EQs)
EQ 1: Implementation in line with Paris Declaration principles?
Harmonization Within GBS to a large extent achieved with respect to disbursement 
conditions and procedures (2.3.2), but less harmonized responses to 
breaches of fundamental principles from 2008 onwards (3.4.2, 3.6)
Alignment Within GBS achieved, but share of GBS in total aid lower than that of 
program aid in 1990s (2.3.4, 2.3.6)
Ownership In 2005-6: executive government ownership of  fundamental 
principles, much less of the PAM; 2007-8: more ownership of PAM, less 
of fundamental principles (2.3.3, 3.3)
Predictability Good in 2006 and 2007, less in 2005 and 2008 (2.3.5)
EQ 2: Donor influence?
On the PAM 2005-6: high, 2007-8: somewhat lower (3.3)
Compliance with PAM 2005-6: low, 2007-8: much more (3.4)
Influence on important 
topics
Poverty expenditure: volume maintained, but doubts on targeting and 
efficiency (3.5.1)
Government transparency: improved public finance management 
achieved, mostly due to combination of donor technical asssitance and 
high government commitment (3.5.2)
External budget audits and Judicial Career Law: formally achieved but 
few actual changes (3.5.2, 3.5.3)
Democracy, human rights, women’s rights: not much achieved and 
deterioration in recent years (3.5.4)
EQ 3: Intermediate effects?
Macro-economic 
effects 
Positive for macro-economic stability, until 2008 (4.2)
Allocative efficiency Positive (4.2)
Transaction costs Positive (4.3)
Strengthening 
government systems
Some positive effects (4.4)
Improved domestic 
accountability
Limited positive effects during 2005-6; deterioration since 2007 and 
little results from donor attempts to turn tide (4.4, 3.5.4)
EQ 4: Government more effective in growth and poverty reduction?
Bolaños government Growth policy hampered by neglect of structural inequalities in access 
to assets; income poverty was not reduced for the same reasons; 
limited progress in social indicators due to regressive government 
income and expenditure policies (5.1, 5.2, 5.3)
Ortega government More attention for structural bottlenecks in advancing productive 
capacity of the poor majority, but results not clear yet; improved access 
to health and education (5.1, 5.2, 5.3)
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1.1 Aimofthisreportandmethodology
This report evaluates the provision of Dutch budget support to Nicaragua. General Budget 
Support (GBS) has been an important part of Dutch development cooperation to Nicaragua 
over the years 2005-2008, representing about one-third of total bilateral aid to Nicaragua. 
The amount involved has been, EUR 9 million in 2005, EUR 10 million in 2006, EUR 11 
million in 2007 and EUR 6 million in 2008.2 These funds were disbursed in the context of the 
Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA), a multi-donor arrangement with the government of 
Nicaragua on the provision of budget support. This multi-donor cooperation implies that 
the evaluation cannot just look at the impact of Dutch budget support, but must include 
the budget support from the other involved donors as well.
GBS is a form of program aid, along with balance of payments support and debt relief. 
Program aid is aid that is not earmarked to specific uses (projects), and is usually 
accompanied by policy conditions. This definition implies that technical assistance is not 
considered to be part of GBS. The policy conditions may be in the form of pre-conditions, 
i.e., selection criteria, and/or in the form of inputs for a policy dialogue with the 
government on policies or institutions to be changed, or outcomes to be achieved.
GBS is expected to have four positive effects:
• It will be more effective than other aid modalities (project aid, sector support) because it 
is expected that there will be more recipient country ownership, more alignment with 
national systems of procurement, planning, budgeting, reporting, accounting and 
implementation, and, to the extent general budget support is coordinated among 
donors, it is also expected to lead to greater donor harmonization. The predictability of 
GBS money is a precondition for this increase aid effectiveness.3
• Donors will be able to influence policies and institutions of the recipient country in the 
direction of their own priorities through the policy dialogue
• By using government systems, GBS will contribute to strengthening these systems instead 
of undermining them, GBS will reduce transaction costs for both donor and recipient, will 
enhance allocative efficiency of government expenditure,4 and will contribute to greater 
transparency of government expenditure and to improved domestic accountability
• Finally, through monetary support and through possibly improved policies and 
governance, government policies are expected to become more effective in fostering 
economic growth and in reducing poverty. 
2 Due to the exclusion of two opposition parties from the November 2008 municipal elections, the 
amount committed for 2008 was halved.
3 Ownership, alignment, harmonization and predictability are principles from the Paris Declaration, 
agreed by more than 100 countries in March 2005 in Paris, and confirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action 
(2008).
4 Allocative effiency is the efficiency gain in output as a result of a better combination of inputs; when 
governments can freely use resources they can choose the optimal combination of spending 
destinations.
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1 Introduction
The evaluation aims to assess the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of general budget 
support to Nicaragua. The evaluation matrix (table 1.1) shows the intervention theory for 
GBS, tracing the expected outputs, outcomes and impact that follow from the two GBS 
inputs, the money and the policy dialogue (the attempt to influence). In line with the four 
expectations regarding GBS, four Evaluation Questions (EQ) will be answered:
1.  Has General Budget Support (GBS) been implemented in such a way that it fostered aid 
effectiveness as stipulated in the Paris and Accra declarations; in particular has it 
contributed to harmonization, ownership, alignment, and predictability?
2.  Have the donors in general, and the Netherlands Embassy in particular, through GBS been 
able to influence policies and institutions? If the answer is yes, then how and what are 
the concrete results?
3.  Has GBS been able to strengthen national systems, to reduce estimated transaction costs, 
to increase allocative efficiency of government expenditure and to strengthen domestic 
accountability?
4.  Have government policies and institutions, supported by GBS money and possibly 
changed by donor influence through the GBS policy dialogue, become more effective in 
fostering economic growth and in reducing poverty?
EQ 1 assesses whether the implementation of GBS is in line with the principles of the Paris and 
Accra declarations, in particular harmonization, ownership and alignment, and predictability. 
To some extent, ownership (part of EQ 1) is the opposite of influence (EQ 2). EQ 2 attempts to 
assess the results of donor attempts to influence policies and governance. In order to measure 
influence, a first step is to investigate the preconditions for GBS of the different donors 
involved and to analyze the extent to which they are fulfilled. Next, an assessment will be 
made of the extent to which the policies, measures and targets of the Performance Assessment 
Matrix (PAM) coincide with priorities of the government or of the donors. In the first case, 
there is ownership (at least among the executive government), and in the second, there may 
be influence. Donors have influence if the priorities are different at the outset and if these 
donor-preferred policies and measures are implemented. Within implementation, there may 
be a difference between formal compliance (for example, approving a law) and actual 
compliance, which would mean that the law is also implemented.
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Table 1.1      Intervention theory for the evaluation of general budget support
Inputs Donor preferences in the policy 
dialogue
Money
Relevant counterfactual Project aid or sector support Project aid
Immediate effects Harmonization Ownership,
or donor 
influence
Harmonization Alignment
Output Institutional change and policy 
change
Domestic systems strengthened 
by using them
Allocative efficiency improved
Lower transaction costs
Domestic accountability improved
Lower deficit or additional money 
for poverty reduction*
Outcome Improved governance
Improved government effectiveness: higher quantity and quality and 
better targeting of services
Impact Economic growth 
Poverty reduction: income and non-income poverty
*Counterfactual: no aid.
EQ 3 deals in fact with four separate issues. Together they can be considered the outputs of GBS, 
mostly related to the availability of freely usable money, but sometimes also related to the other 
input of GBS, the policy dialogue. First, it will be examined whether government systems for 
planning, procurement, budgeting, reporting, auditing, implementation and monitoring have 
improved since the start of GBS and to what extent this is due to GBS and its accompanying 
conditions and policy dialogue. Second, and mainly on the basis of perceptions of participants, 
it will be assessed whether transactions costs of aid have diminished as a result of GBS.
Third, the effects on allocative efficiency of government expenditure are examined. While 
operational efficiency (or X-efficiency) measures the relation between inputs and outputs, 
allocative efficiency, or Pareto efficiency, concerns the efficiency gain in output that can be 
obtained by a better combination of different inputs - in this case, different types of spending. 
According to IDD and associates (2006: 51),5 allocative efficiency is “the degree to which 
resources are allocated according to the strategic priorities of the government”. However, it is 
difficult to know what the strategic priorities of the government are. It cannot be taken for 
granted that pro-poor spending is the strategic priority, as IDD and associates (2006) do.6 For 
this reason, we assume that the availability of more discretionary (non-earmarked) resources 
will enhance the chance that the government can spend according to its strategic priorities - 
unless there is a serious lack of predictability of these discretionary resources and unless 
donors require too much ring fencing of specific expenditure, e.g. pro-poor expenditure.
5 Apparently based on World Bank 1998, Public Expenditure Management Handbook. 
6 Woll (2008), for example, concluded for Ghana that Millennium Challenge Account investment was 
more in line with the government’s priorities than the pro-poor expenditure made for the GBS donors.
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Fourth, it is examined whether GBS through the assumed improved transparency of budgets 
and budget execution, has increased the government’s domestic accountability. This means 
investigating to what extent civil society and the public at large use the increased 
transparency to critically monitor government action and to formulate demands, and to 
what extent the government is responsive to these demands. Fifth, it will also be attempted 
to analyze the marginal macro-economic effect of GBS money, which is not different from 
the effect of all aid provided to the government. The additional money may lead to higher 
government expenditure, to a lower deficit, or to lower taxes. The first two are positive 
effects, the latter would be negative, meaning that GBS leads to a reduction in the country’s 
own efforts in raising resources.
The ultimate objective for GBS is assumed to be economic growth and sustainable poverty 
reduction. A direct link between GBS money and the possible achievement of these 
objectives cannot be established. EQ 4 therefore examines the results of government 
policies, since they have been supported by GBS money and have possibly been changed by 
the GBS policy dialogue. Although GBS money officially only began to flow in 2005, donors 
have supported the Bolaños government whose policy priorities were known at the 
beginning of the process. For this reason, we investigate the results of government policies 
of the full period of the Bolaños administration (2002-2006), as well as first results of the 
Ortega administration (since January 2007). First, we discuss the content of these policies 
and examine to what extent the objectives growth and poverty reduction were or are likely 
to be achieved. Second, we present the relevant macro-economic indicators, including 
income poverty indicators, and attempt to assess the contribution of government policies. 
Third, we examine government expenditure and revenue policies in order to assess whether 
and to what extent they have contributed to reducing income poverty and to improve social 
indicators. In order to do so, we analyze the incidence of expenditure and taxes, and the 
efficiency of government spending.
For this evaluation, many documents and papers have been studied. In March 2009 
interviews have been held in Nicaragua with representatives of donors, the current and 
previous government, as well as with independent experts. In May 2009, interviews have 
also been held in The Netherlands with Dutch staff involved in the start-up of budget 
support in both Nicaragua (Royal Netherlands Embassy) and The Netherlands. A first and 
incomplete draft of this report has been discussed with stakeholders in Nicaragua in 
October 2009, and in the same week some additional interviews were conducted. Finally, 
this report also benefitted from fieldwork in Nicaragua carried out by the first author in the 
context of an “Evaluation of International Debt Relief”, for the Dutch Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department (IOB, in 2002), and in the context of the study “Monitoring and 
Evaluation of Latin American Poverty Reduction Strategies”, for the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA, in 2004 and 2006).
It must be stated at the outset that the expectations and aspirations for GBS as aid modality 
are far too high. First, it cannot be expected that donors, even the more progressive ones, 
will set aside their own criteria and priorities for poverty reduction policies, let alone their 
own economic and foreign policy interests. This reduces the possibilities for donor 
Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua 2005-2008
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harmonization, but also for national ownership. To the extent that donors use GBS in order 
to impose their own priorities, this undermines ownership and may reduce government 
commitment with agreed policies. Second, in practice it may be impossible to achieve both 
socio-economic objectives and objectives with respect to governance. If donors withdraw 
their money because conditions with respect to good governance are not fulfilled, this may 
reduce chances for achieving growth and poverty reduction. As a result of these constraints 
and inherent contradictions, it is a priori impossible that this evaluation generates positive 
answers to all four Evaluation Questions.
In chapter 2, we start by analyzing whether GBS was relevant at the start: what were the 
motivations and objectives for GBS, were the preconditions fulfilled and could it be 
expected that GBS objectives would be achieved? We continue by examining how much and 
in what way GBS was provided in Nicaragua and whether the implementation meets the 
criteria of the Paris Declaration: harmonization, alignment, and ownership. This provides 
an answer to EQ 1. The next chapter examines the extent of donor influence through GBS, 
EQ 2. EQ 3 is answered in chapter 4, and chapter 5 deals with the results of government 
policies. Chapter 6 concludes.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we provide a short political-economic and 
historic background in Nicaragua, including the history of foreign aid in the country and 
the quality and results of the accompanying policy dialogue. Analyzing the background is 
important because it defines the context in which the relevance (ex ante) of providing 
budget support in this particular case can be assessed. In the following, we highlight first 
the economic and social developments in the country over the last 30 years, and then 
discuss the role of aid and in particular the results of the policy dialogue between 
government and donors in the period before the beginning of the Bolaños administration.
1.2 Backgroundandcontext
1.2.1 Politicaleconomichistory
Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in Latin America with a per capita income of USD 
1163 (2008).7 It has a turbulent political economic history. Between 1939 and 1979, the 
country was ruled almost continuously by the Somoza family under a dictatorship. Although 
economic growth was high during the 1950s and 60s, with real GDP rising at an average rate 
of 7 per cent a year,8 much of the Nicaraguan population lived in poverty and did not have 
access to education, health care or water and sanitation. In July 1979, after intensive fighting 
and destruction, especially during the last two years, the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front succeeded in expelling the Somoza regime.
7 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
8 Bulmer-Thomas, 1987, Appendix A.1, pp. 308-9.
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Between 1979 and 1990, Nicaragua was ruled by the left-wing Sandinistas. This government 
nationalized the banks and all property from the Somoza family. The rest of the 
economyrremained in private hands, but state influence was strong: the state allocated credits 
and foreign exchange and established many prices. A literacy campaign was launched and 
health and education services expanded. During the first years, the economy experienced 
positive growth rates, and the income distribution improved. However, these positive growth 
rates could not be maintained (Figure 1.1). This was partly due to policy inconsistencies and 
partly to external circumstances, in particular the hostility from the United States government. 
The US government imposed a trade embargo, impeded loans from multilateral organizations 
and, most seriously, financed the armed opposition to the Sandinista government which led 
to a devastating civil war. From 1984 onwards, output declined in every year and inflation 
accelerated, leading to hyperinflation in 1988. As the international organizations and also 
most Western donors withdrew, the economy became more and more dependent on support 
from the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries.
Source:WDI Online
The elections in 1990 led to a victory of the opposition under the leadership of President 
Violeta Chamorro. Hostilities came to an end and Western donors including the US started 
supporting Nicaragua again. In 1991, hyperinflation was successfully defeated and the 
country concluded an agreement with the IMF. The new government also immediately 
started with the liberalization of the foreign exchange market, liberalization of prices and 
privatization of the firms that had earlier been nationalized. Later during the 1990s, and in 
line with conditions of the IMF and donors such as World Bank, IDB and USAID, many other 
reforms were carried out, such as lowering import tariffs, liberalization of the financial 
sector, privatization of all state banks as well as some of the public utility companies. This 
was not a smooth process however, as the country remained highly polarized politically and 
the government had to fight many battles with FSLN dominated trade unions and peasant 
organizations, with former soldiers from both factions, with the National Assembly and 
with former owners of properties nationalized during the 1980s.
Figure 1.1 Economic growth, 1975-2007 (in percent)
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Table 1.2      External indicators Nicaragua, 1990-2008 (in millions of USD)
Exports Trade 
balance
Remittances Current 
account 
balance
Aid External 
public 
debt*
1990 331 -241 15 -509 481 10.7
1991 272 -397 15 -852 1144 10.3
1992 223 -575 10 -1130 648 10.8
1993 270 -409 25 -883 387 11.0
1994 335 -446 50 -912 580 11.7
1995 466 -415 75 -786 516 10.2
1996 466 -577 95 -882 537 6.1
1997 577 -794 150 -927 398 6.0
1998 573 -824 200 -820 485 6.3
1999 545 -1154 300 -1092 609 6.5
2000 645 -1003 320 -917 544 6.7
2001 895 -910 336 -805 536 6.4
2002 914 -939 377 -744 527 6.3
2003 1056 -971 439 -663 586 6.6
2004 1369 -1088 519 -649 652 5.4
2005 1654 -1302 616 -734 565 5.3
2006 2034 -1451 698 -710 640 4.5
2007 2336 -1759 740 -1001 689 3.4
2008 2675 -2173 818 -1475 413 3.5
*Billions of USD.
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
Although inflation remained low, budget deficits and balance of payments deficits 
continued to be high. Economic growth only resumed in 1994 and was still modest (Figure 
1.2). Although between 1991 and 1996, large amounts of debts, especially from former Soviet 
countries (including former Eastern Germany) and also from Mexico were cancelled, the 
external debt remained very high by the end of 1996, at around USD 6 billion (Table 1.2). The 
country was therefore highly dependent on foreign aid. During Ms. Chamorro’s Presidency 
this aid was coming in large amounts, but this changed after the 1996 elections in which 
Arnoldo Alemán of the liberal party PLC came to power. This leader of the PLC did not show 
any interest in cooperating with the donors. The country’s reserve position deteriorated 
rapidly, which ultimately brought the government to conclude a new agreement with the 
IMF in the form of an ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility), in 1998.
After hurricane Mitch struck the country in November 1998 Nicaragua received large 
amounts foreign aid again, as well as debt relief. But there were increasing signs of 
large-scale corruption by the President and his closest allies. In October 1999, the ruling 
liberal party made an agreement with the second largest party in the Assembly, the FSLN, in 
which they divided all seats of the Supreme Court, the Electoral Council, and several other 
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public bodies. This “Pacto” virtually meant the end of all parliamentary opposition and also 
of an independent judiciary. This added to the governance concerns of bilateral donors.
The 2001 elections were won by Enrique Bolaños of the same PLC, who had been Vice-
President under Alemán. However, one of his first actions was to have the corruption of his 
predecessor investigated. In August 2002 Alemán was indicted for misappropriating USD 97 
million during his Presidency. Later that year he was convicted and sent to jail. This gained 
Bolaños ample support from the donors. But almost all PLC members in the National 
Assembly continued to side with Alemán so that Bolaños did not have much support in 
Parliament. This made it very difficult for the Executive to carry out any policies for which 
new laws were necessary.
1.2.2 Foreignaid
During the 1990s, aid was very important to finance the budget deficit and the current 
account deficit. Between 1992 and 1997, the average budget deficit of the central 
government before grants was 10.7%, and after grants 4.0% (Dijkstra, 1999: 51). Between 
1990 and 1996, the volume of aid was always larger than that of exports (Table 1.2). After the 
government change in 1997, aid declined except for a peak after Hurricane Mitch. The 
relative importance of aid for the economy began to diminish from around 2000. Exports 
increased, and so did remittances. Yet, by 2002 aid still constituted [81 % of central 
government expenditure], 21% of imports and 14% of Gross National Income (Figure 1.2).
Source: WDI Online
The IDB is the largest donor to Nicaragua, with annual disbursements of about USD 100 
million. The World Bank used to be second with about USD 80 million, but is being 
surpassed in recent years by the European Commission (EC). Among the bilateral donors, 
Figure 1.2 Aid indicators, 1980-2007
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Spain has been most important between 2000 and 2007 (20% of all bilateral plus EC), 
followed by the US (14%), and then Germany (13%), Japan (7%), Sweden (6%), Denmark 
(6%), and the Netherlands (5%) (OECD-DAC). This composition of the bilateral donor group 
implies that the largest amounts of aid are provided by donors who are not very much in 
favor of program aid: Spain, US, and Japan.
During the 1990s, most program aid was provided by multilateral donors in the form of 
structural adjustment loans or sector adjustment loans. But bilateral donors also provided 
program aid (grants) in the form of balance of payment support or debt relief. Debt relief  
could imply forgiveness on debt service obligations to the donor itself, or taking over the 
government’s debt service obligations to the international financial institutions. An IMF 
agreement was always a pre-condition for these forms of program aid. Nicaragua started 
IMF programs in 1991, 1994 and 1998. Figure 1.3 shows that program aid peaked in those 
years, and was lower in other years. This was because the governments usually stopped 
complying with IMF conditions in the year after the agreement. In 1999 this was different, 
mainly as a result of more flexible conditions after hurricane Mitch.
Source: BCN. 
During the Chamorro administration, several bilateral donors were concerned about the 
fragile democracy, and they maintained a dialogue with the government on those issues. 
There was no difference between donors willing to provide program aid or not.9 The 
dialogue on economic reforms was left to IMF and World Bank, although some bilateral 
donors began to be concerned about the social consequences of budget cuts. In 1997, a 
group of “like-minded donors” was formed, consisting of Denmark, Finland, Germany, The 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, with the objective of trying to influence the draft of the 
ESAF. In particular, they wanted more attention for governance issues, in particular control 
of corruption, for poverty reduction expenditure and they wanted to eliminate the priority 
9 For example, the Support Group for Nicaragua, installed by the General Assembly of the UN and which 
played a role in a conflict between Executive and National Assembly on a reform to the Constitution in 
1995, consisted of Canada, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands and Mexico (Dijkstra 1999). 
Figure 1.3 Program aid and total aid to Nicaragua, 1990-2008 (inmillions of USD)
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for US citizens in granting indemnity for confiscated properties under the Sandinista 
government (Dijkstra, 1999). They were successful with respect to the indemnity issue, and 
managed to include a clause in the ESAF that social spending was allowed to increase if fully 
financed by foreign aid. To this end, the government established the Fondo Social 
Supplementario (Supplementary Social Fund, FSS). Donors could contribute to this fund for 
specific projects or for social spending in general, which would then be additional. But the 
like-minded donors were not able to include demands on governance. As described above, 
“Mitch” led to large amounts of aid and debt relief, but donors were increasingly concerned 
about governance, in particular, the Pacto and rampant corruption.
1.2.3 Thepolicydialogueuntil2003
On the basis of its huge foreign debt, Nicaragua qualified, in principle, for the enhanced 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) Initiative that was launched in 1999. In order to meet 
conditions for the Decision Point, the government wrote an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper. The other condition was to show a six year compliance with IMF agreements. This was 
far more difficult and by 2000 the country was not even on track with the current 1998 ESAF. But 
the IMF gave a waiver “because of Mitch” so that the Decision Point was achieved in December 
2000. Nicaragua benefited from the “Millennium rush”: the international desire to admit as 
many eligible countries as possible to the Decision Point of the HIPC Initiative. A full PRSP with 
participation was one of the conditions for the Completion Point. With Presidential elections 
approaching in November 2001, both donors and government had an interest in rushing 
through the approval of the full PRSP, which happened in August 2001 (Dijkstra & Evans, 2003). 
However, program aid from bilateral donors was hardly provided due to the serious 
concerns about corruption of the Alemán government. Some few contributions were made 
to the FSS, and following the donor conference for Central America in Stockholm in 
response to the hurricane, several donors set up the Central American Emergency Trust 
Fund which implied temporary suspensions of debt service payments. In July 2001 the IMF 
decided to have a staff-monitored program with Nicaragua. 
Apart from writing a full PRSP, the country had to meet a long list of conditions for meeting 
the Completion Point.10 The (new) government should conclude a new IMF program and 
show a satisfactory performance for at least a year, should use the HIPC interim debt relief 
for poverty reduction expenditure, and had to implement several other structural reforms 
such as civil service reform, public procurement and pension reforms and the privatization 
of the Nicaraguan telephone company ENITEL. In this period there was again a group of 
like-minded bilateral donors, composed of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, the UK 
and the Netherlands, while Germany and Canada sometimes also joined. This group 
attempted to include conditions related to governance in this list of reforms. But they did 
not succeed in influencing the IMF or the World Bank (Dijkstra and Evans, 2003). All in all, 
the often expressed governance concerns of bilateral donors in the period 1997-2002 did not 
have much influence on the government or on the multilateral institutions.
10 After this Point, debt relief according to the HIPC Initiative would become irreversible.
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2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to assess the expected advantages of budget support in the 
Nicaraguan context. To this end, the first part of this chapter assesses the origin and 
motivations for budget support in Nicaragua. It examines the objectives and rationales of 
the donors and assesses whether the preconditions as mentioned by the donors, were 
fulfilled at the start of the process. Special attention will be given to Dutch motivation and 
risk analysis in the decision to provide budget support. The second part of the chapter 
describes the particular form that the joint system of budget support has taken in 
Nicaragua, and examines whether the budget support practice has furthered some of the 
principles of the Paris Declaration, in particular harmonization, ownership, alignment, and 
predictability. In this context, the actually provided budget support resources 2005-2008 
will also be presented, both in historical context and in relation to total aid to Nicaragua.
2.2 Objectivesandconditions
2.2.1 Introduction
This section describes the preconditions for general budget support for the different donors 
and analyzes to what extent these preconditions were fulfilled at the start of the process, 
during 2003-2005. It also discusses the specific motivations and objectives for budget 
support, with particular attention to the Dutch motivations and objectives. 
As described above, President Bolaños immediately started to act against the corruption of 
his predecessor. This gained him a lot of credit among bilateral donors and removed an 
important obstacle for program aid. In November 2002, the new government concluded an 
agreement with the IMF. This formally freed the way for program aid, as an IMF agreement 
is an important pre-condition for the policy based loans of World Bank and IDB and for 
program aid from bilateral donors. Since debt relief or balance of payments support were 
not considered necessary anymore, and in line with the dominant consensus on aid 
effectiveness at that time, donors wanted to move to (General) Budget Support.
In the absence of (as yet) a joint system for providing GBS, bilateral donors had three 
options: giving the money right away, co-financing of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Credit 
(PRSC) of the World Bank, or supply the money to the Fondo Social Suplementario 
(Supplementary Social Fund – FSS). Germany preferred the co-financing mode, some other 
donors provided money to the FSS: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden in 2003, 
and Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland in 2004. In 2004, Sweden provided 
general budget support without any further conditions. The EC began to prepare its own 
sector budget support program, leading to an Education sector support program in 2004.
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The FSS, established in 1999, was a list of projects that were already financed by three 
donors: USAID, the IDB and the World Bank. The earlier bilateral contributions (Sweden in 
1999 and the Netherlands in 2000) had mainly been used to finance the counterpart funds 
for these projects (Dijkstra & Evans, 2003). In 2003, the FSS changed into something that 
was more like a virtual fund in which poverty reduction expenditure would be registered. It 
would be “fed” by HIPC debt relief, by donor contributions for poverty reduction and by the 
government’s own contributions. But the bilateral donors involved still considered the FSS 
as too much project-like. Projects were still individually discussed and approved. Another 
reason for considering the FSS as sub-optimal, especially for the Dutch government, was 
that this modality lacked the possibility for influence on both governance and on poverty 
policies in the country.
For these reasons, Sweden and The Netherlands took the initiative for setting up a Budget 
Support Group (BSG), with the aim of establishing, together with the government, a 
harmonized system for GBS. In May 2003, this group consisted of two multilateral donors 
(The European Commission11 and the World Bank) and eight bilateral donors (Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and The Netherlands).12 Several other 
donors, such as the IDB, Japan, USAID and UNDP participated as “observers”.
 
The general motivation for the involved donors was that they subscribed the international 
consensus for improving aid effectiveness (the 2003 Rome Declaration and later the 2005 
Paris Declaration). In principle, GBS is the aid modality that best guarantees national 
ownership and alignment with national systems. If it leads to the elimination of a large 
amount of projects, and if donors coordinate their disbursement conditions and procedures, 
it is also the best way to achieve donor harmonization. However, usually, the donors want 
certain preconditions to be fulfilled before they begin to consider providing GBS. 
In Nicaragua, by 2004, the donors considered the following three broad preconditions 
important (Guimarães et al., 2004):
• Macroeconomic stability, which for the majority implied that there was an ongoing IMF 
program
• An approved Poverty Reduction Strategy or a similar consensus-based national 
development plan in which poverty reduction plays an important role
• A basis of transparency and efficiency in public finance management, or at least a positive 
trend in this.
With respect to this third precondition, some donors were more exigent than others. For 
example, a minimum degree of budget transparency was very important for KfW (Germany) 
while the Swiss wished to see a serious Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) in 
place.13 Some donors expressed additional concerns or conditions. For Sweden the 
11 The European Commission in Nicaragua currently considers itself to be a “bilateral” donor.
12 Denmark moved out during the preparatory phase. This donor is worldwide much more hesitant to 
start with budget support due to concerns about fiduciary risks in particular. 
13 An MTEF implies that governments make estimates of expenditure for 3 years ahead. It allows much 
better planning of, in particular, investment.
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commitment to poverty reduction was important, as shown in actual policies. The Swedes 
monitored the indicators and targets mentioned in the World Bank’s PRSC that had started 
in January 2004. For the Netherlands, an important criterion for providing GBS was that 
there were observable improvements in governance. This not only implied public finance 
management and control of corruption, but also issues like an independent judiciary and 
civil service reforms. We now describe the development in these three groups of conditions 
in the years 2003-2005. Governance is taken as part of the third group.
2.2.2 MacroeconomicstabilityandHIPCCompletionPoint
The new government quickly succeeded in reducing the budget deficit and in meeting the 
other quantitative targets of the IMF, so that a PRGF (Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) 
could be agreed in November 2002. This program was still on track in 2004. The country also 
met the other conditions for the HIPC Completion Point. Although President Bolaños did 
not have much support in the National Assembly, all deputies were convinced of the 
urgency of receiving HIPC debt relief. For this reason, the government managed to get all 
the laws approved that were required for achieving the Completion Point. These included 
laws that were important for several bilateral donors, such as the Financial management 
law that envisages, among other things, annual audits of public expenditure by the 
Supreme Audit Institution (SAI), and a civil service reform law that establishes merit-based 
careers for civil servants. 
The country achieved the Completion Point of the HIPC Initiative in January 2004 and as a 
result HIPC debt relief became irreversible. Formally, all conditions were met and donors 
could provide budget support. However, after reaching this Completion Point, the 
temporary cooperation between the Executive and the Legislative power came to an end. In 
addition, it was by no means clear that the government would be willing or able to 
implement the approved laws.
2.2.3 PRSP
The situation with respect to the Poverty Reduction Strategy was ambiguous. The Bolaños 
government had rejected the PRSP prepared by the previous administration, the ERCERP. 
However, since having a PRSP was important for achieving the HIPC Completion Point, it 
did write Progress Reports on this strategy. In the meantime it presented its own National 
Development Plan (PND), which was very different from the earlier ERCERP. This PND was 
not accepted by the donors as new PRSP. The main criticisms on contents were that there 
was too little attention for the social sectors and for social protection and that it was not 
sufficiently operational. Although the donors recognized that this strategy was much more 
owned by the (executive) government than the previous one, they criticized the lack of 
consultations with society at large.
Donors responded to this situation in different ways. The World Bank based its Poverty 
Reduction Support Credit on the old PRSP. This PRSC was approved in January 2004 and 
received co-financing from KfW (Germany). The European Commission (EC) also began to 
| 32 | 
2 The implementation of budget support
provide sector budget support (for education) in 2004 on the basis of the old PRSP. Most 
bilateral donors, however, continued to press the government for making a revised PND, 
and World Bank and EC argued that this was also needed for a next disbursement (WB) and 
for another sector budget support program (EC).
Some donors, including the Netherlands, began to financially support consultations on the 
strategy through the Technical Planning Secretariat of the Presidency (SETEC). In practice, 
consultations were held in all territories and departments in the country. During these 
meetings the implications of the national strategy for a specific department or territory were 
discussed and they often led to lists of projects that the regions wanted to see executed 
(Guimaraes et al., 2005). Dutch decision makers of the time remember the consultations as a 
serious attempt to get people involved in development policies, “much better than in most 
other countries”, although they do recognize that the meetings often just resulted in wish lists. 
At the national level, the plan was only once discussed in the CONPES, an advisory organ 
with participation of civil society, and not at all in the National Assembly. This meant that 
the general assumptions and strategic options of the plan have never been discussed 
seriously (Guimarães et al., 2005). With hindsight, a high government officer of the time 
admits that the Plan had not sufficiently been shared and discussed with the political 
parties in the National Assembly and it therefore could not be expected to survive the 
Presidential elections.14 
In October 2004, the government came up with its Operational PND (PND-O). But this 
version was still not fully acceptable to the donors. Finally, the government presented 
another version of the PND in November 2005, and this version was approved by the 
donors, including the Boards of the IFIs, as “second PRSP”. Apparently, the lack of an 
approved Plan did not prevent the joint budget support scheme from coming about, as the 
Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) was signed in May 2005.It can be argued that what really 
mattered, more than having an approved plan, was the government’s commitment to poverty 
reduction. The original PND and all other public statements of the Bolaños government 
made it clear that achieving economic growth was its first priority. It wished to focus 
attention on growth clusters (agricultural exports, free zones) and had a strong belief in 
automatic “trickle down” effects. Policies would foster foreign investment and the resulting 
growth was expected to benefit the poor. In 2003 and 2004, most donors, including the 
Netherlands, thought that this focus on economic growth was welcome after the perhaps 
too one-sided attention for poverty reduction and the social sectors in the first PRSP. 
Although most donors were asking for more attention for social expenditure in the text of 
the PND, there was only a single donor expressing doubts on the “sensitivity” for poverty 
reduction among the current government.15
14 Interview March 2009.
15 Interviews held in 2004 with donors in Managua.
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2.2.4 GovernanceandPFM
With respect to public finance management, the general opinion among the donor 
community was that transparency of public expenditure was improving. Most donors of the 
BSG were, in one way or another, involved in technical assistance programs for the 
improvement of public finance management, which also helped in raising confidence that 
the situation would improve. From 2004 onwards, the World Bank provided a Public Sector 
Technical Assistance Credit (PSTAC) which was co-financed by Denmark, DfID, Finland, the 
Netherlands and Sweden (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007). One of its components was the 
expansion of the System for Financial Administration (SIGFA) which led to more control of 
actual expenditure. SIGFA, already introduced in the 1990s, was improved and extended to 
other state entities. Other components of PSTAC included strengthening of financial 
management by introducing a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF, first applied in 
the 2006 budget but in practice due to Swiss support), setting up a structure for negotiating 
and monitoring general budget support in the Ministry of Finance, fostering a law to 
introduce administrative careers, and supporting a public ethics office and improving the 
national public investment system. The EC had its own program for technical assistance 
which, among other activities, supported the government in its negotiations on GBS, and 
the Swiss provided assistance specifically for the setting up of an MTEF. 
The general governance situation was difficult. Once the HIPC Completion point was 
achieved, the Executive lost all support from Parliament. Many laws that were approved 
could not be implemented for lack of approval of further regulations by the National 
Assembly. For much the executive government wanted to cooperate with the donors in 
working towards a more independent judiciary or a national audit by the SAI, it did not have 
any influence on these agencies or on Parliament. The Pacto was still in existence and 
implied that the two political parties dominated all these institutions. Democracy was also 
lacking within those political parties, as the caudillo (strong man) culture dominated. This 
prevented change from coming about.
2.2.5 Dutchmotivations,conditionsandobjectives
For the Netherlands, the general motivation for GBS as method to improve aid effectiveness 
was important. The Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) had many different projects in 
Nicaragua and wanted to get rid of this project proliferation. Two other factors were 
important;16 first, the fact that President Bolaños was acting against corruption and had put 
his predecessor Alemán in jail, and second, that there was a development strategy that was 
perceived as much more owned than the previous one, while the government also made a 
serious attempt to broaden this ownership by organizing the departmental consultations.17
The Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2005-2008 (MASP) of the RNE sees political and institutional 
changes as necessary for poverty reduction (RNE, 2004). In this context, it defines “just and 
16 Interviews held in May 2009 in The Netherlands
17 Comment from authors: with Dutch money.
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democratic governance” as its main objective, and “budget support that promotes governance” 
as its first strategic result. The same MASP states that the Embassy expects that, by means of a 
joint budget support scheme, it will be able to exercise leverage on two levels: on the Executive 
level for the promotion of transparency, accountability and for improvements in public finance 
management, and on the National Assembly in areas such as reform of the judiciary and equity.
These expectations, and in particular these motivations and objectives for budget support were 
confirmed in recent interviews with Embassy staff and other key decision makers at the time in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague.18 According to one interviewed former Embassy 
staff member, the confidence in poverty reduction policies of the Bolaños administration was 
weak, yet there were no signs of worsening poverty at the time. Also in The Hague, poverty 
reduction was “no issue” at that time. The main rationale for providing GBS was to improve 
governance. Specifically, the Dutch government wished to support the Executive in its fight 
with the National Assembly so that the latter would approve the proposed laws that would 
reform the civil service, the pension system, and the judiciary, among other institutions.
This confirms that at the start of the process, the most important aim for GBS was to 
improve governance, apparently from a strong presumption that this was a necessary 
condition for achieving poverty reduction. It was expected that the mechanism for 
providing GBS, - with agreed policies and targets in a Performance Assessment Matrix that 
would be monitored twice a year - , would guarantee that poverty reduction policies would 
be carried out. GBS would be a much better means to these ends than the alternatives, such 
as providing money to the FSS or co-financing to the World Bank’s PRSC: in both of these 
cases it would not be possible to exert influence on governance.
Yet there were also other opinions, both within the Ministry in the Hague and within the 
Embassy. Some were more hesitant on using the budget support instrument in Nicaragua, and 
others even took the position that the governance situation in the country did not meet the 
conditions for GBS at all. There was no independent judiciary, no democracy within political 
parties and there was too much corruption. In this view, corruption during the Bolaños 
administration was perhaps more sophisticated than under the previous government, but 
nevertheless it did still occur. The opinions also varied on the Bolaños government’s 
commitment to poverty reduction. Some believed strongly that economic growth and foreign 
investment would automatically reduce poverty, while others were of the view that the 
Bolaños administration did not have enough attention for the living conditions of the poor.
The MASP 2005-2008 extensively lists the risks mentioned above: the caudillismo within 
political parties, the weak rule of law, upcoming elections and therefore more politicization, 
weak interest among the government in social themes, the lack of parliamentary support for 
the government, and the non-poor interests that dominate the political parties. Yet, it 
unambiguously opts for providing GBS, and proposes to increase the amount from € 9 million 
in 2005 to € 12 million in 2008, and in the “high-case” scenario to € 15 million (RNE, 2004: 16).
18 There was agreement on this between former Embassy staff and former staff of DEK, the department 
that was responsible for GBS.
Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua 2005-2008
| 35 | 
2.2.6 Conclusion
The expectation of higher aid effectiveness, in line with the Paris Declaration, was the most 
important motivation for starting budget support. In addition, at a general level donors had 
confidence in the Bolaños’ government: its policy priorities (economic growth and 
macro-economic stability), and its willingness to fight corruption - evidenced from the 
jailing of former President Alemán - , and to modernize the state, in issues such as 
improving PFM, building career perspectives in civil service and improving the rule of law.
However, it can be doubted whether the conditions for budget support were fulfilled. First, 
the political risks were underestimated, as also concluded by Gosparini et al. (2006). In fact, 
the Bolaños government had no support in Parliament so it was very unlikely to carry out its 
governance modernization agenda that pleased the donors so much. Donors were 
over-optimistic in thinking that by talking to and supporting this executive they could 
change deep institutional and political structures in the country.
Second, the donors had a far too rosy picture of the intentions of the Bolaños government 
itself. Donors knew or could know that the government did not give priority to investing in 
poverty reduction. Some donors agreed with the government that with private sector 
growth, poverty reduction would follow automatically (overlooking the fact that a large part 
of the donors’ poverty reduction agenda depended on quality and targeting of government 
social expenditure). Others donors expected to address this government shortcoming in the 
policy dialogue accompanying budget support. It can be doubted whether budget support is 
relevant at all if a crucial condition, namely commitment to poverty reduction, is missing.
Third, among the objectives for general budget support there was a heavy emphasis on 
governance issues on the assumption that improving governance (in the direction of 
bringing about developed-country like institutions) is a necessary condition for growth and 
poverty reduction. However, more recent empirical research questions the empirical basis 
for this assertion (Holmberg et al., 2009; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007). In addition, “first best” 
institutional solutions often do not work in a “second best” environment, and may even be 
harmful (Rodrik, 2008).
2.3 BudgetSupportandParisDeclarationPinciples
2.3.1 TheprocessleadingtotheJFAandthefirstPAM
The Budget Support Group aimed at defining common conditions and procedures for GBS. But 
the process was not easy and took a long time. There were several reasons for this.19
First, both the government and most donor representatives had little experience with and little 
knowledge of general budget support and how it is commonly provided. The World Bank invited 
experts to explain what a performance assessment matrix (PAM) was, and what kind of indicators 
were feasible in terms of data availability, and how the monitoring process could be organized.
19 Interviews March 2009 Nicaragua and May 2009, The Netherlands.
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Second, some of the donors forming part of the BSG had already started their own budget 
support programs and wanted to include these programs in the joint system. The World 
Bank had started its PRSC in 2004 with a long list of policies and measures to be 
implemented and also some outcome indicators. It wanted to take this PRSC as basis and 
invited the other donors to co-finance it. However, the bilateral donors were generally of 
the view that the PAM should focus on results oriented targets (outcomes) and should not 
include policies and measures (processes). This would leave more autonomy (ownership) to 
the government. This controversy provoked lengthy discussions among the donors. The EC 
had started an education sector program, in which the money would be transferred to the 
general budget (Treasury) but with many agreed policies and targets for the education 
sector. It also wanted to include them in the PAM. In the end, the PAM implied a 
compromise and included some of the WB policies and EC targets.
Third, the confusion with respect to the PRSP played a role. Rather than using the PRSC as 
basis for a PAM, the bilateral donors preferred using the revised PND (PND-O) because that 
was much more owned by the government. However, it took a long time before the PND-O 
appeared. Fourth, although the government was interested in setting up a joint GBS system, 
it did not always give a high priority to it. Given the adverse political climate, it needed all 
its time and energy to get some support for its policies within the National Assembly.
A fifth reason was that it was a complex process in which many actors were involved. The 
donors wanted to involve not only the Ministry of Finance in the discussions on indicators to 
be met, but also other government agencies. At the start of the negotiations, there was little 
coordination between Finance and the line ministries. Representatives of the donors began 
to consult with sector ministries directly. Another strategy was to involve the sector 
roundtables (consisting of government, donors and sometimes also civil society 
representatives) on the definition of suitable targets. All this was very labor intensive and 
took a long time.
In May 2005, nine donors finally signed the Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) and agreed 
on the PAM. The JFA defined the procedures for providing GBS, with an annual Meeting in 
May of year n in which the achievement of the past year (n-1) would be assessed. Within four 
weeks after the meeting, donors would indicate their preliminary commitments for the next 
year (n+1). In the Mid-Year Meeting in August, the country’s performance in year n would be 
assessed and within four weeks after that the commitments for year n+1 would be 
confirmed, so that they could be included in the government budget for n+1. The JFA also 
defined some fundamental principles that both donors and government had to abide with. 
In case of non compliance with the fundamental principles, disbursements could be 
withheld. These fundamental principles are “commitments to international law and conflict 
prevention, respect for human rights, democratic principles including free and fair 
elections, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic 
processes, accountability and the fight against corruption, sound macro-economic policies 
and commitment to poverty reduction”.20 
20 Joint Financing Agreement on General Budget Support, May 2005. 
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However, it was not very clear how these principles would be used. Some of them, like the 
independence of the judiciary, were not fulfilled at the start, and several others principles 
were also very weakly present, if at all. In addition, for none of them a minimum level was 
defined so that it was impossible for the government to know in what case disbursements 
would be at risk. The discussions among donors and between donors and government for a 
long time only focused on the PAM. The fundamental principles were added later with hardly 
any discussion.21 According to Dutch Embassy staff involved at the time, they were included 
to make it clear to the government and to the country that some thresholds should not be 
surpassed. As examples, they mentioned a military coup or the release of Alemán from jail.22
The PAM on which the donors finally agreed contained a total of 161 policies, measures and 
indicators for a period of two years (2005-2006). According to all parties involved, this was far 
too much. The high number was the result of the fact that all donors wished to include their 
priorities, while the same held true for all government agencies. Although the JFA was clear 
on a time schedule for the monitoring of the PAM and of the consequences, also in this case 
it was not clear how it was going to be used. What percentage of the total would have to be 
met in order for disbursements to follow? Were all indicators of the same weight? Obviously, 
different donors attached different priorities to the indicators and policies.
  
During the long and intensive period of negotiations, some risks involved in budget 
support were reduced, and others increased. Between 2003 and 2005 there were clear 
improvements in the government’s financial administration and financial management.  
By end-2004 a new PND appeared that presumably had benefited from extensive regional 
consultations. On the other hand, May 2005 was only one year and a half before the next 
presidential elections which meant that the climate would become even more politicized 
than it already was, and that President Bolaños would have even less authority to get things 
done. This became immediately clear when two weeks after signing the agreement, the IMF 
declared its program with the country off track. The problem was not that the financial 
targets were not met, but that the National Assembly failed to approve certain laws that 
were considered indispensable for macro-economic stability in the medium term. Since one 
of the conditions of the PAM was macro-economic stability “to be defined by the IMF”, the 
budget support donors had to define their position (see chapter 3). 
 
2.3.2 Budgetsupportandharmonization
The JFA was signed by the ministers of Finance and of Public Affairs of Nicaragua, and by 
nine donors: the European Commission, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the World Bank. The IDB was mentioned as 
signatory in the JFA but in the end did not sign, because a “legal problem” prevented its 
participation. This means that several important aid donors in Nicaragua were not part of 
the GBS agreement: Japan, the United States, UNDP, Spain, and the IDB, reducing donor 
harmonization. However, representatives of these donor agencies could attend the 
21 Interviews with several donors in Nicaragua, March 2009.
22 Interviews The Hague May 2009.
| 38 | 
2 The implementation of budget support
meetings of the Budget Support Working Group and the Budget Support Technical Working 
Groups (established by sector) as observers, at least until early 2008. This facilitated the flow 
of information and thus donor coordination to some extent. However, along with these 
coordination mechanisms for the operation of GBS, other donor coordinating bodies 
continued to exist: the Mesa Global (Broad Roundtable) for the representatives and 
ambassadors, and sector roundtables for the donor agencies’ sector specialists and 
representatives of the government sector agencies. The Mesa Global’s task was to carry on 
the overall dialogue between donors and government, and the sector roundtables dealt 
with the dialogue around all aid activities. This implied continued high transactions costs 
for both the government and for donor representatives. In the first year of the JFA (2005), 
the co-existence of the Mesa Global with high-level meetings on budget support caused 
some irritation among government officers, because it led to a duplication of discussions 
(Guimarães and Avendaño, 2007). In later years, however, the importance of the Mesa 
Global was greatly reduced. 
In the course of time, the composition of the JFA donor group changed. With a new 
representative in Nicaragua, the IDB finally joined at the end of in 2007. On the other hand, 
the headquarters of two bilateral donors decided to phase out their assistance to Nicaragua 
and therefore to also finish their budget support: Sweden made this decision in 2007 and 
the UK in 2008. Sweden continued to be a member of the group until early 2008 and DfID 
until early 2009. At the end of 2007, the German Parliament suspended general budget 
support worldwide awaiting a study of this modality by its National Audit Office. Although 
the conclusions in March 2008 were not negative, governance became even more important 
as an entry condition for Germany. No new disbursements were announced but the country 
continued to be a member of the BSG.
Although observers (donors not contributing to budget support) could still participate in the 
BSG meetings, in 2008 they were no longer admitted to the meetings with the government.23 
This was probably related to the fact that the political dialogue between donors and 
government was deteriorating. Donors qualified the non-invitation of observers to the 2008 
mid-year meeting as indicating a reduced openness of the government.24 At the end of 2008, 
the active members of the BSG were the European Commission, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, the IDB and the World Bank, while Germany was a non-contributing 
member.
 
Most donors that did participate in the JFA continued with other aid modalities as well. GBS 
implied between 25 (WB) and 90 (EC) per cent of total aid from these donors. This means all 
these donors were also still involved in project aid and/or in sector support; modalities in 
which harmonization in Nicaragua was less advanced than in general budget support. However, 
given the risks involved in GBS, this use of different aid modalities was probably a good choice.
23 In 2009, observers were again invited to a high-level meeting.
24 According to the Report of the meeting.
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With respect to donor harmonization within the JFA, the text of the JFA holds that bilateral 
agreements between individual donors and government take precedence over the JFA. 
Some specific bilateral conditions are already included in the JFA, for example, that the 
Nicaraguan Parliament has to approve a budget consistent with PRS priorities (Switzerland) 
or that Nicaragua must be on schedule with payments to KfW (for Germany). The World 
Bank continues to identify specific disbursement “triggers” related to its PRSC. Both the EC 
and Switzerland apply a so-called split response mechanism: part of disbursements (the 
“fixed tranche” in the EC system and the “general portion” in the Swiss system) are linked to 
a general assessment of the PAM and the fundamental principles. Another part is linked to 
the degree of performance in specific indicators. For Switzerland these are indicators linked 
to Public financial management and private sector development (each 25% of total flow). 
The EC defines “variable tranches” for each of its sector budget support programs. In the EC 
education sector program, for example, results in the education sector in year n-1 and 
during the course of year n are assessed, and disbursement of the variable tranch in year n+1 
can be 0%, 50% or 100% depending on the degree of fulfillment. More implicitly, all 
agencies have their own priorities within the PAM and the fundamental principles, and 
these priorities will heavily influence actual disbursement. Chapter 3 deals with the 
different donor responses to breaches in compliance with the conditions.
2.3.3 Extentofnationalownership
As described above, providing GBS was an initiative of the donors. The donors began discussing 
the idea and also began discussing among each other the indicators and policies for the PAM. 
The President and the highest government officers had an interest in receiving as much donor 
support as possible, especially since domestic support was so limited. The Ministry of Finance 
obviously had an interest in receiving the funds because GBS funds are transferred directly to it. 
However, although there was government ownership of the idea of GBS, ownership of JFA 
and PAM was partial. With respect to the fundamental principles, donors and the executive 
agreed to a large extent: for example on the adherence to democratic principles, an 
independent judiciary, the rule of law, and the need for macroeconomic stability. But this 
ownership was limited to top political officers of the Bolaños government and did not 
extend to the dominant political parties or the National Assembly.
On the other hand, representatives of the government expressed that there was very little 
government ownership of the PAM (with the exception of macro-economic stability and 
PFM). This already held for the PRSC: negotiators at the time felt that they had very little 
influence on the policies and indicators included in the PRSC. There was “heavy 
conditionality”.25 This did not change with the PAM. The indicators reflected donor 
interests, much more than government interest (Gosparini et al., 2006). Donors, including 
the IDB that ended up not-signing, tried to use the PAM for influencing government sector 
policies - in sectors in which they also carried out projects. In fact, many of the targets and 
indicators reflected current donor projects. The Ministry of Finance, which was the 
25 Interviews government officers,  2004.
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coordinating agency for budget support, felt uneasy with several policy conditions as they 
often concerned the work of other ministries and there was little coordination within the 
government. This was even worse if donor wishes had to be met by agencies on which the 
executive had no control whatsoever, such as the SAI, the Judiciary and the National 
Assembly. During the second year of the JFA, 2006, the coordination with line agencies went 
somewhat better. This was partly due to PAI-NIC, the technical assistance program of the 
European Commission.26 According to the donors, the dialogue with the government 
improved during the second year because they (the donors) also began to meet directly with 
the National Assembly and with the SAI.27 All in all, the government representatives felt that 
GBS was accompanied by heavy conditionality. For the amount of influence the donors tried 
to exert, they provided far too little money, in their view.28
With the new government from early 2007 onward, the national ownership changed.  
The Ortega government had an interest in continuing GBS, basically because of the freely 
spendable funds. But this government did not subscribe many of the fundamental 
principles, and attempted to eliminate them from the JFA. This was not accepted by the 
donors and the JFA was not changed. Nevertheless, the donors were willing, in principle,  
to continue GBS and decided to give the government the “benefit of the doubt”. As will be 
analyzed in the next chapter, this led to increasingly difficult discussions on elements of,  
or related to, the fundamental principles.
On the other hand, ownership of the PAM increased. During its first annual meeting, the 
government made it clear that it wanted to change the PAM in order to bring it more in line 
with its own priorities. After intensive discussions, a new PAM came about, with fewer 
indicators and policies. According to all respondents, these indicators and policies were 
more realistic and easier to achieve than the previous ones. Some donors even qualified 
some of the new indicators as having little validity.29 It was clear that this time it was much 
more the government’s PAM.
 
2.3.4 AmountsofGBS2005-2008
The Central Bank of Nicaragua registers all aid disbursements (loans and grants) to 
Nicaragua and keeps track of “liquid” aid resources versus aid directed to projects. Liquid 
resources is in fact program aid. After 2000, budget support (general or sector) was its 
largest component, although there was still some balance of payments support. Table 2.1 
shows that program aid in general, and budget support in particular, has been small relative 
to total aid disbursements 2000-2008, although in 2004 (pre-JFA), 2006 and 2007 the 
amounts were substantial and exceeded USD 100 million. In the years 2004 and 2006, 
budget support constituted more than 10 per cent of the government budget (and about 
2.5% of GDP), but in other years this share was more modest. Yet, total aid in most years 
26 Interview former government officer, March 2009.
27 Interview with donor representatives 2006.
28 Interviews government officers, 2006.
29 For example, the share of women benefiting from the new Hambre Cero program (handing our cattle to 
poor rural inhabitants) was not considered a good indicator for gender equality or women’s rights.
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amounted to more than half of the budget and more than 10 per cent of GDP. It is clear that 
project aid was still the dominant aid modality.
On average, program aid represented 13.3 % of total aid between 2005 and 2008, and 5.9 % 
of total expenditure. This is higher than between 2001 and 2004, when the relative figures 
were 7.2 and 4.2 %, respectively. However, if we look at a longer time frame, program aid has 
become less important. Between 1995 and 2000, the share of program aid in total aid was 
22% (Dijkstra & Komives, 2008), see also Figure 1.3. 
Table 2.1 also shows that year-to-year fluctuations in budget support disbursements were 
large. This is to a large extent due to ups and downs in the policy dialogue with the 
government (see next chapter).
The European Commission was the largest budget support donor between 2005 and 2008, with 
24.7 percent of total resources provided (Table 2.2). The World Bank and IDB also provided large 
amounts - but these banks disbursed loans, not grants.30 The Netherlands was the third donor 
and the largest bilateral donor of budget support, with a 16.4% share in the total.
30 IDB did provide budget support, even before being a member of the JFA. 
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Table 2.1      Budget support, program aid, and total aid (in millions of USD, and in per cent  
                        if so indicated)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
2001-04
Average
2005-08
Total budget 
support
7.9 0.0 31.2 25.2 109.3 40.2 131.9 98.5 30.0 41.4 75.2
   Loans 0.0 0.0 14.9 0.0 50.9 5.2 62.6 45.7 0.0 16.5 28.4
   Grants 7.9 0.0 16.3 25.2 58.4 35.0 69.3 52.8 30.0 25.0 46.8
BOP support 4.0 3.7 2.7 2.4 1.1 11.2 0.7 10.6 0.8 2.5 5.8
Total 
Program aid
11.9 3.7 33.9 27.5 110.4 51.3 132.7 109.1 30.7 43.9 81.0
Total aid 544.0 536.0 527.0 586.0 652.0 565.0 640.0 689.0 413.0 575.0 577.0
Budget 
support as % 
of total aid
1.5 0.0 5.9 4.3 16.8 7.1 20.6 14.3 7.3 6.7 12.3
Program aid 
as % of total 
aid
2.2 0.7 6.4 4.7 16.9 9.1 20.7 15.8 7.4 7.2 13.3
Total public 
expenditure, 
USD, 
budgeted
847.0 1093.0 924.0 933.0 1008.0 967.0 1247.0 1385.0 1571.0 990.0 1293.0
GDP in USD 3938.0 4102.0 4026.0 4106.0 4465.0 4872.0 5294.0 5691.0 5365.0 4175.0 5306.0
Budget 
support as % 
of total 
expenditure
0.9 0.0 3.4 2.7 10.8 4.2 10.6 7.1 1.9 4.2 5.9
Budget 
support as % 
of GDP
0.2 0.0 0.8 0.6 2.4 0.8 2.5 1.7 0.6 1.0 1.4
Aid as % of 
total 
expenditure
64.3 49.0 57.0 62.8 64.7 58.4 51.3 49.7 26.3 58.4 46.4
Aid as % of 
GDP
13.8 13.1 13.1 14.3 14.6 11.6 12.1 12.1 7.7 13.8 10.9
Sources: Central Bank of Nicaragua for aid figures and GDP in USD, Ministry of Finance and Public Credit for total 
budgets, CBN for exchange rates; and own calculations.
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Table 2.2      Budget support by donor, 2005-2008 (in millions of USD and in percent)
2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
05-08
In %
Loans:
World Bank 0.0 30.3 25.2 0.0 55.5 18.5
IDB 0.0 29.7 14.9 0.0 44.6 14.8
Germany 5.2 2.6 5.7 0.0 13.5 4.5
Grants:
European Commission 11.5 27.6 26.2 9.1 74.4 24.7
Finland 1.8 4.4 0.0 0.0 6.2 2.1
Netherlands 10.8 12.8 18.0 7.7 49.3 16.4
Norway 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.2 12.7 4.2
United Kingdom 0.6 1.9 0.0 4.8 7.3 2.4
Sweden 7.4 9.5 0.0 0.0 16.9 5.6
Switzerland 0.0 10.0 5.2 5.2 20.4 6.8
Total 40.3 131.9 98.6 30.0 300.8 100.0
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
2.3.5 Predictabilityofthefunds
The predictability of budget support resources is an element of mutual accountability in the 
Paris Declaration. It is important that the government knows in advance how much budget 
support is forthcoming, because in this way resources can be included in the budget and 
can be spent. If already committed budget support is not disbursed, this may affect 
macro-economic stability. On the other hand, if budget support is not announced 
beforehand and is provided at the end of the budget year, it is unlikely to be used for the 
goals of the donors i.e. poverty reduction. It may just be added to the reserves - which may 
or not be a good thing, depending on the macro-economic situation. Apart from the 
predictability of funds for a certain budget year, the predictability of disbursements within a 
budget year also matters. For the government, the availability of budget support by 
trimester is important, since the IMF assesses the reserves at the end of every quarter. 
According to the JFA, donors would give indicative commitments for the next year at or just 
after the Annual meeting, which would be confirmed after the mid-year meeting in August. 
Donors would then also provide a disbursement calendar to facilitate government planning 
and also in order to spread disbursements throughout the year. On both these issues, there 
have been some problems.
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Table 2.3 shows that in all years, JFA members’ disbursements have been lower than 
commitments, and the gap was particularly large in 2005 and 2008. In 2005 disbursements 
were lower due to the IMF program being temporarily off track. When government and IMF had 
signed a “Comfort letter” (in October) and the donors finally decided to disburse, one donor 
had administrative problems to disburse the full amount quickly (EC) and another decided that 
the money would be more useful if provided within next year’s budget (Switzerland). In the case 
of the World Bank, some prior actions for the second tranch of PRSC 1 were not met in time. 
The disbursement figure for 2006 therefore includes some amounts promised for 2005 (in the 
case of Switzerland, the 2005 pledge seems to have been repeated in 2006).
In 2007, and despite the government change, the gap between pledges and disbursements was 
small. In 2008, however, the gap was large. Most bilateral donors applied sanctions in view of 
perceived breaches of the fundamental principles, in particular the exclusion of two parties 
from the municipal elections, and the fraud committed in the same elections. The two banks 
(IDB and WB) did not disburse for legal reasons: due to all election turmoil the National 
Assembly did not meet at the end of 2008 so that the budget for 2009 could not be approved. 
The banks disbursed early 2009 (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The EC sometimes disbursed less money 
than committed due a lower performance in the indicators for the variable tranch.
With respect to actual disbursements, most budget support was disbursed in the last quarter 
of the year (Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1). The multilateral banks (2006, 2009) and the EC (2006) 
sometimes disburse in the first trimester, but usually this concerned commitments of the 
year before. Some bilateral donors in some years managed to disburse earlier in the year, for 
example Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.
In order to assess the predictability within the budget year, we need information on the 
schedule of both commitments and disbursements. For 2005 and 2006, this information is 
not available. However, according to interviews with both donors and government officers 
held in 2006, the donors disbursed in 2006 according to the agreed schedule. There was 
only one donor with a small delay. Among the pledges for 2007, six out of nine donors 
indicated when they planned to disburse, which was always in the first or second trimester.31 
These promises were largely not kept, with the exception of, partially, the EC (Table 2.4). For 
2008, only four donors announced a calendar: World Bank (first trimester), Netherlands 
(second), the EC and Finland (third or fourth). In this year, the pledged money was delayed 
until 2009 (WB), reduced, or not disbursed at all. 
In sum, GBS funds have not always been predictable over time, mainly due to perceived 
breaches of the fundamental principles - if the IMF program being off-track is assumed to 
be a breach with maintaining “sound macro-economic policies”. This also reduced 
predictability within the budget year. The fact that most funds were disbursed in the last 
quarter of the year (except when commitments due in year n were disbursed in year n+1) 
also complicated the government’s financial management.
31 Letter from the BSG’s Presidency to the Ministry of Finance, 30 October 2006. The six donors were 
Germany, the EC, Finland, Norway, Netherlands and the UK.
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Table 2.3      Commitments and actual disbursements per donor per year (in millions of USD) 1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Pledge Actual Pledge Actual Pledge Actual Pledge Actual Pledge Actual
Loans:
World Bank 35.0 0.0 35.0 30.3 25.0 25.2 20.0 0.0 20.0 20.0
IDB 0.0 29.7 25.0 14.9 20.0 0.0 20.0 60.0
Germany 5.6 5.2 2.4 2.6 5.1 5.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grants:
European Commission 19.9 11.5 30.9 27.6 22.9 26.2 39.8 9.1 65.9 14.0
Finland 1.8 1.8 4.2 4.4 2.5 0.0 2.7 0.0 3.2 0.0
Netherlands 10.8 10.8 12.0 12.8 14.0 18.0 16.2 7.7 19.1 0.0
Norway 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 4.2 3.2 4.9 0.0
United Kingdom3 0.0 0.6 1.8 1.9 2.8 0.0 5.0 4.8
Sweden 7.7 7.4 8.7 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Switzerland 5.1 0.0 10.0 10.0 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.2 4.9 0.0
Total 89.2 40.3 107.9 102.2 105.8 98.6 113.3 30.0 138.0 94.0
Sources for actual: Central Bank of Nicaragua. For pledges: 2005 and 2006: data obtained from BSG. For 2007, 
2008 and 2009: letters from the Presidency of BSG to Minstry of Finance, respectively 30 October 2006, 14 
December 2007, and 28 July 2008. 
1  Since donors commit resources in their own currencies, differences between commitments and disbursements may 
be due to exchange rate variations.
2  The IDB only became a member in (end) 2007, so pledges are not known for 2005 and 2006. Source for pledge 
2007: Report Mid-Year meeting 19 November 2007.
3  According to BSG, the UK did disburse the pledged amount in 2007, but this has probably been sector budget support, 
as DfID already notified the government of this possibility in the October 2006 letter of the BSG’s President. 
Table 2.4      Budget support by donor and by quarter, 2005-2009 (in millions of USD)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
World Bank 30.3 25.2 20.0
IDB 14.9 14.9 14.9 20.0
Germany 5.2 2.6 5.7
European 
Commission
11.5 11.4 16.3 8.5 17.7 9.1
Finland 1.8 1.9 2.5
Netherlands 10.8 12.8 15.3 2.8 7.7
Norway 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.2
United 
Kingdom
0.6 1.9 4.8
Sweden 7.4 9.5
Switzerland 0.0 10.0 5.2 5.2
Total 5.2 0.0 0.0 35.1 66.6 11.4 14.7 39.4 25.2 13.7 24.4 35.4 4.8 0.0 0.0 25.2 60.0
Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
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Source: Central Bank of Nicaragua.
2.3.6 Alignmenttonationalsystems
Most GBS resources were provided to the central government without restrictions on their 
use. In 2005, however, DfID (UK) earmarked its (small) disbursement and required that it 
would be transferred to municipalities (additional to the 6% of the budget that 
municipalities received regularly), and that it would be spent on investment. The reason 
was that the disbursement was late and that DfID wanted to have a big impact with its small 
amount of money.32 This objective of course contradicts the essential feature of GBS.
The resources of the EU sector budget support programs are not earmarked in principle, but 
in practice the conditions for the variable tranch are so extensive that at least part of the 
resources must be transferred to the sector involved. This happened, for example, with the 
Education program. The Ministry of Education and Culture did receive a higher budget due 
to this program.33 
2.3.7 Conclusions
The expected advantages of budget support for achieving aid effectiveness depend on the 
degree to which actual budget support arrangements further the principles of the Paris 
Declaration, in particular, harmonization, ownership, alignment and predictability. They 
also depend on volume of budget support relative to total aid. On the latter, a first thing to 
be noted in this respect is that important donors in Nicaragua did not engage in budget 
support and that budget support only represented, on average, 12% of total aid between 
2005 and 2008 – the share of program aid in total aid was 13%. Although this is higher than 
in the period 2001-2004, it is much lower than the share of program aid in total aid during 
1995-2000, which was 22%. 
32 Interview with a DfID representative Managua, August 2006.
33 Acevedo Vogl (2007) and interviews, March 2009.
Figure 2.1 Disbursements of budget support by quarter, 2005-2009 (in millions of USD)
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Harmonization was achieved to a large extent within the common scheme of nine (later 
eight) donors. Some donors maintain specific disbursement conditions, however. The 
Bolaños government (i.e., the executive) had a large degree of ownership of the 
fundamental principles (but limited political power to enforce them), but much less of 
many of the indicators and policies of the PAM. The negotiations were experienced as heavy 
conditionality. With the Ortega government it was broadly the other way around; there was 
limited ownership of fundamental principles, but a lot more of the (revised) PAM.
Virtually all budget support resources were fully aligned with the national budget and other 
national systems, but there were some problems with the predictability of resources. In 
2005 and 2008 actual disbursements were much lower (45 and 26%, respectively) than 
pledges. In 2008, this was clearly the result of donor responses to breaches with the 
fundamental principles (the problems with the municipal elections). In 2005 the reason for 
non-disbursement was that the IMF program was off track.
On the whole, GBS helped to achieve the implementation of the Paris Declaration. 
However, compared to the previous decade, progress on the principles of the Paris 
Declaration is limited. The share of fully aligned aid in total aid is smaller, while the 
conditionality has increased: more donors are involved (not just the multilateral 
institutions) and it covers more areas of government policies and institutions. 
Influence
3
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to answer the question whether the donors in general and the RNE in 
particular, have been able to exert influence on government policies. To a large extent, 
influence is the opposite of ownership. If priorities of donors and government coincide, the 
government “owns” the policies preferred by the donors and there is no (need to exert) 
influence. We can only conclude that donors had influence if these priorities were different at 
the start. We concluded in chapter 2 that under the Bolaños government there was 
ownership of the donors’ governance agenda but much less so of its poverty reduction 
agenda, while it was a little bit the other way around under the Ortega government
This chapter provides an overview of the policy dialogue and its results as conducted between 
government and the BSG donors between 2005 and 2008/9. It begins with a short description 
of the framework of this dialogue, the formal and informal channels for influence used.  
A next section analyzes a first result of this dialogue, namely the contents of the Performance 
Assessment Matrices (PAM) and the changes in it over time. This also shows the scale and 
scope of the attempts at influence. Section 3 describes in chronological order the monitoring 
and assessment of JFA and PAM. It examines the extent of compliance and the donor 
responses to it. Special attention is given to the Dutch responses. The next section examines 
the outcomes of the policy dialogue. What are the results according to the donors and what 
can be said about actual policy changes? In the final section, conclusions are drawn. 
3.2 Theframework:channelsofinfluence
The framework for the policy dialogue around budget support is set in the JFA and consists 
of the Annual meetings (in May) and the Mid-year meetings (in August). The aim of the 
meetings is to assess performance of the government in general and on the PAM in 
particular. The meetings consist of both plenary sessions and technical working group 
sessions. During the plenary meetings, high-level representatives of all signatories are 
present. On the government side the ministers of Finance, the Vice-Chancellor and the 
Technical Secretary of the Presidency participate. On the donor side participants include 
Ambassadors (for bilateral donors and EU) and Representatives (World Bank, IDB). The 
technical working groups discuss performance in each of the five (later four) matrices of the 
PAM. For each of these meetings, the government prepares reports of the status of 
execution of the PAM, and usually other documents are sent as well, such as reports on 
budget execution, (draft) national development plans, progress reports on national 
development plans and other statistical information.
Apart from these formally stipulated high-level meetings, there were many other contacts 
and thus channels of influence between government and budget support donors. During 
the years 2005-2008, there was an intensive schedule of meetings during the entire year, 
both of the BSG (donors only) and of all the technical working groups (with government), 
which intensified in the weeks before these high-level meetings. In addition, government 
and these same donor representatives met each other in other fora such as the Mesa Global 
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and the sector roundtables, and there were of course numerous informal occasions for 
donors and government representatives to meet, such as receptions or other celebrations. 
Donors also had bilateral contacts with government representatives, which they could use 
for exerting influence. In our analysis of the policy dialogue we focus on the formal 
channels as established within the JFA because this is best reported on. We add information 
on the other channels to the extent we know them.
3.3 ThecontentofthePAM
The content of the PAM as agreed in the May 2005 JFA has changed many times. In practice, 
donors and government were almost continuously working on revisions: developing new 
indicators, discussing baseline data or sources of information, removing or changing 
actions and indicators. From the contents of the various matrices it is clear that the policy 
dialogue covered all possible sectors and areas of government policy. 
The first PAM was very extensive. It contained 95 separate “actions” (policies, measures and 
laws) the government had to carry out over three years: 2005-2007, as well as 66 indicators, 
leading to a total of 161 separate items (Table 3.1). This was in line with the earlier PRSC 
(2004) which had contained 143 items (for three years). “Actions” often included laws to be 
approved by the National Assembly, or measures to be taken by entities over which the 
executive had little influence, such as the Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) or the Supreme 
Court of Justice (SCJ). The targets for the indicators were defined for two or three years: with 
2004 as baseline, targets were defined for 2005 and sometimes for 2006, too. 
Both donors and the government were convinced that this first PAM was too large, and in 2006 
they worked on a revision. This led to a substantial reduction in the total items and especially 
in the number of specified actions. In itself, a shift from “actions” to indicators and targets 
implies an increase in results orientation - one of the principles of the Paris Declaration - and 
may lead to an increase in ownership and a reduction of micromanagement, as the donors 
monitor the results of policies, not the specific policies themselves. However, Table 3.1 shows 
that the number of “actions” was still considerable in 2006. The total number of actions and 
indicators also remained large. According to a government representative interviewed by one 
of the authors in 2006, a larger reduction in the number of actions and indicators was not only 
resisted by the donors, but also by the different government ministries: they all wanted to 
maintain their presence in the PAM. Reductions were particularly large in the area of public 
finance, - where many of the required changes had been accomplished during 2005 and early 
2006 - , but also in the productive sector matrix.
In 2005 the content of the PAM was clearly dominated by donor wishes. Donors wanted to 
use budget support to influence all areas and sectors of government policy (macro-
economic, public financial management, social policies, governance and the productive 
sector). By including all this in the PAM and given the agreed mechanism for monitoring, 
donors were secured of at least two moments in the year in which they could hold the  
government to account on this very broad range of government policies. They managed by
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Table 3.1      Actions and indicators of the PAM, 2005-2008
2005 2006 2007 2008*
A
ctions
Indicators
Total
A
ctions
Indicators
Total
A
ctions
Indicators
Total
A
ctions
Indicators
Total
Macro-economic 3 3 6 3 6 9 3 1 4 3 1 4
Public finance 22 9 31 2 9 11 2 5 7 2 5 7
  Pensions 4 1 5
  Decentralization 2 1 3 2 1 3
  Tax revenues 4 1 5 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 1 1
  Civil service 2 1 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 1
   Public finance 
management
7 3 10 0 2 2 1 3 4 2 2 4
  Public procurement 2 1 3 0 1 1
  Auditing 1 1 2 2 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 1
Productive sector 33 14 47 14 13 27 7 7 14 12 6 18
   Competition and 
competitiveness
8 4 12 4 3 7
  Land 8 4 12 4 4 8 1 1 2 2 1 3
   Environment and 
natural resources
4 1 5 1 1 2
  Rural development 3 1 4 1 1 2 2 1 3 3 1 4
  Energy 6 2 8 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3
  Finance 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 3 4 1 5
  MIPYME 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3
  Infrastructure (roads) 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 3
Social and public 
services
15 24 39 19 15 34 5 7 12 7 7 14
  Poverty 1 2 3 2 2 4 1 1 2 2 1 3
  Education 1 2 3 3 3 6 2 2 4 3 2 5
  Health 9 14 23 9 7 16 1 2 3 1 2 3
  Water, environment 4 5 9 5 3 8 1 2 3 1 2 3
Governance 22 17 39 8 17 25 6 7 13 11 8 19
   Judiciary, including 
access
8 10 18 1 5 6 1 2 3 1 2 3
  Security 5 1 6 0 2 2
   Citizen participation, 
access to information
2 1 3 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 5
   Human rights and 
women’s rights
5 3 8 2 5 7 2 2 4 3 2 5
   Transparency and 
corruption
2 2 4 3 3 6 1 1 2 2 1 3
Total 95 66 161 48 61 109 23 29 52 37 28 65
*  The 2008 PAM looks bigger than the previous one but the 2008 PAM includes actions for 2008 and 2009, while 
the 2007 PAM only covers actions for 2007
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and large to include their priorities, but with a few exceptions. For example, due to lack of 
data, no information was included on the flow of budget resources to poor areas nor were 
data gender disaggregated (Gosparini et al., 2006). 
In 2007, the (new) government started to propose the new indicators, which were then 
negotiated with the donors (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2008). It was a complicated process 
which took a long time, but it led to a further reduction. The macro-economic and public 
finance matrices were combined into one “macro-economic and financial” matrix, and the 
other matrices were streamlined. In fact, many topics that had been important for the 
donors were no longer included, leading to a total of only 52 items to be monitored. 
Another change was that the matrix no longer contained actions for which the executive 
was dependent on the National Assembly. Only in one case, the government was to 
“promote” (impulsar) a law approval. In 2008, the PAM did not change much although on 
the action side, new measures were added. Most indicators were maintained. All in all, as 
also concluded above (2.3.3), the degree of government ownership of the PAM was much 
larger than under the previous administration.
3.4 Themonitoringanddonorresponses
As analyzed above (Chapter 2), it was not at all clear how the donors were going to use the 
JFA and the PAM. What would be defined as a “breach” with the fundamental principles 
(many of which were not met at the start)? And when would performance with the PAM be 
assessed as “insufficient”? It could be expected that the government would not be able to 
comply with all 161 items to the full extent, but it was not clear what would be the minimum 
compliance level for disbursements. In the following, we describe the degree of compliance 
and the donor responses to it.
Table 3.2      Compliance with PAM actions and indicators
Year Complied Not complied or remarks Degree of compliance
2005 45 actions 25 23 45%
62 indicators 20 32 32%
2006 32 actions 13 19 41%
55 indicators 16 39 29%
2007 24 actions 18 6 in 2008 67%
28 indicators 25 3 89%
2008 24 actions 10 14 with 50% progress
28 indicators 9 19 with 50% progress
Source: Interview with government coordinator for budget support, March 2009.
Table 3.2 suggests that there was in increase in compliance with the PAM over time, and in 
particular between 2006 and 2007. This is not surprising, as the policies, targets and 
indicators for 2007 and 2008 were not only much more owned by the government, but also 
easier to achieve. Another reason why this overall compliance is not such a valid indicator 
for influence is that not all actions and indicators are equally important. For this reason we 
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analyzed the reports of the Annual and  Mid-Year meetings in order to find out in which 
areas compliance and non-compliance was important to the donors and to what extent 
donors succeeded in improving compliance. 
3.4.1 Theperiod2005-200634
Two weeks after the signing of the JFA the first annual meeting was held. Donors were 
satisfied with the overall performance, but had a number of concerns. These involved the 
governance matrix, in particular the lack of cooperation of the Supreme Audit Institution 
(SAI) and the lack of progress in the fight against corruption, but also the social matrix 
where concerns were expressed on the low efficiency and equity of expenditure in health 
and education, leading to a worrying decrease in primary school enrolment. But the donors 
were most concerned with the lack of progress in some structural reforms that were 
considered important for maintaining macro-economic stability, and that upheld the IMF 
program (the PRGF).35 These were laws that the National Assembly had to pass but did not, 
because of tensions between the executive and the two main political parties.36
In the weeks after this first Annual Meeting, the donors had an intensive debate on whether 
the fact that the IMF program was “off track” was a reason for withholding budget support. 
They finally achieved a consensus. They notified the government that they wanted to see a 
Comfort Letter from the IMF (to be requested by the government), which would confirm 
that there were no problems with macro-economic stability in the short term, but that the 
only reason for the program being off track was that some structural measures had not been 
taken. In the meantime, donors suspended budget support disbursements.
Most donors expected that publication of this Comfort letter would be a matter of a few 
weeks. In practice, it took until early October before the IMF wrote this letter. Moreover, 
according to most observers, it was not a Comfort Letter but rather a “Discomfort letter”, 
because it contained a long list of additional government measures and laws that had to be 
approved (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007). 
The Mid-Term Meeting was held on 30 September, when it was clear that the IMF was going 
to write the Comfort Letter and that the suspension could be lifted soon. Donors were 
satisfied with improvement in public finance management but they pressed for an 
independent audit of the budget. Progress in the productive and governance matrices was 
mixed, while in the social area many targets were missed and often with a large margin. 
Donors raised concerns on the volume of “poverty expenditure” and on its quality.
34 Unless otherwise indicated, sources in this and the following section are the agreed minutes (Ayuda 
Memoria) of the Annual and Mid-Year meetings.
35 The PAM did not have its own indicators for macro-economic stability, but instead stipulated “to be 
defined by the IMF”.  
36 These included a law to improve the budgeting process (Financial Administration Law), a reform of the 
tax equity law, and laws to address and mitigate the increased government expenditure as a result of an 
earlier approved pension reform and as a result of increased transfers to municipalities (a donor 
priority) without expanding their responsibilities.
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After this meeting the (Dis)Comfort Letter appeared and the government agreed to it. This 
Letter had several consequences (Guimarães and Avendaño, 2007). First, the sheer existence 
of the Letter made donors release most of their promised disbursements for 2005.37 They 
also confirmed their earlier promises for 2006. Second, this agreement, backed by pressure 
not only from the IMF but also by all budget support donors, pushed the National Assembly 
to discuss and approve many of the required laws. Thirdly, the IMF agreed to an extension of 
the PRGF until end of 2006.38 In January 2006, an agreement on the PRGF extension was 
achieved. It included that the government had to send many more law proposals to 
Parliament before 31 August of that year, and one particular law had to be approved as well.
When donors reflected on these events, they were satisfied with their harmonized response. 
However, some donors regretted that budget support disbursements had become 
dependent on IMF judgment, and in practice also on delays in IMF missions. DfID organized 
a survey among donor representatives in Managua to investigate how and at what level 
budget support decisions were made, and how important an IMF agreement was. It turned 
out that for most donors it was not formally necessary that an IMF program be on track. 
However, the IMF’s opinion on the macro-economic situation was always an important 
input in the decision, and it would be difficult for most representatives to defend 
disbursements to their headquarters in case of a negative IMF assessment.
In order to reduce dependence on the IMF, donors began to develop their own indicators 
for macro-economic stability for the revised PAM in 2006. However, the selected new 
indicators all formed part of the IMF program as well. Another lesson from the events in 
2005 was that donors planned to intensify the policy dialogue with those powers over which 
the executive had little influence: the National Assembly, the SAI, and there were also plans 
to talk to the Supreme Court of Justice and the Electoral Council.39 
The 2006 Annual Meeting was held according to schedule, on 16 and 17 May. The donors 
applauded the government for meeting the IMF targets so far and for the fact that some 
important laws had been adopted by the National Assembly. Progress was again observed in 
financial management. In the productive sector, ten out of fourteen indicators showed 
satisfactory performance. Governance performance was in general satisfactory, but not in all 
aspects. Donors complained on the fact that no regulations were approved for the Judicial 
Career Law so that this law - itself the result of donor pressure - could not be implemented 
yet. The representative of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) informed the donors that the 
approval of the regulations would soon follow. In the social area, four out of six policies 
were implemented, but only nine out of 24 indicators were met. Several indicators were not 
available due to the fact that the results of the Census and of the Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS), carried out in 2005, were not yet available.
37 A government officer told us that despite the government not complying yet with the IMF or with the 
poverty indicators of the PAM, donors disbursed quickly, because there was a threat of a possible coup 
d’état by the two political parties of the Pacto. 
38 This was remarkable, since 2006 was the year of presidential elections and usually the IMF is cautious in 
those years.
39 Interviews held in August 2006.
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The mid-year meeting was held on 5 and 6 October 2006. With respect to public finance 
management, the donors requested to make a new procurement law, because the 
complexity of the recently approved law (in accordance with IDB standards) induced many 
state entities to request and obtain exemptions, so that in practice the law was not 
implemented. In the productive and social areas, there was progress on the majority of the 
agreed actions. However, there was still no information from the LSMS so that progress in 
actual poverty reduction was not known. By this time, the majority of donors began to have 
doubts on the intentions of the government in the area of poverty reduction.40 
Furthermore, rumors held that results were not very positive and that the government was 
hiding them until after the national elections.
Under the strategic themes discussed in the plenary, there was again a discussion on the 
quality of social spending, as the higher volume did not seem to translate in improved social 
indicators. Donors also continued to complain about the failure to adopt the regulations 
for the Judicial Career Law. Another “strategic theme” brought up by the donors was the 
external auditing of the 2005 budget. The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) had still not 
started this auditing, despite the additional budget allocated to it. Apparently, the SAI had 
used this money for raising salaries. It requested additional funds. The donors made it clear 
that the now committed budget support funds for 2007 could only be disbursed if the 
results of the auditing would be presented.
During 2006 disbursements were only slightly lower than commitments.41 The World Bank 
reduced disbursements because the country missed one trigger in 2006. The EC reduced its 
variable tranch on the education budget support program with € 1 million due to the 
decrease in the primary school enrolment rate.
3.4.2 Theperiod2007-2008
Early 2007, the new FSLN government of President Ortega began its rule. This changed the 
context for the monitoring of the JFA and the PAM. In fact, this change already began at the 
end of 2006, when the National Assembly approved the penalization of therapeutic 
abortion, with support of the FSLN. This gained the FSLN important support from the 
conservative Catholic Church in the upcoming presidential elections.42 Another change was 
that the group of donors participating in the JFA gradually became smaller. 
Most donors gave the new government the benefit of the doubt, and began to monitor its 
actions. These actions sent mixed and confusing signals. On the positive side, the 
government showed a willingness to maintain macro-economic stability and negotiated an 
agreement with the IMF (achieved in October 2007). Furthermore, it showed a much higher 
priority for poverty reduction. It announced free education and health care services, and 
40 Interviews August 2006.
41 According to Table 2.3, actual disbursements were higher than commitments, but this is caused by 
delayed transfers of the 2005 commitments.
42 In fact, the Bolaños faction was in favor of an even more conservative version of the law than the FSLN 
(interview RNE staff March 2009).
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introduced special programs for the poor, such as Hambre Cero and Usura Cero.43 The aim 
of these programs is to make the poor more productive. The government also appeared 
willing to maintain the improvements in public finance management and managed to 
make an end to the proliferation of well-paid consultants in the public sector. On the other 
hand, there were signs of decreasing government transparency and more concentration of 
power in the hands of the President and his wife. The government began to receive large 
amounts of aid from Venezuela but these funds were managed in a non-transparent way, 
thus providing rumors that they were primarily used for party interests - in particular, 
securing re-election of President Ortega - rather than state interests. The government 
wanted to foster direct democracy by installing CPCs, Citizen Power Councils, but this raised 
concerns of possible exclusion on party-political basis. The donors were divided on how to 
respond to these developments.
In this context, the first Annual Meeting with the new government took place on 10 July, so 
with a slight delay. The government reported the progress in 2006 on the previous PAM, on 
the expectation that a new matrix would be agreed upon soon. The results of the 2005 
Living Standards Measurement Survey were now presented but they were indeed not very 
positive on the poverty incidence, and more than half the indicators of the Social matrix of 
the PAM were not met. In the plenary session several “old” strategic themes were discussed, 
such as the independence of the judiciary (only 25 of the 120 required regulations now 
approved), the audit of the budget (2005 now done but implementation of the 
recommendations necessary, as well as secured funding for the audit of the 2006 budget), 
and the quality of social spending. There were two new themes. First the donors made it 
known that sexual and reproductive rights of women are part of the fundamental principles 
and that they would closely monitor maternal mortality as a way to assess the practice with 
respect to therapeutic abortion.44 Second, and as the government had rejected the NDP, the 
donors requested a new national development plan. It was not enough for the government 
to present its policy priorities.
During the Mid-Year meeting on 19 November 2007 drafts for a new PAM were discussed. 
Many of the same strategic issues were brought up as well. The government presented a 
plan for the audit of the 2006 budget, and promised to elaborate a National Human 
Development Plan. Donors emphasized the importance of citizen participation and access 
to information for all citizens, not just members of CPCs.
The 2008 Annual meeting was held on 23 May. By this time, the external economic situation 
began to deteriorate with rising food and especially oil prices, leading to higher inflation 
and an increasing current account deficit. The first revision of the PRGF in March 2008 had 
not led to a release of the second tranch, although quantitative targets were still met. The 
IMF demanded control of illegal energy consumption and transparency on the volume, 
43 The first implies handing over a cow, a pig and a hen to a poor household, the second is a transfer of 
credit to female micro and small enterprises at an annual interest rate of 4%. 
44 However, this was problematic. First, maternal mortality has many more causes than the legal 
prohibition of therapeutic abortion, and second, reliable figures on maternal mortality (from the 
Demographic and Health Survey) are only available once in about five years. 
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terms and uses of the loans from Venezuela.45 It also worried about the consequences of the 
negotiations that the government had started on the payments on government bonds 
(Negotiable Investment Certificates or CENIs) that were mostly held by domestic banks. 
Some members of the Board of the Central Bank had stepped down and the IMF requested 
replacements. The donors expressed these same concerns during the Annual meeting.
The final version of the new PAM had only been completed in March of that year. Many of 
the indicators were achieved but there were important exceptions such as the number of 
cases passed on by the Prosecutor General to the courts. The approval of the Regulations for 
the implementation of the Career Law moved slowly: 107 of the 142 articles were now 
approved. The donors were also concerned with the delays in the audit of the 2006 budget 
and with the lack of institutionalization of this external auditing. As the SAI required more 
money for doing the audit, the IDB offered to finance this as part of its promised technical 
assistance grant. This was accepted by the government - reluctantly so by the other donors. 
The law on access to information had been approved, but was only applied in five 
institutions. Donors complained about the lower transparency of government institutions. 
They applauded the first draft of the PNDH but did not approve its contents yet: it contained 
a “lot of ideology” and was not sufficiently operational. This held up disbursement of the 
fixed tranch of one of the EC programs.
The Mid-Year meeting took place on 25 September 2008. The IMF had finally approved the 
first revision of the PRGF. Information on the amount and uses of Venezuelan aid was now 
made available, and re-establishment of the Central Bank Board was at hand.46 On the other 
hand there were rising tensions between donors and government on issues related to the 
fundamental principles. In June, the Supreme Electoral Council had taken away the legal 
personality of two political parties that aimed to participate in the municipal elections of 
November 2008. During the meeting, donors raised concerns about the possibility for free 
and fair elections, and about government harassment of civil society representatives.
With respect to the PAM, a lot of progress was observed. According to Ministry of Health 
figures, maternal mortality rates were declining, for example. The regulations for the SCJ 
were finally approved and the 2006 auditing had just been received. The government was 
urged to include more ambitious indicators and targets on several objectives.47 And donors 
complained about decreasing transparency and possible corruption in public procurement 
due to the systematic exemptions granted.
The government, on the other hand, worried about the lack of predictability of the 2008 
disbursements: hardly any had been received. The donors responded that disbursements 
were upheld by the discussions on the fundamental principles and for some (EC) also for 
“technical reasons” (the non compliance with specific conditions). The donors considered 
the exclusion of two political parties from the elections and the lack of a decision on 
45 IMF Press releases 08/45 and 08/147, http://www.imf.org/external/country/NIC/index.htm accessed 
14 September 2009.
46 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr08204.htm accessed 14 September 2009.
47 For example, the number of institutions applying the Law on access to information was set too low. 
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allowing external observers as signal of a weakening democracy in Nicaragua and the 
former also as a breach of the fundamental principles.
Both sides considered the quality of the policy dialogue to have deteriorated.48 The donors 
perceived the government as non-responsive to their demands and called it a dialogue with 
deaf people, (sordos). The government complained that discussions were no longer on the PAM 
or on poverty reduction but only on issues related to the fundamental principles – while the 
principles themselves were formulated vaguely and it was not clear how the government 
would be able to satisfy the donors. In view of the dominance of political issues in the 
dialogue around budget support, the government decided to transfer the coordination of 
budget support from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the meantime, donors did no longer succeed in unifying their responses. For two BSG 
members, namely the World Bank and the IDB, governance issues were no reason to stop 
disbursements. They disbursed in 2007 and intended to do so in 2008 as well. From 
mid-2008 onwards, the other members of the BSG began to make different assessments of 
the political and governance situation in the country. In practice, a first division was already 
evident early 2007 when Sweden and Germany took the penalization of therapeutic 
abortion much more seriously than the other budget support donors.49 Although Sweden 
and DfID no longer disbursed in 2008, they were still present in the meetings with 
government and usually they were the first to take the floor and criticize the government. 
This caused some resentment among the other donors. Germany also had its own reasons 
for not contributing anymore since the end of 2007: discontent on governance issues but 
also a dispute with the government on the appreciation of private water supply. A 
government change in Finland led to a harsher stand towards the Nicaraguan government, 
and Finland suddenly stopped disbursements in 2008. At the end of September 2008 the 
Netherlands decided to halve the committed amount for 2008 due to the exclusion of the 
two political parties. Decisions in both Finland and the Netherlands were taken at 
headquarters without much consultation with the other members of the BSG.50 Norway, 
Switzerland and the EC did disburse at the end of 2008, but the EC disbursed only a small 
amount relative to commitments due to lack of compliance with several conditions for the 
fixed and variable tranches of its programs, so-called “technical reasons”.
On 9 November 2008, the municipal elections were held and there was clear evidence of 
fraud. According to the final report of the authoritative Nicaraguan civil group Etica y 
Transparencia,51 at least 33 and probably around 40 mayors (out of 146) were elected in a 
fraudulent way. Within a few days after the elections, protesting against this fraud led to 
demonstrations in the streets but the government suppressed them by force, leading to 
casualties. The opposition parties in the National Assembly also protested and the National 
Assembly refused to meet. This implied, among other things, that loans from WB and IDB 
could not be disbursed as by law they have to be approved by the National Assembly.
48 Interviews with government and donor representatives, March 2009.
49 The protesting against this measure was left to the Mesa Global in which the UN took a leading role.
50 The Netherlands at least informed the other members of the decision.
51 Published in Revista Envío No. 332, March 2009. http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3952
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After the election fraud, the European Commission, Finland and the Netherlands froze 
budget support for 2009. Switzerland and Norway were the only bilateral donors still 
considering disbursements, but they came in a difficult position. Norway, in particular, 
preferred to disburse in view of the predictability objective, but did not want to be the only 
bilateral donor to do so. The BSG continued to discuss their response. Donors did not agree 
on the demands to be forwarded to the government and on what exactly the government 
would have to do in order to unfreeze disbursements. This ranged from the undoing of the 
results of past elections to providing guarantees for free and fair next elections. The EC also 
required an improved version of the PNDH. In the meantime, the financial situation of the 
government deteriorated rapidly. Due to the global economic crisis, lower growth and 
lower tax revenues were expected, and the lower oil price reduced the aid volume from 
Venezuela. All this came on top of the about USD 60 million budget support forgone in 
2009. This made the government willing to at least talk to the budget support group.
When discussions with the government were resumed, the BSG attempted to coordinate 
also with the US Embassy especially on its Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), money 
that is also conditional on governance. In response to the election fraud, the US 
government had decided to freeze the MCA. A definitive decision would be taken before 1 
April. In coordination with the BSG, this was later postponed to 1 July to give the 
government more time for an appropriate response. Norway did not want to maintain 
uncertainty any longer, and decided to discontinue budget support and leave the BSG in 
May 2009. By 1 July, the MCA was definitely cancelled.
In May and June, the BSG discussed with representatives of the government on three 
themes: macro-economic issues, the PNDH and governance. The latter included an attempt 
to install a national dialogue with the opposition on the past elections. On the government 
side, high party leaders participated. No results were achieved, however. A next series of 
discussions focused on guaranteeing free and fair next elections. The BSG formulated four 
concrete demands, with the intention to link partial disbursements to their compliance - 
although it was clear that not all remaining donors of the group would (or will) do so. These 
demands included:
• Allowing national and international observers
• Making improvements in the registration of voters
• Rehabilitation of the two parties that had been excluded
• Improving the credibility of the Supreme Electoral Council by appointing new officers.
In July, the government announced that it would admit observers to next elections, i.c. the 
March 2010 elections in the Atlantic (Eastern) regions. In response, the EC unfroze €10 
million of its budget support resources, earmarking this money to the education sector. 
This was again a decision made at headquarters, with no consultation with the other BSG 
members. Switzerland was ex post willing to join the EC, but did not want to be the only 
bilateral donor doing so. For the Netherlands, unfreezing was not considered appropriate 
yet. However, in practice national observers were not admitted to these elections and the 
two earlier excluded political parties were not allowed to participate. Other breaches of 
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democratic principles were also observed. For these reasons, the EC did not see any reason 
to unfreeze budget support in 2010 and in May of that year the Dutch government decided 
to not extend the JFA. Finland came to the same conclusion and Switzerland also followed, 
implying that no bilateral donors remained in the BSG. 
3.4.3 Dutchmonitoringandresponses
In 2006, the Dutch were in general satisfied with the possibilities to jointly influence 
government policy in the budget support group. When confronted with the possibility that data 
might show that the poverty incidence did not decrease between 2001 and 2005, the response 
of Dutch staff of the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) was that in that case “we”, donors, had 
done something wrong in the policy dialogue. At the same it was admitted that a government 
failure to reduce poverty might be a reason to reconsider budget support. In view of these 
concerns, the RNE was preparing a study on the possibilities for “trickle down” in Nicaragua.52
The National Assembly’s decision to penalize therapeutic abortion gave rise to a debate 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands. Some considered this a violation 
of human rights and thus a reason to suspend budget support. Others argued that 
predictability of budget support was important; disbursements should not be reconsidered 
after these kinds of political events. In June, 2007, Dutch Development Assistance minister 
Koenders visited Nicaragua and he transmitted a strong discontent to the Nicaraguan 
government about the abortion policy, but there was no threat of sanction. 
According to the MASP 2008-2011, the Embassy expected that by emphasizing good 
governance, and also by supporting sustainable economic development and social services, 
it could “contribute to creating an inclusive and more equitable society.” (RNE, 2008: 2). The 
policy dialogue around budget support would again be the instrument to foster governance 
and transparency. In 2007 and 2008, the dialogue was used to continue the struggle for the 
external audits of the budget execution and for a more independent judiciary. It was also 
used for monitoring the government policy for women’s rights and its attention for mother 
and child care. In addition to this, the Netherlands along with the other donors expressed 
criticism on the decreasing transparency of the government, the party-political use of the 
CPCs, and the limitations set to the work of NGOs.
The Supreme Electoral Council’s decision to withhold legal personality of two political 
parties came in June 2008, just after the Annual meeting and just before the donors would 
make known their disbursements for 2008 and their commitments for 2009. The RNE 
proposed the Netherlands’ government to make a signal by halving the amount committed 
for 2008 that was due in the third quarter. It was hoped that this would put pressure on the 
government to eliminate this decision so that the two parties would still be able to 
participate in the elections. There was no immediate response from The Hague. Early 
September Minister Koenders met in The Hague with Minister Santos of External Relations 
of Nicaragua, but also after this talk no decision was made. At the end of September, the 
52 Interview of one of the authors with Embassy staff, August 2006.
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government decided to halve the disbursements for 2008. In the view of the RNE, the fact 
that the decision was made so late implied that the Embassy could not use the threat of 
suspension in the political dialogue in Managua.
After the observed election fraud, the Embassy proposed to follow the EC and freeze 
disbursements for 2009. In The Hague, there were again different opinions. The  regional 
department agreed with RNE but the budget support department preferred to postpone 
such a decision until January 2009, when the Track Record would have been made up and a 
full assessment of the government could be made. This would have led to a more balanced 
decision, taking into account the successes achieved so far in the policy dialogue, and the 
fact that this government did a lot more for reducing poverty. The Minister, however, 
decided to freeze the full 2009 amount.
During the next months, the RNE again wanted to continue the dialogue with the government 
of Nicaragua. By luring with the carrot, it hoped to induce political concessions. Negotiations 
within the BSG were difficult, but it was also difficult to convince the Dutch government. In 
March, the Embassy proposed to define minimum actions of the Nicaraguan government 
necessary for unfreezing the support. The Dutch government preferred to wait for Nicaraguan 
actions and did not want to define precise criteria. In 2010, the JFA was not extended (see above). 
3.5 Resultsofthepolicydialogue
According to the above analysis, important topics in the policy dialogue have been the 
volume and quality of poverty expenditure, the transparency of budgets and the auditing of 
budget execution, the Judicial Career Law and its Regulations, and the Law of access to 
information. In later years, political issues also became important, including for most 
donors (and certainly for the Netherlands), the area of women’s rights. Table 3.3 gives an 
overview of the achievements of the policy dialogue in these areas. Column 2 lists the 
formal successes as the donors tend to see them, column 3 puts them in perspective, and 
column 4 shows the real results in these areas, based on interviews with other stakeholders 
such as government representatives and independent observers. The actual donor influence 
in these four specific areas (poverty expenditure, government transparency, rule of law, and 
democracy & human and women’s rights) will be analyzed in more detail below.
We start with discussing some other perceived achievements of the policy dialogue. One 
such achievement is the coming into being of the National Development Plan as “Second 
PRSP” in 2005, on which budget support could be based. For this plan regional and 
municipal consultations had been held, with donor financing, but that proved insufficient 
for the plan’s sustainability after the elections. The new government rejected this plan as it 
had other priorities, and in particular, other political priorities. Under donor pressure, it 
began to write its National Human Development Plan (PNDH) but in 2008, the plan was 
considered to be more a political manifest than a development plan, with a lot of attention 
for the Citizen Power Councils (CPCs). In 2009, the government elaborated a “Technical 
Summary” of the PNDH. This new version of the plan was approved by the donors in 2010.
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Table 3.3      Achievements of the policy dialogue 
1) Topic 2) Formal successes 3) Limitations 4) Real results
Poverty 
expenditure
Poverty expenditure 
increased 2002-04, was 
maintained 2005-08; 
social spending increased 
2002-08
Almost half of poverty 
expenditure benefits the 
non-poor, this holds even 
more for social 
expenditure
No reduction in poverty 
incidence 2001-05; mixed 
progress social indicators;  
Actual social indicators are 
worse than official figures
Transparency Improved budget 
transparency through Law 
550; aid in budgets; 
improved expenditure 
control; improved 
planning of investment 
Lack of transparency of 
Venezuelan aid; in 2008 
amounts and uses were 
published
Real progress in 
government financial 
management has 
continued in GBS period; 
Programs funded with 
Venezuelan aid are under 
party control
External audit of 2005 and 
2006 budget execution, 
coverage increased from 
21 to 28 agencies
With delays and largely 
paid by donors; 
No follow-up of audits’ 
findings
Political pressure within 
Supreme Audit Institution 
limits findings 
Law on government 
procurement adopted
Law is complex, so many 
exemptions are granted
Law is hardly 
implemented
Approval of Law of access 
to information 2008
Applied in limited number 
of state agencies, low 
targets for 
implementation in PAM
Actual access to 
government information 
decreased since 2007 
Rule of law Approval of Judicial Career 
Law 2005; approval of 
Regulations for this Law 
2008
Law only applies to lower 
echelons of judges; 
regulations approved 
after long delay; 
appointments in 2008 
made according to old 
Law, “retroactively”
No improvement in 
judicial system since 2005
Democracy 1999 Pact between PLC 
and FSLN dominates 
politics; no democracy 
within these parties
Since 2008 deterioration 
in formal democratic 
processes 
Women’s 
rights
Approval of Law of Equal 
Opportunity 2006;
More attention for 
violence against women 
since 2007;
Reduction maternal 
mortality in 2008
Penalization of 
therapeutic abortion in 
November 2006, not 
changed; Figures on 
maternal mortality not 
reliable, but decreasing 
tendency is true – 
although due to other 
factors rather than donor 
influence
Law on therapeutic 
abortion is implemented; 
since 2007 more attention 
for socio-economic 
women’s rights and for 
fighting violence
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Many donors used the policy dialogue around budget support also to influence sector 
policies in areas in which they executed project aid. Some results were achieved. For 
example, for the Germans it was important that a national water and sanitation strategy 
came about which separates policymaking and monitoring from execution. However, the 
extent to which this will be implemented under the current government is not clear. The 
World Bank and the EC have promoted school autonomy with their education programs, 
and the number of schools under this regime gradually increased. However, the current 
government did not want to pursue this road and the donors have accepted this change. 
Some also see donor pressure behind the improvement in the energy situation in the 
country under the current government, but more likely this is due to Venezuelan aid. 
3.5.1 Povertyexpenditureandsocialexpenditure
Poverty expenditure in percent of GDP has always been an indicator in the PAM. However, the 
definition of this spending has changed twice, in 2005 and in 2007. Since 2005, programs to 
strengthen institutions not directly related to poverty reduction (such as the Secretariat of the 
Presidency) were excluded, as well as the costs of the Managua offices of the ministries of 
Health and Education. Infrastructure investment (roads, airport) was still included (Report 
Mid-Year meeting 2006). In 2007, the new government changed the classification again in 
order to include its own poverty programs.53 In view of the changed and sometimes arbitrary 
definitions, the figures for poverty spending are not a fully valid indicator for the actual 
anti-poverty spending. For this reason, we also examine social spending. Although social 
spending may include non-poverty spending (tertiary education, for example), the trend in 
this figure may give some additional information of policy priorities.
Poverty expenditure increased in all years between 2002 and 2008, but relative to total 
expenditure and to GDP it increased only between 2002 and 2005. Between 2005 and 2008 it 
remained more or less stable (Table 3.4). Social expenditure registered a more continuous 
positive trend relative to total expenditure and to GDP, and both health and education 
benefited from it. It seems that the policy dialogue around budget support managed to 
increase social spending and to at least maintain poverty reduction spending.
53 According to an interview with a government officer at SEPRES, the new classification is explained in 
Annex 5 to the PNDH but the version of April 2008 available on internet www.pndh.gob.ni does not 
contain annexes (accessed 16 September 2009). The same officer also said that this classification plus 
retroactive data with this new classification has been presented to the BSG in one of the 2008 meetings. 
However, this does not appear in the reports or in the government presentations. 
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Table 3.4      Poverty expenditure and social expenditure1 (in billions of NIO and in percent)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
In current billions of NIO:
Poverty expenditure 5.2 6.9 8.5 10.7 11.4 14.0 16.5
Social expenditure 4.9 6.3 7.4 9.1 10.3 12.3 15.2
   Education 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.4 5.3 6.6
   Health 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.8 3.2 3.9 4.6
In % of total expenditure:
Poverty expenditure 44 46 53 58 54 59 58
Social expenditure 42 42 46 50 49 52 54
Education 20 19 19 21 21 22 23
Health 15 14 14 15 15 16 16
In % of GDP:
Poverty expenditure 9.1 11.1 12.0 13.1 12.3 13.3 13.4
Social expenditure 8.5 10.2 10.3 11.2 11.1 11.7 12.3
   Education 4.0 4.7 4.4 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.3
   Health 3.1 3.5 3.2 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.7
1  As explained in text, poverty expenditure and social expenditure are partly overlapping categories but they are not 
the same.
Source: MHCP for budget data, BCN for GDP and exchange rates (mid-year).
According to the government, poverty expenditure was financed partly from its own 
resources, and partly from external loans, grants and debt relief (forgone debt service) 
(Table 3.5). The external grants and loans are project aid. Budget support is here included in 
“recursos del tesoro” (government resources). It can be observed that the share of 
government financing of poverty expenditure increased in 2005 and 2006. However, this 
share was in 2006-08 lower than in 2002. As will be shown below (chapter 4), only a small 
part of the substantial debt relief received was used for poverty reduction expenditure.
Table 3.5      Financing of poverty reduction expenditure (in percent)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Government resources 55 33 28 39 52 52 50
Debt relief 9 21 23 19 15 16 17
External grants 16 19 17 19 17 18 19
External loans 21 27 32 24 16 14 14
Source: MHCP. www.hacienda.gob.ni
3.5.2 Governmenttransparency
Many improvements have been achieved in budget planning and budget transparency during 
the Bolaños government. Government control over budget execution improved through the 
expansion of SIGFA (Integrated System for Financial Management and Auditing), and from 
2006 onwards a Medium Term Expenditure Framework was gradually introduced, which 
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improved government planning. The classification of investment (capital expenditure) also 
improved. The Financial Administration Law (Law 550) introduced stricter rules for the 
budgeting process. For example, all external resources had to be included in the budget.54 
Table 3.6      Differences between execution and budgets (in percent of the budgeted figures)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenues 2 2 9 1 0 0 -2
Total expenditure -13 -7 -9 -7 -8 -7 -5
Social expenditure -13 -6 -11 -4 -6 -5 -3
Education -12 -2 -9 -3 -4 -6 -3
Health -11 -4 -6 -3 -4 -2 -3
Other social 
expenditure
-20 -18 -20 -8 -8 -6 -5
Capital expenditure -23 -14 -19 -13 -20 -14 -9
Current expenditure -8 -3 -2 -1 -2 -3 -4
Source: Elaboration of MHCP budget reports. www.hacienda.gob.ni
Table 3.6. shows that there are only small differences between budgeted and actual data on 
budget execution. Actual expenditure never exceeds budgeted expenditure, and the degree 
of under-execution has decreased over time, indicating a better planning. Under-execution 
occurs especially in investment. In this respect, Nicaragua performs much better than many 
other low income countries, e.g. Ghana or Bolivia (De Jong 2009, Lawson 2007).
The discussion on, and later implementation of GBS fostered technical assistance programs 
for improving public financial management from World Bank, IDB, IMF, EC and some 
bilateral donors. These programs were effective because there was also a high level of 
commitment among government officers. Actual donor influence on improvements in PFM is 
therefore limited.
After 2007, the technical improvements in budget processes continue, but transparency of 
budgets and budget execution deteriorated. This is mainly due to the aid resources coming 
from Venezuela, which are not included in the budget. So far, pressure from the IMF and 
also from the BSG donors has it least managed to reveal the amount of these resources and 
their uses in 2008. Most resources stem from Venezuelan oil imports: the government only 
pays part of the bill, and the remainder is a long-term loan at a 2% (later 1%) interest rate. 
The government argues that this aid is in fact a loan to a private company (in which both the 
Nicaraguan and the Venezuelan state oil companies participate), so there is no reason for 
approval by the National Assembly. But Petronic, the state oil distribution company is led by 
the FSLN party treasurer, which harbors suspicion of mixing up state and party interests 
(Linneker, 2008). This limited transparency about a huge amount of money, probably 
around USD 1 billion in tree years, is a serious concern for the budget support donors.
54 This sometimes caused delays in the use of foreign aid, as the National Assembly first had to approve 
the budget expansions.
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In 2005, a new procurement law was introduced based on standards of the IDB. However, this 
law has not improved actual procurement procedures. Too many exemptions are granted, 
and if anything, corruption in government purchases seems to be on the rise. Donors have 
made the external auditing by the Supreme Audit Institution a condition from the start of the 
JFA. In 2006 they threatened with sanctions in 2007 if the 2005 audit would not be 
forthcoming. With delays, and after additional IDB financing, the 2005, 2006 (and in 2009 
also 2007) budgets have been audited. This is an achievement, but according to independent 
observers, the SAI is politicized and the auditing cannot possibly have revealed all abuses. 
There is evidence of political pressures on the officers carrying out the audit.55 Furthermore, 
so far no follow-up has been given to the findings of the 2005 and 2006 audits.56
Although the Law on Access to Information was approved, in the implementation the 
government emphasizes its technical aspects such as the coming into being of offices for 
the general public and access through the internet. Lack of resources constrains this 
implementation. In practice, civil society representatives observe that access to government 
information has been reduced under the Ortega administration. This was also experienced 
by the authors of this report. With the exception of the Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance, websites of government agencies are no longer maintained.
3.5.3 Improvedruleoflaw
An independent judicial system is important for the protection of human rights but also for 
the business climate. Donors wanted to support the Bolaños government in its attempt to 
improved the malfunctioning judicial system. This malfunctioning affects the rule of law: in 
case of a violation of private rights or other abuses, firms and citizens do not have access to 
justice and even if they have, they cannot expect fair and impartial procedures. The Supreme 
Court of Justice is a political organ in which the judges are appointed according to the 
Pacto. This influences all other judges and other officers in the system. For this reason, the 
donors have tried to foster the independence of the Judiciary by having a Judicial Career Law 
approved. The aim was that judges - at least, those below the highest level who continue to 
be appointed by the National Assembly - would be appointed on the basis of merit rather 
than their political alliances. However, the two main political parties of the Pacto were 
sabotaging the execution of this Law by holding up the Regulations that allegedly were 
necessary to implement the Law. Under heavy donor pressure (among other things, 
approval was a prior condition for the EC Justice sector budget support program), these 
Regulations were finally approved in June 2008. However, even after this approval, new 
judges were appointed on the basis of the old Law, “retroactively”. According to 
independent observers the new Law and its regulations have not made any difference in the 
functioning of the judicial system. It is possible, however, that the law and the regulations 
have some effect in the medium term.
55 Interviews, March 2009.
56 This is the conclusion of an assessment, commissioned by RNE and carried out by DES S. de R.L., 
consultants and auditors (2009), of the 2006 audit carried out by the SAI.
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3.5.4 Improveddemocracyandhumanandwomen’srights
As noted above, the donors have so far not been able to improve or restore the democratic 
character of the 2008 elections. The two parties remained excluded, no external observers 
were allowed and the 2008 election results have not changed. In June 2009, however, the 
government announced that EU observers would be admitted to next elections, the March 
2010 regional elections. In practice, these elections proved to be not fully transparent either.
The Nicaraguan human rights situation is considered to be good, especially in comparison 
with other countries of the region. However, there are recent incidences of harassment of 
civil society members and there is also evidence of increasing self-censorship in the press. 
Also in these areas, the policy dialogue has not been successful.
On women’s rights, an important blow was the penalization of therapeutic abortion in 
November 2006. So far, pressure from donors and from other sectors of society has not 
been able to change the law. According to the government, in practice doctors will care 
about the life of the mother and will carry out abortions in emergency situations. This 
seems to be confirmed by the lower maternal mortality rate in 2008. Although these 
government figures are not reliable and most likely underestimate actual maternal 
mortality, a lower figure in 2008 may reflect a real decrease. But this is probably not the 
result of doctors being flexible with the abortion law. There are many other plausible 
explanations for a possible reduction in maternal mortality. Since 2005, aid projects of 
several donors helped to establish more health posts in the countryside including specific 
mother and child care centers. Via sector budget support to the health sector, donors 
fostered training of health personnel and more access to family planning. After the 2007 
change in government Cuban doctors came to work in Nicaragua and they were assigned to 
the Atlantic region where maternal mortality was highest.57 According to a recent report of 
Amnesty International on Nicaragua, many doctors in Nicaragua do implement the law, 
resulting in widespread suffering, pain, and deaths.58
In 2006, and with some pressure from donors, the Law on Equal Opportunity was approved 
by the Assembly. But ownership among state institutions, other than the Nicaraguan 
Women Institute, was limited (Agurto, 2006). The current government has not yet met with 
the donor demand of making a national gender equity plan, but it does give a higher 
priority to gender equity. It targets women in its priority programs Hambre Cero and Usura 
Cero. It also gives much more attention to reducing violence against women, establishing 
women’s police offices where women can denounce this violence.
57 Interview with health specialist at RNE, March 2009.
58 www.es.amnesty.org/noticias
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3.6 Conclusions
This section summarizes the conclusions from the analysis in this chapter. First, some 
remarks will be made on aspects related to the process of the policy dialogue, and then some 
conclusions will be drawn on the results, the actual influence. 
The JFA and the PAM have provided the budget support donors a mechanism for a policy 
dialogue with the government on all areas and sectors of government policy. The reports of 
the Annual and Mid-Year meetings reflect detailed discussions, in which the government is 
held to account for what is has and has not done - comparable with what usually happens in 
Parliaments. This policy dialogue around budget support managed to foster the coordination 
within the government on policies to be implemented – principally between Ministry of 
Finance and line agencies and other state bodies, and also among line agencies. During the 
Bolaños administration, this coordination was also fostered by donor-financed consultants 
in the different ministries who took care of this coordination. During the Ortega 
government more ministers and vice-ministers participated in the discussions with donors 
themselves, instead of delegating this to consultants or other staff. The policy dialogue 
created spaces for technical coordination among them, while before there was only 
coordination on political issues. 
The donors did not always succeed in harmonizing their responses in the policy dialogue 
with government. During the years of the Bolaños government it went well, but donors 
acted more and more on their own in 2007, 2008 and 2009. The deterioration in donor 
harmonization was partly due to the fact that governance issues do not hinder 
disbursements from the multilateral banks. The IDB even stepped up lending, including 
budget support, in 2009 in order to compensate Nicaragua for the negative effects of the 
global economic crisis. But also among bilateral donors and the EC the response was not 
uniform, mainly due to headquarter interventions. As soon as political factors began to 
play a role, decisions were no longer taken in Managua and were therefore more difficult 
to harmonize.
 
What have been the results of the policy dialogue? The principle objectives of the policy 
dialogue in 2005 and 2006 were two-fold: first, to expand and improve (or establish) poverty 
reduction policies and second, to support the modernization agenda of the Bolaños 
government in the sense of achieving more budget transparency, and improving the rule of 
law. After the change in government, it was less necessary for donors to raise attention for 
poverty reduction. Instead, donors continued to press for improvements in transparency 
and in the judiciary, and began to bring in demands related to the functioning of the 
democracy and in the area of human rights, in particular women’s rights.
Over the full period, the donors were successful in maintaining poverty reduction 
expenditure (after the increase between 2002 and 2004) and in improving some aspects of 
public financial management. The former result is some evidence of influence on the 
Bolaños government. Whether this higher expenditure translated in poverty reduction or 
improvement of social indicators will be examined in chapter 5. The improvements in 
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public finance management can be partly ascribed to the stimulus that budget support has 
provided to technical assistance programs in this area. Priorities of donors and of the 
executive mostly coincided in this issue so donor influence was not needed.
Donors proved to have some influence on sector policies if they managed to convince the 
involved officers and ministers. But given the limited implementation power of the 
previous government, actual execution was slow. In addition, with the government change, 
some of these policies have been reversed. The current government is less likely to concede 
to donor wishes. But if it does get convinced, the chances of implementation are much 
higher than under the previous government. In this respect, it can be expected that a policy 
dialogue on poverty reduction policies can be more fruitful than it was in 2005 and 2006.
Donors had much less influence on the more political components of the policy dialogue, 
areas that potentially affect the power base of the Ortega government, or that were related 
to the division of power according to the Pacto, agreed in 1999 between Ortega’s FSLN and 
Alemán’s PLC. The Bolaños administration did not have any support from these two parties 
that dominated the National Assembly, and was dependent on donor pressure to get things 
done. In 2005, donors suspended budget support to add leverage to the demands of the IMF 
for having several laws approved by the National Assembly. The Bolaños government agreed 
with the contents of these laws, but the two political parties dominating the National 
Assembly did not. In the end, this donor pressure was successful and the laws were 
approved. Earlier, this use of budget support was typified as supporting the IMF (“Grupo de 
Apoyo al Fondo”, Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007: 38). But interviews held in 2009 with both 
government officers and donor representatives involved at the time, made it clear that 
donors and executive in fact worked together together against the interests of the majority 
in the National Assembly.  In this case donors had influence, because the laws were 
approved. But if laws are approved just because of donor pressure while their content runs 
counter to majority opinions in Parliament, one can doubt whether they will be fully 
implemented.59 A possible effect is a reduced confidence in laws themselves. This raises the 
question of the legitimacy of these donor interventions.
In some other instances, donors used the threat of suspension in order to increase pressure on 
the government and on the two main political parties. In 2006, the donors collectively 
threatened to not disburse in 2007 if the government would not present the audit of the 2005 
budget execution. And the EC did not start its Judicial Sector Program of about €20 million per 
year if and as long as the Regulations for the Judicial Career Law were not approved. In both 
cases, compliance was achieved after heavy pressure and with long delays. These achievements 
are so far more formal than real, but they may have some effects in the medium to long term.
After the perceived breaches of the fundamental principles of the JFA by the Ortega 
government, in particular human (women’s) rights and the conditions for free and fair 
elections, bilateral donors and the EC froze disbursements. The government responded by 
59 As happened, for example, with the laws approved in order to comply with the HIPC Completion Point 
in Nicaragua.
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interrupting the policy dialogue, and did not change any of its policies in these areas. 
However, early 2009 the country’s economic situation proved so adverse (lower tax revenues 
and lower aid from Venezuela) that the government re-opened negotiations with the BSG. 
So far, these have produced one government concession, in the form of a promise to allow 
EU observers in the 2010 elections for regional governments in the Atlantic region.
These results confirm the findings of earlier studies, namely that policy conditionality is not 
very effective (Collier et al.,1997; Dijkstra, 2002; Dollar & Svensson, 2000). Governments will 
only implement what they intended to do anyway, and the country’s political economy is 
determinant in what will be implemented. Political conditionality is least effective 
(Crawford, 1997). From these earlier studies it can also be learnt that donor influence in 
political areas is more likely to be effective if donor demands are specific - confirmed by 
success of the specific demand for allowing external observers in next elections.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines some intermediate effects of budget support. Budget support implies 
resources which the government can spend according to its own priorities and using its 
own systems for planning, budgeting, reporting, procurement, and auditing. At the 
macro-economic level, there are three possible “uses” of the money involved in budget 
support. First, budget support may enhance macro-economic stability if these resources 
help to finance a budget deficit. Second, budget support may increase government 
expenditure. A third possible effect is that the availability of these resources gives an 
incentive to reduce tax efforts: the so-called “fiscal response”. A combination of the three 
effects is possible. To the extent that project money is fungible, at this macro-economic 
level there is not much difference between project aid and budget support.60
Some other assumed intermediate effects are specific for budget support as opposed to 
project aid. Within the government, the flow of discretionary resources is supposed to 
enhance the allocative efficiency of public expenditure and to strengthen local systems. 
Furthermore, it is expected that this aid modality reduces transaction costs for both 
government and donors. And finally, for society at large, budget support may foster the 
government’s domestic accountability, since it is the government that is responsible for 
priority setting and actual implementation of these resources. This positive effect on domestic 
accountability may also be the result of the policy dialogue around budget support, as donors 
usually demand more transparency of budgets and budget executions. The domestic 
accountability effect is in part contingent upon the strengthening of local systems and will 
therefore be dealt with in the same section (4.4) of this chapter. Section 4.3 deals with 
transaction costs, and we begin with the macro-economic effects and allocative efficiency.
4.2 Macro-economiceffectsandallocativeefficiency
This first section attempts to analyze the macro-economic effects of budget support 
resources: so whether they increased expenditure, reduced tax revenues or helped financing 
a deficit. By examining changes in (other) components of government income, expenditure 
and financing of the deficit, we try to establish a “counterfactual”: what would have 
happened in the absence of these resources? This question should in particular be answered 
for the years 2004-2007, when “liquid aid resources” (most of it budget support)61 were at a 
relatively high level (Chapter 2). Important years for which changes must be examined are 
therefore 2004 (when liquid resources, or program aid, increased) and 2008 and 2009 
(when they fell). We start the analysis in 2002, the first year of the Bolaños administration, 
and examine first income, then expenditure, and then the deficit.
60 In addition, there are many modalities in between general budget support and project aid, such as 
sector budget support and sector baskets.
61 The Central Bank of Nicaragua registers aid as either “liquid resources” (recursos líquidos), which are not 
linked to projects, or “tied resources” (recursos atados), which are. Liquid resources is in fact program 
aid, and general budget support is, especially in the period under study, its dominant modality. Before 
2000, balance of payments support was the most important modality of program aid. 
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With respect to the actual macro-economic uses of budget support, its predictability is an 
important factor. We concluded in Chapter 2 that budget support disbursements have been 
(much) lower than commitments in 2005 and 2008. This means that predictability across 
years was modest. Predictability within the budget year was good in 2006, but much less in 
the other years, and in all years most resources were transferred at the end of the year. These 
two characteristics (moderate predictability and late receipt) reduce the possibility for using 
(the bulk of ) budget support for additional expenditure. The moderate predictability makes 
it also unlikely that the government has reduced tax efforts.
Table 4.1      Sources and uses of government resources (in % of GDP)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Government revenues 14.8 16.4 17.2 18.0 18.8 19.6 19.0
  Tax revenues 13.4 15.1 15.7 16.7 17.4 18.0 17.6
  Other income 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5
Total expenditure 20.4 24.1 22.4 22.5 22.7 22.7 22.9
Deficit -5.6 -7.8 -5.3 -4.5 -3.9 -3.1 -3.8
Financing of deficit:
  Grants 3.7 5.3 2.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.3
  Net external financing 2.0 4.0 5.7 3.5 2.7 2.6 1.7
  Net internal financing -0.1 -1.5 -3.2 -2.8 -2.6 -3.2 -1.2
Total expenditure 20.4 24.1 22.4 22.5 22.7 22.7 22.9
  Poverty expenditure 9.1 11.1 12.0 13.1 12.3 13.3 13.4
  Social expenditure 8.5 10.2 10.3 11.2 11.1 11.7 12.3
  Interest internal debt 1.6 2.5 1.6 0.6** 1.2 1.0 0.7
  Interest external debt 1.1 1.9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
  Other expenditure* 9.2 9.6 10.2 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.5
Memo items:
Program aid 0.8 0.7 2.5 1.1 2.5 1.9 0.5
Amortization external debt 2.0 3.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6
New external loans 4.0 7.2 6.2 4.1 3.5 3.3 2.3
Deficit after grants -1.8 -2.5 -2.5 -0.7 -0.1 0.6 -0.5
*    Total minus social minus debt payments.
**  The 2005 figure for interest on internal debt is much higher in Table VI-9 of Fiscal accounts from the Central 
Bank (1.4% of GDP), but here we use the MHCP figures.
Sources: Own calculations based on: MHCP (Liquidación presupuestaria) for budget data, BCN for GDP data and 
exchange rates (year average).
Government revenues and also tax revenues increased during the whole period. Tax revenues 
increased from 13.4% in 2002 to a peak of 18% of GDP in 2007 (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). These 
increases are due to the effect of a new tax Law adopted in 2002, and further improvements in 
the efficiency of tax collection during the Bolaños administration. On first sight there does not 
seem to have been a “fiscal response”. However, one of the motives for the 2002 tax Law was the 
long-term declining trend in foreign aid, in real terms. In addition, a World Bank study (Artana, 
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2005) shows that tax exemptions still reduce tax income by the equivalent of 4% of GDP. In 2009, 
when foreign aid and budget support fell further, and under the influence of the economic crisis 
which reduced tax income, the Ortega government proposed a new tax law in order to increase 
revenues and make them more progressive. In conclusion, budget support in itself is perhaps 
unlikely to have induced a “fiscal response” due to its unpredictability, but total aid may have had 
this effect: tax revenues might have been raised earlier in the absence of the generous aid flow.
Source: Table 4.1
With respect to other income components, the government obtained substantial “virtual 
income” from 2004 onward by the reduction in external debt payments. Interest payments 
on external debt decreased from 1.9% of GDP in 2003 to around 0.4% of GDP in later years 
(Table 4.1). Amortizations also decreased substantially (memo item), which is reflected in a 
higher net external financing,62 but this effect only seems to have occurred in 2004. As of 
2005, the volume of new loans decreased, so net external financing decreased again. The 
virtual flow of forgone interest payments on external debt from 2004 onwards was of about 
the same size as the increase in program aid between 2003 and 2004. However, the debt relief 
was permanent, while the program aid increase was only temporary, lasting up until 2007.
 
Total expenditure peaked in 2003, and this seems related to the one-time rise in interest 
payments in that year. From 2004 onwards, expenditures have been stable in relation to 
GDP, but at a higher level than in 2002 (Figure 4.1). However, government revenues in 
relation to GDP increased more than expenditure between 2002 and 2004, so it is difficult to 
conclude that the higher expenditure is due to budget support, or to foreign income in 
general. The combination of stable expenditure from 2004 onwards, increasing domestic 
revenues in all years, and a one time surge in foreign income (including forgone external 
62 Net external financing is new external loans (memo item) minus amortization external debt (memo 
item).
Figure 4.1 Government income and expenditure, 2002-2008 (in % of GDP)
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interest payments) in 2004, led to a lower deficit. The budget deficit continued to decrease 
until 2007, and rose slightly in 2008 (Table 4.1). The deficit after grants (memo item) became 
negligible since 2005 and was even positive in one year (Figure 4.1). This shows that 
macro-economic stability has been achieved in these years. But budget support does not 
seem to have played a large role. In 2005 and 2008 actual budget support proved to lower 
than promised, but this did not lead to a higher deficit - with a possible exception in 2008, 
but in that year revenues also decreased. Apparently, consecutive governments were 
determined to keep the deficit at a low level.
In all years, the deficit has been financed by external loans and grants, while net internal 
financing was negative. The higher flow of freely spendable external resources (budget 
support plus the virtual flow of forgone external interest payments) since 2004 was 
accompanied by an increase (in absolute terms) in the negative net internal financing of the 
deficit. This means the government was repaying on its internal debt more than it was 
borrowing. This negative internal financing moved from around 1% of GDP in 2002 and 
2003 to around 3% over the years 2004-2007. In 2008, when budget support was reduced 
substantially (and tax revenues decreased), this net negative internal financing decreased to 
around 1%. Figure 4.2 shows the parallel movements in negative net internal financing 
(repayment) and in budget support in the years 2004-2008. In 2009, with the economic 
crisis and the further reduction in budget support, it became clear that net internal 
financing had become positive. This means that macro-economic stability is affected, the 
more so since the government is borrowing at an increasing domestic interest rate.63
Net internal repayment = minus net internal financing. 
Source: Table 4.1. 
It can be concluded that it is unlikely that budget support has led to an increase in 
government expenditure (there was no such increase, see Figure 4.1) or to reduced tax 
63 In March 2009, this interest rate was 10.5%.
Figure 4.2 Program aid and net internal repayment (in % of GDP)
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revenues. Although Figures 4.1 and 4.2 cannot prove anything, they do make plausible that 
the most likely use of budget support over the years 2004-2007 has been an increase in the 
negative internal financing of the budget deficit (in Figure 4.2: an increase in internal 
repayment). In this sense, budget support has contributed to macro-economic stability. 
This is confirmed by the developments in 2008 and 2009 - years in which budget support 
was reduced. The immediate effect was an increase in the government’s domestic 
borrowing, in 2009 followed by an increase in the deficit itself.
With respect to the composition of expenditure, Chapter 3 already concluded that poverty 
reduction expenditure in relation to GDP increased between 2002 and 2005 and was then 
maintained, and that social expenditure increased more continuously between 2002 and 
2008. This is also evident in relation to total expenditure (Table 4.2). This rising trend was 
achieved despite stable total expenditure between 2004 and 2008. In 2004, the increase in 
poverty and social spending could be financed by lower debt payments. In later years, the 
(smaller) increases in poverty and social expenditure were at the cost of other (non-social 
and non-debt) expenditure (Table 4.2). It must be remarked, however, that Nicaragua 
received large amounts of HIPC debt relief after 2001 and that over the years 2002-2006, 
only 44% of debt relief has been allocated to poverty reduction expenditure (Guimarães and 
Avendaño 2008: 61-62).
Table 4.2      Government expenditure in percent of total expenditure
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
  Capital expenditure 32 36 43 42 32 32 27
  Current expenditure 68 64 57 58 68 68 73
  Poverty expenditure 44 46 53 58 54 59 58
    Capital 21 26 32 32 27 28 23
    Current 24 20 21 26 27 31 35
  Social expenditure 42 42 46 50 49 52 54
  Interest payments 13 18 8 5 8 6 5
    Internal debt 8 10 7 3 5 5 3
    External debt 5 8 1 2 2 2 1
  Other expenditure* 45 40 45 46 44 42 41
* Total expenditure minus social expenditure minus debt payments.
Sources: See Table 4.1.
Budget support may enhance the allocative efficiency of government expenditure because 
governments can spend a larger part of the total resource envelop according to their own 
priorities. Budget support can only increase allocative efficiency if i) resources are really 
freely spendable and not earmarked to specific uses, ii) there is not too much donor-
demanded ring fencing of expenditures, and iii) resources are predictable, both during 
the budget year and across years. Chapter 2 concluded that most budget support resources 
were freely spendable, but that there have been some problems with predictability in 
2005 and 2008. With respect to donor requirements for ring fencing, the requirement for 
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poverty reduction expenditure and also other demands such as raising transfers to 
municipalities from 6 to 10% of tax revenues in 201064 may have reduced allocative 
efficiency. On the whole, general budget support may have had some positive effect on 
allocative efficiency in comparison with project aid.
4.3 Transactioncosts
One of the assumed advantages of budget support as compared with project aid is that 
transaction costs will be reduced. Transaction costs are the costs of making a transaction,  
in this case aid; i.e. the costs of preparing a transaction (information and search costs), 
negotiating it, and the costs of monitoring (donors) or bonding (recipient) in relation to 
the transaction (Hazeu, 2000). Table 4.3 lists these costs if we apply them to project aid and 
to budget support. Most of these costs involve time, and are thus salary costs. But there is 
also a small component of material costs (travel costs, meeting costs, paper, etc.) The 
problem is that there is no hard information on these costs.
Table 4.3      Overview of transaction costs of aid, for donor and recipient, project aid and  
                         budget support (by type of costs)
Project aid GBS
Donor Recipient Donor Recipient
Information 
and search
Priority setting at 
HQ and in country; 
preparatory visits 
or missions to the 
field
Defining 
“supportable” 
projects and 
programs, selecting 
appropriate donors 
for them
Determining 
criteria for GBS at 
HQ; Assessment of 
quality of PRSP, 
governance, PFM, 
macro-economic 
stability (e.g. via 
“track records”)
Finding out donor 
criteria for GBS and 
trying to comply 
with them; e.g. 
writing PRSP;
negotiating and 
maintaining IMF 
agreement 
Negotiation Negotiation with 
particular agency 
involved
Negotiation with 
particular donor 
involved
Discussion on JFA, 
preamble and 
annual matrices; 
among donors and 
with government
Discussion on JFA, 
preamble and 
annual matrices
Monitoring 
and bonding
Financing executing 
agency and/or 
monitoring unit; 
monitoring in 
embassy and at 
HQ; mid-term and 
final evaluations
Reporting, auditing 
and monitoring as 
required by the 
donor
BSG meetings; 
Mid-term and 
annual meetings
Writing progress 
reports for mid-
term and annual 
meetings; 
participation in 
those meetings;
Writing Annual 
Progress Reports 
on PRSP
64 Interview with government officer in March 2009.
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In the following, we attempt to compare the transaction costs of an “average” bilateral or 
multilateral project with the costs of joint general budget support as it has been implemented 
in Nicaragua. But of course we must bear in mind that an average bilateral or multilateral 
project is probably around USD 5 million,65 while budget support was meant to be around USD 
120 million annually, or more. In practice, the average total disbursements over the years 2005 
to 2008 were USD 75 million (Chapter 2). This was at least 15 times the estimated size of an 
individual project. So budget support has reduced transaction costs if we can prove that the 
transaction costs for budget support are less than 15 times those for an individual project.
Information and search costs for the government have been much higher than for an 
average project. The Bolaños government had to write and later revise its National 
Development Plan (NDP). Largely because of donor demands, it also held regional 
consultations on this plan. Donors again required the elaboration of a comprehensive 
national development plan from the Ortega government (a third PRSP). The costs of 
preparing these plans, and the costs of the consultations held for the NDP are huge.66 
In part, however, they were incurred by the donors who provided technical assistance 
(consultants) and resources for organizing the consultations of the NDP.
Donors had to define their selection criteria for budget support and had to investigate 
whether the country meets these criteria. The defining of the criteria is usually done at 
headquarters, but applying them to a particular country still takes a lot of time and effort 
from in-country donor staff. The RNE, for example, elaborates track records every year for 
each country.67 Other donors commission specific studies on public finance management, 
for example. To a large extent, donors still have separate, non-harmonized, criteria and 
procedures for their assessment. This increases transaction costs for the donors. There are a 
few exceptions, such as the jointly organized Public Expenditure and Financial 
Accountability (PEFA) assessment in 2006. In 2007, three bilateral donors worked together 
in writing an assessment of the political situation in Nicaragua (Norway, Switzerland, and 
Finland). However, many other separate bilateral assessments were also written or 
commissioned to consultants, for example by Finland, Switzerland, and The Netherlands.68
Chapter 2 showed that the preparation of the JFA and in particular of the PAM took about 
two years and involved an intensive coordination and negotiation process. There were many 
meetings among the donors, meetings between donors and government and meetings 
between government institutions. The donors were of the view that transaction costs were 
65 In 2008, Nicaragua received around USD 400 million in aid, in the form of about 270 projects. But this 
includes aid going to NGOs and budget support, registered by donor as individual “project” (Information 
Vice-Chancellor, November 2009). If budget support is exclueded, USD 370 million and around 265 
projects remain, or an average project size of USD 1.4 million. It can be expected that bilateral and 
multilateral projects are larger than the average project, so USD 5 million is a conservative estimate.  
66 These national comprehensive plans, and the participation processes that (should) accompany it, may 
have benefits in itself. But there are reasons to question these benefits, as argued, for example, in 
Dijkstra (2005).
67 Recently only once in four years a “full” track record is required, and in the other years the Embassy 
elaborates a track record “light”.
68 For example, a SCAGA (Social Corruption And Governance Analysis) was carried out in 2008.
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very high in the preparation phase.69 The government experienced these intensive meetings 
as an “increase in transaction costs”,70 probably as compared to the liquid aid provided before 
the JFA, for example in the context of the FSS, or compared to the individual budget support 
loans by the multilateral banks or the balance of payments support from bilateral donors in 
the 1990s. The negotiation process had become more complex than under previous 
program aid modalities because many more donors and many more government 
institutions were involved.
Also after the signing of the JFA, negotiation costs continued to be high for both donors and 
government. This includes the annual and mid-year meetings (taking one or two days each), 
but also the meestings of technical working groups of donors and government to work on 
permanent revisions of the PAM. Usually there are some additional high level meetings of 
the BSG and with the government as well.
In terms of monitoring and bonding, the transaction costs for the government are 
somewhat higher than in the case of projects, but not much higher. Part of the required 
reports such as the report on budget execution, are prepared anyway because they are 
presented to the National Assembly. In addition to these reports, the government must 
elaborate Annual Progress Reports on the national strategies - which probably would not 
happen otherwise. For the donors, the monitoring costs of budget support are not much 
higher than for project aid. They hardly have to read additional material - over and above 
what informed agency staff would read anyway.
Table 4.4. lists the possible factors with which transaction costs of an individual project 
must be multiplied in order to get the transaction costs of budget support. The negotiation 
of the first JFA was heavy but can be seen as a one-time investment. On the other hand, the 
information and search costs are in part recurrent. During all years, donors do not just 
monitor the progress on the PAM, but they continuously assess whether Nicaragua meets 
the entrance criteria. A new government in the recipient country that does not agree with 
the existing national plan, is required to elaborate a new long-term, comprehensive and 
preferably participation-based strategy.
Table 4.4      Rough estimates of the quantitative relation between transactions costs of  
                         budget support as compared to transaction costs of an average project
Donor Recipient
Information and search 3x 14x (partly financed by donors)
Negotiation, first JFA 8x 8x
Annual negotiations 3x 3x
Monitoring and bonding 1x 2x
Source: own estimates.
69 Interviews with donors 2004 and 2009.
70 Interview March 2009 with former officer Hacienda, and in 2004 with vice Chancellor.
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If these estimates are approximately correct, and given the assumption that the volume of 
budget support was at least 15 times the volume of an individual bilateral or multilateral 
project, the balance is positive for budget support. The multiple in transaction costs for 
budget support is slightly higher for the recipient government than for the donors. Yet, also 
for the recipient government the balance is positive. This positive balance is confirmed in 
interviews with officers of the current government.71
So far, we have related the transaction costs of budget support to the volume of the 
transaction. However, as shown above, most transaction costs in budget support are the result 
of donors setting entrance conditions and establishing policy conditions via negotiations with 
the government. This means that transaction costs must also be assessed in relation to the 
benefits of these attempts to influence government policies. Chapter 3 shows that some results 
have been achieved, but that these results were in many cases limited to the formal level.
4.4 Strengtheninglocalsystemsanddomestic
accountability
4.4.1 Strengtheninglocalsystems
Budget support is transferred directly to the government and thus uses national systems for 
planning, budgeting, procurement, reporting and auditing. By using these national 
systems, it is expected to help strengthening these systems. This section investigates to what 
extent GBS helped strengthening these systems, both in the Ministry of Finance and in the 
most important line ministries, those of Health and Education.
There is no doubt that some government systems have been strengthened, especially during 
the government of Bolaños.72 SIGFA has been introduced and has allowed a much better 
control and transparency of government spending. Planning and budgeting of resources 
have improved due to the adoption of Law 550 and the introduction of the MTEF. During the 
last years of the Bolaños administration, investment planning improved and also became 
more participatory: the national investment planning system SNIP was integrated with the 
municipal and departmental investment plans, which in turn were established with broad 
participation. A new procurement law was adopted that matched international standards 
and the 2005 and 2006 budgets were externally audited. Due to the inclusion of all aid 
resources in the national budget, planning also improved at sector level. Line agencies also 
managed to improve their monitoring systems.
In addition, under the influence of donors and with donor-financing, the government set 
up a statistical information system, SINASID, to monitor progress on the Millennium 
Development Goals and other social indicators mentioned in the National Development 
71 March 2009.
72 See for more extensive overviews Guimarães and Avendaño (2007, 2008) and Acevedo Volg (2007).
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Plan. This system brings together information from many different sources (line ministries, 
statistical institute). SINASID was however far from perfect, since there was no provision for 
systematic updating of the indicators (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007).
Some of the improvements achieved during the Bolaños administration were more formal 
than real (procurement, external auditing, see chapter 3). In addition, the government change 
in 2007 led to a change in the monitoring systems for social indicators (starting from scratch 
with a new system) and weakened the geographic coordination of investment planning.
General budget support has contributed to the strengthening of government systems by 
using these systems and not undermining them, and also by giving a stimulus to technical 
assistance programs from World Bank, IMF, IDB, EU, and Switzerland (MTEF), some of them 
co-financed from other bilateral donors such as the Netherlands. The financial volume of 
these programs (including equipment, training and salaries of well-paid consultants) was 
huge. Programs in the area of public financial management were relatively successful since 
there was a high extent of commitment, both at the political level and among senior 
management in, for example, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. This 
commitment also made the benefits more sustainable.
4.4.2 Domesticaccountability
 
Budget support may also increase domestic accountability. If a larger share of the foreign aid 
resources is channeled through the regular revenue and expenditure channels, and if the 
dialogue around GBS brings about more transparency in public finance management and 
more public knowledge of government policies and results, citizens have more possibilities 
to hold their government to account. This may then also lead to more government 
responsiveness to its own citizens. On the other hand, GBS and aid more generally are 
sometimes said to decrease domestic accountability. In highly aid dependent countries, 
governments tend to listen more to the donors than to their own citizens; accountability is 
outward and upward instead of inward and downward (Moyo, 2009; Sogge, 2002).
In Nicaragua, a combination of donor technical assistance and government commitment 
led to improved transparency in public finance management. Government budgets are 
available online, and information on budget execution is also fully transparent - data being 
published immediately after each trimester. This means that transparency not only 
improved for the donors, but also domestically.73 Transparency on government policies, on 
investment projects (the SNIP) and on laws being discussed in the National Assembly has 
also improved, with most of this information available online. Despite the adoption of the 
Public Access to Information Law in 2007, which would guarantee citizens access to 
information on government policies, in practice this access diminished across the board 
since 2007. Except for the BCN and the MHCP, government agencies’ websites became 
73 There were exceptions. For example, in 2004, the government sent the IMF more realistic tax revenue 
projections than it did to the National Assembly in the context of the budget. This was meant to lower 
the transfers to universities and municipalities, which by law are a percentage of tax revenues 
(Guimarães and Avendaño, 2007: 48).
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incomplete and outdated. Transparency of budgets and budget execution was, but a 
problem is that these budgets themselves are no longer complete, since they do not include 
Venezuelan aid.74 However, pressure from the IMF and from GBS donors led to the 
publication of all sources and used of this aid in 2008. The new government moved SINASID 
to the Institute for Statistics (where it was not maintained due to lack of resources) and set 
up a new monitoring system for policy outcomes in the domain of social welfare, including 
458 indicators. However, so far this system can only be accessed by government officers. It is 
not available for society at large or for members of the National Assembly.75
The greater transparency of government budgets and policies that was achieved under the 
Bolaños government has certainly been used by civil society and Parliament. The National 
Assembly had always discussed national budgets and revenues intensively, but became more 
active in monitoring the actual use of government resources. For example, in 2006, the 
National Assembly formally recognized SIGFA as the only source for monitoring budget 
execution (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007). Civil society also makes active use of the publicly 
available budget information. The Coordinadora Civil76 has an Economic Committee that 
scrutinizes the allocation of government expenditure, government policies and outcomes, 
as well as the IMF agreements and the conditionality involved (Acevedo Vogl, 2007). The 
Coordinadora Civil has, among other things, denounced IMF conditionality and the high 
and allegedly illegal payments on internal debt.
Although the Bolaños government was very dependent on donor support and therefore 
paid attention to donor wishes, it was also dependent on Parliament for approving its 
budgets and other laws. As it did not have a majority in Parliament, it had to work hard for 
obtaining this support. High government officers did not always participate in the technical 
working groups of GBS and were more involved in negotiating with members of Parliament. 
In this sense donors did not weaken domestic accountability systems. On the other hand, 
donors have added leverage on Parliament for approving certain laws, in particular in 2005 
when the IMF program was off track. This was successful, which means that laws have been 
approved against the original opinion of Parliament’s majority. The long-term effects of this 
are not clear: if these laws are beneficial to the country and are implemented, the effect may 
be positive. If these laws are not implemented, donor pressure contributed to a weakening 
of formal institutions such as laws, but also of Parliament itself.
With respect to possibilities for civil society to respond to government actions, donors 
urged the government to discuss drafts of the National Development Plan (NDP) in regions 
and municipalities, which may have improved domestic accountability. In the same period, 
the Citizen Participation Law was adopted in the National Assembly which increased 
participation at municipal and departmental levels (Guimarães & Avendaño, 2007). On the 
other hand, the Bolaños government initially weakened the CONPES (National Committee 
74 In 2007, a study on budget transparency in Latin America showed that Nicaragua was the penultimate of 
the region, just before Venezuela (interview with representative of Coordinadora Civil).
75 Interview with representatives of Secretariat of the Presidency (SEPRES), March 2009.
76 This is the most important umbrella organization of civil society in Nicaragua, representing more than 
400 organizations and persons.
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on Economic and Social Policies), an advisory organ to the government in which civil 
society participated, by directly appointing a large number of its members. The NDP was 
only once discussed in CONPES and never in Parliament. Towards the end of the Bolaños 
period the CONPES was expanded and regained some independence.
Under the current government, the possibilities for independent citizens and civil society 
organizations to express opinions and to influence government policies have been reduced. 
Civil society representatives complain it that has become more difficult to openly criticize 
the government. Some people have been arrested, against other persons legal charges have 
been raised, and yet others have been threatened by government officers. Under President 
Ortega not a single meeting of CONPES has been held. Despite FSLN support in the National 
Assembly for the Citizen Participation Law, this Law is no longer implemented. Instead, the 
Ortega government has set up its CPCs, which are supposed to be instruments of direct 
democracy. CPCs do discuss government plans in some cases, for example the draft gender 
equity plan.77 But in practice they are more likely to be instruments for top-down control of 
the population. The election fraud in the 2008 municipal elections is another signal of the 
limited responsiveness of this government to the opinions of the population: the 
government did not even respect the ballot results.
Donors have attempted to prevent these deteriorations in formal democratic procedures 
and in citizen’s rights. In comparison with the relatively small amount of GBS money, 
donors have been able to get a lot of attention for their demands especially after the 2008 
election fraud. Despite the reduced membership of the BSG in 2008-2009, press attention 
for GBS meetings and statements remained high. In the aftermath of the elections, the 
domestic opposition sometimes seemed to use the external actors as their spokespersons. 
This means that during the Ortega government, donors have attempted to improve 
domestic accountability in line with attempts of domestic actors. However, donor demands 
have so far mainly focused on formal systems of accountability and could pay more 
attention to the protection of civil rights, such as freedom of speech and of press.
4.5 Conclusions
The most likely use of budget support resources has been the financing of the deficit. In particular, 
budget support resources were used to increase the net negative internal financing of the budget 
deficit. Budget support did not lead to lower tax revenues or higher public expenditure. Total aid, 
however, may have reduced tax efforts in Nicaragua, especially if a longer time period is 
considered. Budget support may have had some positive effect on allocative efficiency.
Although transaction costs have been huge, especially during the preparation phase of the 
JFA, the relatively high volume of budget support during the years 2005-2008 still brings about 
a positive balance for budget support in comparison with project aid. Transaction costs in 
budget support are slightly higher for the recipient government than for the donors.
77 Interview with government officer at Ministry of Gobernación, March 2009.
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Government systems have been strengthened, especially during the Bolaños government 
(2002-2007). The policy dialogue around budget support played some role. But the most 
important factor in strengthening local systems was donor technical assistance linked to 
budget support, which was effective due to a high degree of commitment among 
government officers.
Domestic accountability improved somewhat during the final years of the Bolaños 
administration, and the policy dialogue around budget support may have played a role. Also 
in this area, the situation is deteriorating under the current government, and the policy 
dialogue around budget support has not been able to counteract this trend.
Government policies 
and poverty reduction
5
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General budget support implies that donors transfer their money directly to governments, 
so that these governments are able to carry out their policies for growth and poverty 
reduction with a larger resource envelop. It is therefore important to examine what these 
policies are and what their results have been. Donor money has contributed to these results. 
This chapter analyzes these policies and their results.
In Nicaragua, general budget support has been provided to two different governments: in 
2005 and 2006, donors supported the Bolaños administration that was already in power from 
2002 onwards. For this period, we examine the policies carried out in the full period 2002-
2006, and the results of these policies over the same period. The data obtained in the Living 
Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) conducted in 2001 and 2005 are a good proxy for 
assessing the results of President Bolaños’ policies. In 2007 and 2008, donors supported the 
Ortega administration. We examine the policies of this government and in particular the 
policy changes, but it is hardly possible to examine their outcomes, as the results of new LSMS 
will only be available in 2010. There is some recent information on several social indicators, 
and with respect to poverty reduction we limit ourselves to assessing expected outcomes.
This chapter first analyzes the growth and poverty reduction policies of the two consecutive 
governments. A next section analyzes the results in terms of private investment, growth, 
and poverty reduction, in particular income poverty. Section 3 analyzes government policies 
and expenditure policies for the social sectors as well as their outcomes. 
5.1 DevelopmentpoliciesunderBolañosandOrtega
This section analyzes and compares the growth and poverty reduction strategies of both the 
Bolaños and the Ortega governments during the period under study (2004-2009). Although 
both governments have maintained the same post-conflict macroeconomic framework 
developed under the tutelage of the IMF since the 1990s, they have significant difference in 
their socioeconomic philosophies and development policies. The Bolaños administration 
believed that foreign investors and the relatively large domestic private sector were the 
driving forces of economic growth and employment generation, while the Ortega 
government emphasizes the key role of the state in fostering economic growth with equity.
Both governments incorporate in their growth policies the large social segment of small 
agricultural producers and informal businesses, but with different strategies. The Bolaños 
policy was to promote the modernization of peasant agriculture and the informal business 
sector, while the FSLN promotes food security and employment generation. There are 
significant discrepancies between these two administrations in their diagnoses of the 
causes of Nicaragua’s weak post-conflict economic performance. Hausmann, Rodrik and 
Velasco developed a model for identifying the causes of low levels of private investment and 
entrepreneurship in developing countries (Rodrik, 2007). Based on this model, the causes 
of low economic activity identified by the Bolaños administration were mainly the 
government failure to protect property rights, reduce corruption and provide adequate 
infrastructure for private investors. In contrast, the Ortega administration’s diagnosis of the 
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causes of low private investment is that the high cost of finance, poor infrastructure, and 
market failures cause the exclusion of the key small and medium business sector in 
economic development. This exclusion is the key constraint on economic growth.
 
The centerpiece of the Bolaños government growth policy was its cluster development strategy 
for the business export sector. The underlying logic was that private and public investment in a 
selected group of clusters was going to improve Nicaragua’s competitiveness in the global 
market. These selected clusters of firms were going to generate growth through economies of 
scale and externalities of information, skilled labor and productive chains. The key sectors 
identified with growth potential were textile and garment, tourism, agro-industries (coffee, 
beef and dairy) and natural resources industries (forestry, fishing and mining).
The main government role in this context was to improve the business climate for foreign 
and domestic investors. This included both the reform of the judicial system to guarantee 
investors rights, and public investment in the transport and communications infrastructure 
needed to develop the clusters. In particular, the infrastructure development was geared 
towards facilitating access to the US market given the business opportunities that had been 
generated by the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the US (CAFTA). This 
development strategy also included the privatization of sectors that were still partially or 
totally state-owned such as telecommunications, energy and water. The implicit diagnosis 
of this growth policy was that the rate of return on private investment was too low because 
investors’ risks were too high and export infrastructure was inadequate and inefficient. The 
high level of investors’ risk was mainly caused by uncertainty over property rights and the 
corruption of the judicial system. 
In contrast, the FSLN government has abandoned the cluster development strategy arguing 
that it was biased in favor of foreign and large domestic investors. The new Human 
Development Plan emphasizes the role of the state in making markets work and fighting 
social inequality through market regulation and intervention. One goal is to support 
small-scale agriculture and the micro and small business sector oriented towards both the 
domestic and the external markets. The role of the government in this strategy is to 
intervene in the markets to facilitate access to credit and business services, and to promote 
the organization of rural and urban cooperatives.
Another goal is to regulate the capitalist sector to protect consumers from monopoly pricing. 
The strategy includes the partial or total re-statization of the energy and water sectors and the 
establishment of a new state development bank. Public investment serves both goals. It is 
oriented to finding cheaper energy sources such as renewable energy and to improve transport 
infrastructure, particularly in the rural sector. In this case, the implicit diagnosis of the 
government strategy is that market failures and the lack of infrastructure are the main causes 
of the low rate of return of private investment, particularly for the rural sector.   
Another key dimension of the FSLN government strategy is the creation of a parallel public 
sector financed by the Latin American Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA), aimed in part to 
promote trade diversification to reduce Nicaragua’s dependence on the US market. This 
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parallel public sector operates through public-private corporations that intervene in a wide 
variety of sectors including imports and distribution of oil, food, machinery and 
equipment, finance, agro-industries, tourism, housing and transport. ALBA is a regional 
integration plan initiated by Venezuela’s President Chávez as an alternative proposal to the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by President Clinton in 1994. It is based on 
two fundamental concepts: cooperative advantages and Great Nationals.
Cooperative advantages consist of incorporating a dimension of solidarity in international 
relations and maintaining the principle of national sovereignty. To construct these advantages 
ALBA envisages the creation of regional compensation funds—a sort of special and 
differential treatment that must be used to achieve social and economic objectives. That is, 
Nicaragua receives petroleum under a preferential agreement, such that the savings from oil 
purchases can then be invested both in social spending and in new public-private businesses. 
It is in this context that Petroalba came about, to facilitate access to oil and payment for it over 
longer periods. Albacom, Telesur and ALBA TV are businesses that emerged to develop 
communications, services and infrastructure, along with ALBA-Medicines for the importation 
of generic drugs and ALBA-Food for accessing agricultural and industrial supplies. 
The Great Nationals, a “state” version of transnationals, would be in charge of 
implementing all these large projects. In practice, they have been implemented through 
public-private links. The cooperative Nicaraocoop is an example of a private entity with 
links to the FSLN government that is used for selective distribution to farmers of urea 
fertilizer provided by Venezuela and channeled through ALBA officials and agreements. 
The poverty reduction policies of both governments also have significant differences. The 
Bolaños government approach was characterized by its strong belief that economic growth 
generated by the export clusters would have trickle down effects and reduce poverty.  This 
approach was supported by three sets of specific poverty reduction policies. The first set was 
human capital investment policies that emphasized increased coverage of primary and 
technical education, primary health care and infant nutrition. This included investing in the 
construction of new schools and health centers or the repair and expansion of existing ones. 
It also included administrative decentralization to increase efficiency in these services. 
Administrative decentralization of schools and hospitals involved providing limited 
government funds and a degree of administrative autonomy. In the schools, this meant that 
participating schools received some central funding, including for infrastructure repairs, but 
had to raise their own funds as well, mainly by charging parents. School managers had 
greater autonomy in decision making, and parents had more incentives to be involved. 
School directors and teachers received salary incentives when schools participated in the 
program. This policy, however, contradicted the government’s stated goals, because the rise 
in fees led to the exclusion of the poorest families. In the health sector, decentralization 
involved the development of a two-tiered system, whereby privatized services were available 
within the public hospitals. Patients could choose to be treated without charge, or they could 
pay and receive a private room and better service. The theory was that people who could 
afford to pay would then contribute to the funding of the public system. In practice, 
however, this policy led to a decline in the quality of services to those who could not pay.
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A second set of policies sought to improve the standard of living of the poor with increased 
coverage of the provision of drinking water and sewage, and improved housing. The third 
set was the cash transfer program to reduce extreme poverty. This was called the Social 
Protection Network (Red de Protección Social) based on the Mexican model of Progresa/
Oportunidades. It consisted of monthly cash payments to the caregivers of children living in 
extremely poor households, conditional on all children going to primary school and 
under-fives attending regular clinics to monitor their health and growth. 
The Ortega government has substantially modified this poverty reduction approach. It 
eliminated the two-tiered system in the health sector and the school autonomy program. 
Human capital investment policies now emphasize increased and free access to all levels of 
education, and the reduction of illiteracy of the population above fifteen years old. These 
policies also include the development of a decentralized and participatory health model 
that stresses preventive care (modelo de salud familiar y comunitario). 
Nonetheless, there is continuity in the social infrastructure investment policy such as the 
expansion of schools, health centers, drinking water and sewage facilities. The only 
significant exception is the policy shift from improving existing houses to a massive 
program of construction of low cost houses (casas para el pueblo).
The other significant change is the creation of programs to recover the productive capacities 
of both the rural and urban poor, instead of the cash transfer policy.  The Ortega 
government launched the Zero Hunger program (Hambre Cero) to provide animals, inputs 
and equipment to 75,000 rural women, representing about 7% of the total rural female 
population. Similarly, the other new program, Zero Usery (Usura Cero), aims to provide 
small loans at low interest rate to urban women engaged in informal business. Neither 
program is sustainable because each has a very low rate of loan or cost recovery. In addition, 
there are concerns about political influences on the selection of beneficiaries (Kester, 2009).
5.2 Theimpactofgrowthpolicies
Under both Bolaños and Ortega governments, growth policies have had limited impact on 
Nicaragua’s overall economic performance. The Nicaraguan economy grew at an annual 
average of 3.2 percent during the period 2001-2008, well below the annual growth rate of 
5.5 percent that the World Bank estimates would be necessary to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goal of reducing extreme poverty by half (World Bank, 2008a).
In fact, the absolute poverty rate was virtually unchanged from 2001 to 2005. Nicaragua had 
a positive poverty elasticity in these years, which is very unusual (World Bank, 2008a). 
Poverty, and also extreme poverty, is much more severe in rural areas (Figure 5.1). Rural 
poverty did not change at all, while there was a slight decrease in urban poverty. The 
continuation of high poverty levels suggests that more efforts have to be made to pursue 
broad-based and inclusive growth policies.
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Source: World Bank 2008a.
Moreover, growth will be significantly lower during 2009-11 because of the impact of the 
global financial crisis. The Nicaraguan economy contracted in 2009 for the first time since 
the early post-conflict years (1990-1993) with an estimated 2.3%.78 Growth rates in 2010 and 
2011 are expected to be around plus 1.8%, which means that per-capita growth will be 
negative over the years 2009-2011. As a result, the modest gains in poverty reduction 
achieved since the end of the armed conflict (1990) could be partially reversed by the impact 
of the current global crisis on the Nicaraguan economy. 
Source: Elaboration of data from BCN.
78 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report Nicaragua, February 2010. www.eiu.com
Figure 5.1 Poverty and extreme poverty in Nicaragua, 2001 and 2005 (in % of population)
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Total poverty RuralUrban Total extreme 
poverty
Urban Rural
2001 2005
46 46
30 29
68 68
15 15
6 5
27 27
Figure 5.2 Growth by sectors
-4.0
-2.0
2.0
6.0
0.0
10.0
8.0
4.0
2001 2008
GDP
Primary sector
Secondary sector
Tertiary sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
| 92 | 
5 Government policies and poverty reduction
The modest growth performance during this period (2001-2008) has been marked by 
strong fluctuations (Figure 5.2). During the first two years of the Bolaños administration 
(2002-2003), growth performance was affected by several factors, including the contraction 
of exports and public spending, and the slow recovery of banking credit after the financial 
crisis of 2000-2001 that led to the closure of four banks. Traditional exports were 
hampered by low international prices, while fiscal adjustment took place after the 
widening of the government deficit during the electoral year (2001). In addition, the 
government bail out of the banking sector led to a significant increase in domestic public 
debt. This increased debt burden has restricted the government’s ability to increase social 
spending and hence reduce poverty. After this initial phase of economic stagnation, there 
was an economic recovery during the last three years under Bolaños. The reactivation was 
stimulated by a significant expansion of public investment and by the upturn of exports 
due to better international prices. The investment climate improved with the successful 
negotiation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (2003-2005), the fiscal reform 
(the 2003 Fiscal Equity Law) and the entry of Nicaragua into HIPC (2004), which both 
strengthened public finance.
 
These policies continued under the Ortega administration, which respected CAFTA and the 
macroeconomic agreement with the IMF. However, growth was weaker because of the 
negative impact of high international food and oil prices combined with the global 
financial crisis that started in 2008. 
Source: Elaboration of data from BCN.
The main source of growth (Figure 5.3.) over the period 2001-2008 was the moderate and 
steady expansion of the commerce and services sector (tertiary sector), although the most 
dynamic sector of the economy was manufacturing (secondary sector). In contrast, the 
primary sector had a weak performance, after being the growth engine of the post-conflict 
recovery during the second half of the 1990s. Agriculture, which accounts for almost one 
Figure 5.3 Sources of growth
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half the primary sector value added, was affected by low international prices, increasing 
vulnerability to climate change and the reduction of the availability of tropical forestland 
that could be converted into agricultural production.
  
The main agricultural export, coffee, which also accounts for over one fifth of agricultural 
value added, was particularly affected by a substantial reduction of its international price.  
Average coffee prices during 2000-2008 were 5 percent lower than over the period 1995-1999. 
The decline of coffee profitability led to a sharp deterioration of coffee plantations because of 
a lack of investment and even basic maintenance. Average coffee output during 2001-2008 was 
significantly lower (-26 percent) than during 1995-2000 and has not yet recovered its pre-crisis 
levels. This had adverse social consequences in rural employment and income, and might be 
one of the factors that explain the persistence of high levels of rural poverty.
Nonetheless, the increase of the value added of the other main agricultural activities –sugar 
cane, peanuts, grains and other crops- helped to offset the contraction of coffee output. 
Sugar cane and peanuts were stimulated by the increase of their export quota to the US 
under the CAFTA agreement, while grains production for the domestic market has been 
growing since the early post-conflict years, mainly through the conversion of tropical 
forestland into agriculture, though this growth has decreased in recent years. Red beans 
exports, which are also included in grains production, has been particularly encouraged by 
the growing demand of El Salvador and other Central American markets. The future growth 
of grains production, however, is likely to be restricted by the exhaustion of the agriculture 
frontier and by the increasing variability of rainfall caused by global climate change. 
The expansion of the other main pillar of the primary sector, cattle production, has also 
been based on the availability of forestland. Cattle and milk production have grown 
steadily, stimulated by private investment in the establishment of new processing plants 
and the renovation and expansion of existing ones. Cattle growth, however, has been 
negatively affected in recent years by government restrictions on the export of live animals 
to the growing markets of Mexico and other Central American countries. The government 
acted under the pressure of the beef processing industry that felt threatened by foreign 
competition.  The other significant animal production activity, poultry, also experienced a 
steady growth over the period, stimulated by increasing demand from the domestic market. 
The depletion of natural resources has severely affected the growth of other primary sector 
activities such as forestry, fishing and mining. The extensive and indiscriminate exploitation 
of timber forced the government to establish a moratorium on extraction of the most 
profitable timber species, which in turn has slowed export growth.  Likewise, overfishing 
prompted new government regulations that aim to replenish the stocks of fish, lobster and 
shrimp. The decline of ocean fishing, however, has been offset by the rapid growth of shrimp 
farming. Mining has also been affected by the exhaustion of the existing gold mines, and the 
gross production value of metal mining has declined by one third over the period 2001-2008.
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The weak performance of the primary sector contrasts sharply with the dynamic growth of 
the manufacturing sector over the period 2001-2008. The textile, garment and leather and 
the food, beverages and tobacco manufacturing branches were the main drivers of this 
expansion. Thus, the share of the primary sector of total value added declined from 21.5 
percent to 20.2 while the corresponding share for the secondary sector increased from 17.1 
to 19.7 percent. 
The value added of textile, garment and leather products more than doubled over the 
period in response to the successful negotiation of the CAFTA with the US. Under this trade 
agreement, the Nicaraguan textile and garment industry was favored with more 
concessionary rules of origin than those negotiated for its Central American counterparts. 
The strong development of agro-industrial activities –beef, dairy products and sugar- played 
a key role in the significant increase of the value added of the food, beverages and tobacco 
manufacturing branch. The sugar industry has benefited from increased access to the US 
market as mentioned above and the growing international demand for ethanol. Beef and 
dairy products have benefited from the growing demand from Central American countries 
and the Caribbean, and from the migrant communities that live in the USA. Thus, the 
cluster development strategy was successful at promoting export growth.
The commerce and services sector grew faster than the economy as a whole over the period.  
Financial services, communications and hotels and restaurants were the most dynamic 
activities of this sector. Banking coverage and services expanded considerably after the 
government rescue of the banking system during 2000-2001, while the entry of new firms 
stimulated the telecommunications’ market and has improved the access to telephone lines 
and the Internet. Nicaragua still has the lowest access rate to telephone lines (including cell 
phones) and to Internet in Central America. Finally, the growth of the hotels and restaurant 
services was associated with the dynamism of tourism. 
In synthesis, the weak economic growth performance over this past decade and the adverse 
consequences of the global financial crisis suggest that aid supported government policies 
need to be modified and adapted to foster economic recovery and poverty reduction. While 
the cluster development strategy succeeded in fostering the growth of industry and services, 
such as textiles and tourism, the overall stagnation of the key primary sector held back 
economic and social development and explains the stagnation in rural poverty reduction.  
In fact, the few dynamic branches in primary production, notably sugar cane, peanuts and 
cattle, are relatively capital intensive and provide little employment. 
The cluster development strategy also failed to address key structural bottlenecks, such as 
the needs of the large informal sector and the limited skills of the labor force. The micro, 
small and medium enterprises and agricultural holdings of the informal sector employ 63% 
of the economically active population. These enterprises are characterized by low capital 
invested per worker, resulting in low labor productivity and in most cases also low product 
quality and market potential.
The majority of the labor force still has no or only primary education. The educational 
pyramid is not conducive to economic growth considering Nicaragua’s level of development. 
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There are many more youth enrolled in universities than in technical education. 
Furthermore, the public system for provision of technical and vocational education and 
training is ineffective and does not respond to the demands of the private sector. 
The rural sector, which harbors the majority of Nicaragua’s poor population, faces three 
additional structural problems: inequality of access to land and land markets, lack of access 
to financial services and inadequate transport infrastructure, particularly roads. Despite the 
considerable land redistribution that took place during the 1980s and early 1990s, land 
distribution is highly skewed. The estimations of the Gini Coefficient varies from 0.72 
(Carter et al., 2005) to 0.86 (World Bank, 2003), which means that Nicaragua has one of 
highest level of land concentration in Latin America (Hollinger and Davies, 2008). The 
landless represent 38% of the rural population (Reardon and Corral, 2005).
Land concentration has been stimulated by two parallel processes. The first is the expansion 
of the agricultural frontier through the destruction of the remaining humid tropical forests 
followed by the conversion of small agricultural plots into large cattle farms. The other key 
process is the sale of land by the former beneficiaries of the agrarian reform of the 1980s 
and early 1990s because of land rights insecurity, lack of credit and of technical assistance. 
The poor access to financial services has improved with the growth of microfinance over the 
last decade but is still limited. Only a quarter of the total households have access to credit 
according to the LSMN 2005, and the proportion is slightly lower for the rural sector. Other 
financial services, such as savings and insurance, are even less developed.
The condition and coverage of Nicaragua’s road network are the poorest in Central America, 
limiting access to markets and social services for many rural communities, particularly in 
the Caribbean regions. Only about 19% of rural households in Nicaragua has access to a 
paved road, and in the Caribbean region it is only 10% (World Bank 2008a). Road access is an 
important factor in economic development. 
These structural problems have been only partially addressed by the Ortega government. 
Although the Human Development Plan identifies the market exclusion of the small and 
medium agricultural holdings and enterprises as the key constraint on pro-poor economic 
growth, the Ortega government has not significantly changed the existing policies and 
programs towards this sector.
Rural development policies do not deal with the inequality of access to land and land 
markets, and have instead given continuity to the Bolaños policy of legalizing existing 
agricultural holdings. Yet, the Ortega government gives serious attention to the 
demarcation and titling of indigenous territories. Though the government recognized that 
one of the main constraints on rural producers is the lack of access to financial services, and 
proposed the establishment of the state development bank, this bank still only exists on 
paper. In addition, the starting capital of the bank that has been approved by Parliament 
falls far short of the estimated needs of the agricultural sector. The government has not 
been able to improve rural road infrastructure due to fiscal constraints.
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There is limited government support for improving market access and competitiveness of 
micro, small and medium manufacturing and services enterprises. Their access to financial 
markets has not improved significantly because the government program Zero Usury only 
provides a limited amount of working capital and has low recovery rates. Furthermore, this 
program’s lenience with respect to the repayment obligation has negative spill-over effects 
on the sustainability of other micro-credit programs in the country and may therefore have 
a net negative effect on poverty reduction.  
With regard to education, school attendance seems to have increased slightly with the 
elimination of school fees but the policy towards higher education has not changed. 
Technical education continues to be relegated in favor of university education. Per-capita 
education expenditures have not increased.
Finally, two sets of tensions affect the climate for economic growth and poverty reduction. 
The first set is related to the tension between building the parallel public-private ALBA 
business group and the national business sector. The justification for the formation of ALBA 
was an ideological anti-capitalist and anti-American discourse, while arguing at the same 
time for the need to improve the climate for private investment. Through ALBA, the 
government is creating firms that compete with domestic and foreign private investors. To 
address this problem, the government engages in bilateral negotiations with the domestic 
private sector (COSEP) and with individual foreign investors. It remains to be seen whether 
this is sufficient to temper the private investment decline that has already set in.
 
The second tension is between the use of Venezuelan aid to build up the ALBA business 
group and for political clientelism, and the urgent need to expand social expenditure, 
productive credit and public investment more generally in the context of economic 
recession. Unless there is a reorientation of the use of these funds, Nicaragua will continue 
to have slow growth and limited poverty reduction. 
5.3 Socialpoliciesandresults
Over the long term, from 1993 onwards, most social indicators improved. However, in the 
period 2001-2005 (or 2006), the period of the Bolaños government, the picture is much less 
favorable. Progress on social indicators was limited, with small improvements in infant and 
child mortality and virtual stagnation in primary school enrolment rates (Table 5.1.). Family 
planning coverage declined from 24.5% in 2001 to 12.9% in 2005 (World Bank, 2008b). In 
access to water and sanitation, some progress has been made between 2001 and 2005 and 
also, it seems, between 2007 and 2008 (Table 5.1).
After 2006 some more improvements can be observed. According to government figures (not 
in Table 5.1), maternal mortality decreased in 2008. Government figures show some increase 
in school enrolment and a large decrease in the illiteracy rate in 2008. However, the 
reliability of many of these figures, especially those provided by the government, can be 
questioned. The most reliable data are those obtained in the 1993, 2001 and 2005 LSMS, and 
in the 1998, 2001 and 2006/7 (registered under 2006) Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
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Table 5.1      Some social indicators 1993-2008
1993 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Net primary enrolment 76 83 86 86 87 84 86 87 87
Illiteracy 19 19 18 20 8
Infant mortality 58 42 30 29
Child mortality 72 51 37 35
Chronic malnutrition 20 18 17 17
Immunization rate 80 72 85
Institutional births 64 66 74
Access to water* 68 70 72 85 65 70
Access to sanitation* 45 52 56 36 42
* Given the large fall in 2007 and 2008, the definition of this access has probably changed over time.
Sources: 1993, 2001, 2005: World Bank (2008a); child and infant mortality, immunization arte and institutional 
births 1998, 2001, and 2006: DHS 2008; For 2002, 2003, and 2004: MED and MINSA as published in Guimarães & 
Avendaño (2008); for 2006: Government of Nicaragua (2007), and for 2007 and 2008: Government of Nicaragua, 
“Programa Económico-Financiero 2007-2010, Evaluación de Indicadores Sociales 2008” (available from www.bcn.
gob.ni).  
Nevertheless, it can be asked why progress has been so slow between 2001 and 2006. Social 
indicators improved only slightly despite increases in social spending and poverty reduction 
spending as of 2002. This section attempts to answer some of these questions by analyzing 
in more detail government income and expenditure: the structure of revenues and 
expenditure and their incidence, and the targeting, efficiency and quality of government 
services. To the extent possible, changes in 2007 and 2008 are analyzed as well.
5.3.1 Governmentrevenues:structureandincidence
Some of the structural inequalities in the Nicaraguan economy as analyzed in 5.2. are also 
visible when we examine the structure of government income and expenditure. As shown in 
Chapter 4, tax revenues as percent of GDP have increased since 2002, from 13.4% of GDP in 
2002 to 18.0% of GDP in 2007. This was due to introduction of the Tax Equity Law in 2003 
and to improvements in the tax administration. Economic growth also helped. Before this 
Law, taxes on goods and services, including taxes on trade, represented almost 80% of total 
tax revenues. Apart from a value added tax, there were excise taxes on about 1000 products. 
On the other hand, income taxes for both companies and individuals had many exemptions. 
The new Law introduced a tax on assets, increased the tax base by taxing financial profits and 
by eliminating the accelerated depreciation mechanism for investment, and simplified 
excise taxes. A Poverty and Social Impact Analysis concluded that the new Law would 
increase the progressiveness of the tax system. This study used the shifting assumptions 
method and measured the tax burden per quintile of household consumption (Gasparini et 
al., 2006). The same study found that the existing individual income tax was already 
progressive before the tax reform, and that this would not change after the reform.
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Table 5.2      Structure of tax revenues 2002-2008 (in percent)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Income tax 20.9 26.1 28.3 28.6 29.5 30.4 32.3
VAT 19.2 17.0 16.6 15.7 16.3 16.4 14.5
Special consumption taxes 6.9 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.1 4.9 5.2
Oil products tax 18.2 16.7 14.4 12.9 11.4 11.1 10.0
External trade 34.5 32.0 34.8 37.3 31.3 31.4 32.3
Other tax income 0.3 1.8 0.3 0.1 6.3 5.7 5.8
Tax revenues 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Memo items:
Tax revenues in % of GDP 13.4 15.1 15.7 16.7 17.4 18.0 17.6
All revenues in % of GDP 14.8 16.4 17.2 18.0 18.8 19.6 19.0
Source: Elaboration of MHCP liquidación presupuesto, several years.
In fact, Table 5.2 shows that the share of income tax in total revenues indeed increased after 
2002, from 20.9% to 32.3%. The share of VAT and special consumption taxes decreased. As 
income taxes are probably more progressive than other taxes, the progressiveness of the tax 
system did indeed increase. However, it must be born in mind that the system was regressive 
at the start. In addition, the system still had many weaknesses, also after this reform 
(Artana, 2005). The tax base is still low due to widespread evasion and also due to still 
existing special treatments, the so-called tax expenditures. Artana estimates that the total 
loss in forgone tax income is about 11% of GDP, of which 60% is due to evasions and 40% 
due to tax expenditures. It can be expected that the benefits of both accrue mainly to the 
higher income groups. The very large extent of evasions puts the information on the 
progressiveness of the tax system in perspective: one can only measure the relative tax 
burden for taxes that are actually paid. The largest inequality in tax payments is probably 
due to the fact that the rich manage to not pay taxes at all. 
5.3.2 Governmentexpenditure
Table 5.3 shows the functional distribution of expenditure, in percent of total expenditure 
including debt amortization. Total debt payments have taken 20% of total expenditure over 
these seven years – more than the average amount spent on education. That is very high, and 
this money could not be used for improving the social indicators. More importantly, the share 
of expenditure spent on internal debt payments directly contributes to the skewed income 
distribution in the country, since it accrues either to rich individuals or it helps to increase the 
profits of domestic banks - which are owned by rich Nicaraguans. This share has been 12.8% 
on average, which means that one-eighth of the total budget is directly benefiting the rich in 
Nicaragua. This structural feature of the Nicaraguan budget both maintains poverty and 
inequality in the country, and reduces the chances of improving the other Millennium 
Development Goals as well. In this context, it is positive that the Ortega government managed 
to renegotiate the terms of the domestic debt. The agreed reduction in the interest rate is 
already visible in a slight decline in 2008 internal debt payments, but 12% is still high. 
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Table 5.3      Functional classification of expenditure*
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 average
Social 37.1 35.6 41.2 43.0 43.0 45.3 47.6 41.8
  Education 17.5 16.4 17.4 18.2 18.4 19.4 20.7 18.3
  Health 13.3 12.2 12.8 13.3 13.2 14.4 14.4 13.4
  Other social 6.3 7.0 11.0 11.5 11.5 11.5 12.6 10.2
Economic services 15.6 13.5 18.0 15.5 11.8 14.9 14.4 14.8
Administration 12.0 9.0 11.6 13.4 15.0 9.9 10.5 11.6
Defense and security 11.6 10.2 10.6 10.3 11.3 11.6 11.4 11.0
Total debt 22.8 30.7 18.0 17.3 18.5 17.9 15.7 20.1
Internal debt 9.3 12.9 15.0 13.4 13.5 13.8 12.0 12.8
External debt 13.5 17.8 3.0 3.9 5.0 4.1 3.6 7.3
Total expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Memo item:
Total expenditure in % of GDP 23.0 28.6 25.1 26.0 25.8 25.9 25.8 25.7
* Total expenditure includes debt amortization.
Source: Elaboration of MHCP liquidación presupuesto, several years.
Targeting,efficiencyandqualityofexpenditure
According to the Public Expenditure Review (PER), Nicaragua spends a similar percentage of 
GDP on health and education as the average Latin American country (World Bank, 2008b). 
Health spending is slighly above the average for Central America. However, the country 
spends relatively much less on secondary education, and more on tertiary education. In 
fact, the country spent USD1000 per university student in 2005. At the same time, the 
Poverty Assessment found that virtually all of this spending benefits the non-poor (World 
Bank, 2008a). There are also other categories within social spending that manly benefit the 
non-poor. A large part of “other social spending”, for example, comprises pensions that are 
received by those having enjoyed formal employment, usually the middle and higher 
income groups. Social spending as a whole has been shown to benefit the non-poor more 
than the poor: more than 55% of this spending is enjoyed by the non-poor.
The same study also analyzed poverty reduction expenditure. Poverty reduction expenditure 
excludes spending on higher education, and includes rural development programs, municipal 
transfers for social infrastructure, and rural roads, among other issues. It was found that within 
poverty reduction spending, primary education, pre-school education, adult education, school 
feeding programs, the conditional cash transfer program (social protection), and curative 
health care are pro-poor meaning that these services are more used by the poor than by the 
non-poor. However, several other social programs included in poverty reduction spending are 
more used by the non-poor, for example secondary and technical education. Preventive health 
care was only marginally pro-poor. In the non-social areas, rural development programs were 
pro-poor as well as food aid from the World Food Program. Most projects of the Emergency 
Social Investment Fund (FISE) were pro-poor, with the exception of community works. On the 
whole, the targeting of the poverty reduction spending proved to be slightly better than of 
social spending, but still 47% of this spending benefits the non-poor (World Bank, 2008a).
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This benefit incidence analysis of government spending shows a too rosy picture of the 
actual distribution effects, as it only examines the use of actual government services of 
different income groups. Those who do not have access to these services at all are not 
included in the measurement of the concentration indices. Some 15% of pupils in school 
age do not attend primary school, and 38% of children of four to six years old do not have 
access to pre-school education. The most important reason given for not attending school 
is “lack of money”, which may include lack of money for transport (World Bank, 2008a).
In 2004, a study has been carried out on the targeting of public investment (Belli, 2004). It 
focused on investment in education, health and infrastructure, and found that this state 
investment was highly regressive with respect to geographical areas. Most investment was 
carried out in the central and Pacific regions, which are the most prosperous ones. The 
reverse targeting was largest in health. But this may have improved. FISE explicitly uses a 
poverty map in the allocation of its thousands of small-scale investments all over the country.
It is difficult to conclude on the targeting of poverty reduction expenditure after 2005. Poverty 
reduction expenditure itself decreased in 2006, which was mainly due to a slower execution of 
investment projects. Although it recovered in 2007, the level is only slightly higher than in 
2005. Some changes came about within this spending (Table 5.4). The new government 
abolished the conditional cash transfer program (FISE social protection) which was highly 
pro-poor. At the same time, it expanded adult education (with literacy campaigns, among 
other things) and abolished fees for primary education and health care services. Some effects 
of these measures can be observed, for example in the enrolment rate and the illiteracy rate 
(Table 5.1). The new government also aims to give more attention to preventive care, including 
mother and child care. The reduced maternal mortality rate in 2007 and 2008 may be due to 
these efforts, but is also due to other factors, such as aid-financed or donor-induced 
expansions of health post and of family planning programs, already started during the 
previous government, and the cooperation of Cuban doctors in the Atlantic region. In the new 
poverty reduction spending definition, the programs Zero Hunger and Zero Usury are now 
also included, but effects of these programs on poverty are as yet unknown.
The efficiency of health and education spending, measured by comparing input with output 
indicators, proves to be low in Nicaragua. The health sector performs slightly better than 
the education sector, but both rank below the medium Latin American country (World 
Bank, 2008b). A sector analysis of health spending found that health spending is not only 
badly targeted, but that there is also too much emphasis on curative care instead of on 
preventive care. Another structural inefficiency of the health sector is evident in the 
procurement and distribution of medicines (World Bank, 2007). This is confirmed in the 
outcomes of the LSMS: among the poorest two quintiles, the most important reasons for 
not seeking care when ill (apart from self-medication) are “lack of medicines”, and 
“distance”, before “too expensive” and “low quality” (World Bank, 2008a). The health sector 
PER also found that the increases in health expenditure in 2005 and 2006 have mainly been 
absorbed by salaries (World Bank, 2007).
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Table 5.4      Some categories of poverty reduction spending, 2005-2008 (in % of total expenditure )
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Poverty expenditure 50.4 47.7 51.6 51.7
Education minus universities 13.3 13.1 13.9 15.3
  Primary  6.7 7.7 8.2 7.5
  Secondary 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3
  Pre-school 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2
  PINE (school feeding) 0.0 0.4 0.3 1.2
  Adult education 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4
Health 13.3 13.2 14.4 14.4
FISE water and sanitation 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1
FISE social protection 0.1 0.0
Bonos productivos 0.6 0.8
Usura cero 0.2 0.3
FISE social investment 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.9
Source: Elaboration of data from MHCP, Informes de Ejecución Presupuestario, 2005-2008.
The education sector expenditure review analyzed internal efficiency of the sector and 
found that some indicators for this deteriorated between 2002 and 2006. Dropout rates 
from preschool education increased from 13% to 16%, and from primary education from 7 to 
13% (Moore & Soto, 2007). The pupil teacher ratio in the public primary school increased in 
the same period. On the other hand, the primary completion rate increased from 26% in 
2001 to 41% in 2005 and was maintained at 40% in 2006 (p. 44). This review also found that 
the increased budget had mainly been used for salaries. In 2005 and 2006 there was a 
marked decrease in physical investment for the sector, which was expected to have serious 
consequences for the future.
5.4 Conclusions
The economic policy of the Bolaños government focused on improving the investment 
climate for large and foreign investors, especially in some targeted clusters: textiles and 
clothing, tourism, and agro-industry (coffee, meat, dairy). This would lead to growth and 
the benefits of this growth would automatically trickle down to the poor. For the poorest of 
the poor the government maintained the social protection network (set up and still mostly 
financed from foreign aid), the Nicaraguan conditional cash transfer program.
There has been growth between 2001 and 2006, but it was lower than 2% per capita. The 
most dynamic production sector was textiles and clothing, which was mainly assembly 
production from the free trade zones. Some of the other clusters favoured by the Bolaños 
government also registered high growth rates, especially agro-industry (food, beverages and 
tobacco). Other dynamic branches were transport and communication, financial services, 
and trade, hotels and restaurants. However, growth rates in many other sectors lagged 
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behind. In any case, the Bolaños strategy of improving the business climate for domestic 
and foreign investors has not trickled down. Despite this positive growth, there was no 
reduction in poverty between 2001 and 2005 and only a slight decrease in extreme poverty. 
While social indictors improved, several others deteriorated despite steady increases in 
social spending.
Explanations for the slow progress in poverty reduction include:
• The extreme inequality in assets (land, credit) and income in Nicaragua, which causes a 
low poverty elasticity, implying that a much higher growth rate is necessary for reducing 
poverty;
• The growth policy of the Bolaños government focusing on clusters that - with the 
exception of assembly industries, are extensive in employment;
• The liberalization policies of both previous and the Bolaños government that allowed for 
high profits in trade, transport and communications, energy, and the financial sector - 
sectors with little employment; 
• A (although improved since 2002) regressive tax structure, exacerbated by many 
exonerations and by pervasive evasion;
• The highly regressive structure of government expenditure with some 13% of expenditure 
directly going to the richest households in the form of internal debt payments; 
• The poor targeting and low efficiency of social spending;
• The high leakage to the non-poor (47%) of “poverty reduction expenditure”
From 2007 the Ortega government pursued different growth and poverty reduction policies. 
The policy of free education appears to have increased primary enrolment rates and adult 
education programs have managed to reduce illiteracy rates. The government managed to 
negotiate a lower internal debt service. In the productive realm, it abolished the cluster 
strategy and has more attention for the structural constraints of small producers. This may 
enhance prospects for employment growth. However, in practice, access to land and to 
credit hardly improved so far. The use of Venezuelan aid to create a new public-private 
business group appears to be hampering private investment. In addition, growth prospects 
are reduced due to the impact of the global financial crisis. All in all, it can be doubted 
whether a substantial reduction in poverty will be achieved under the Ortega government.
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Annexe 1 About IOB 
Objectives
The objective of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase 
insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for 
independent evaluation of policy and operations in all policy fields falling under the 
Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the 
planning and implementation of the evaluations for which policy departments and 
embassies are responsible. Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister for Development Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the 
allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future.
Efforts are accordingly made to incorporate the findings of evaluations into the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a 
view to improving both policy intentions and implementation. Insight into the outcome of 
implemented policy allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.
Approachandmethodology
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations, it 
calls on the assistance of external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under 
investigation. To monitor its own quality, it sets up a reference group for each evaluation, 
which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the Ministry.
Programme
The evaluation programme of IOB is part of the programmed evaluations annexe of the 
explanatory memorandum to the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Anorganisationindevelopment
Since IOB’s establishment in 1977, major shifts have taken place in its approach, areas of 
focus and responsibilities. In its early years, its activities took the form of separate project 
evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Around 1985, evaluations 
became more comprehensive, taking in sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, IOB’s 
reports were submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain.
1996 saw a review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
As a result, IOB’s mandate was extended to the Dutch government’s entire foreign policy. In 
recent years, it has extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, 
for instance through joint evaluations.
Finally, IOB also aims to expand its methodological repertoire. This includes greater 
emphasis on statistical methods of impact evaluation. As of 2007 IOB undertakes policy 
reviews as a type of evaluation.
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Annexe 2  Terms of Reference Budget support 
Nicaragua
An elaboration of the applied methodology by evaluation question
EvaluationQuestion1:Ownership
On the one hand, ownership is the opposite of donor influence (EQ 2): the more influence of 
donors, in the sense of getting things done that the government would not have done 
otherwise, the less ownership. But under this EQ we can also measure the perception of 
national ownership and national accountability among different actors within government, 
political parties (National Assembly members), and civil society. The question is, first, whether 
GBS has increased the perception of national ownership among these actors (as compared to 
project aid), and second, whether GBS through the assumed improved transparency of 
budgets and budget execution, has increased national government’s accountability.
EvaluationQuestion2:Influence
This involves four steps:
1. Preconditions for budget support
Why did, and do, the Netherlands and other donors provide budget support, what were the 
conditions and to what extent were these conditions considered to be fulfilled and actually 
fulfilled at the start? For the earlier years, use can be made of previous studies (Guimarães et 
al. 2004; Guimarães et al. 2005; Booth et al. 2006; Gosparini et al. 2006). For the years 2007 
and 2008, donor documents will be studied and interviews with donors will be held.
2. An investigation of government and donor priorities for the PAM
In interviews with government representatives (separate 2005-06 and 2007-08, if possible) of 
different agencies (MHCP, MINREX, SETEC, line agencies), it will be asked what the priorities 
were for the PAM. In the case of donors, the investigation involves inquiring after donor 
concerns, in terms of discrepancies between donor wishes and actual policies and institutions, 
and the actual attempts at influence via the setting of priorities for the PAM. In all this it is 
good to distinguish between development concerns and priorities, and governance concerns and 
priorities as in Hyden (2008). Measuring influence on the basis of discrepancies or explicit 
priorities or donor wishes implies that so called “latent influence” is excluded. This latent 
influence (if government considers certain policies as obvious or natural, while in fact they are 
based on donor influence or donor power) is very difficult to assess.
Sources: Interviews with government officers, donor documents and interviews with 
donors.
| 108 | 
Annexe 2 Terms of reference budget support Nicaragua
3. Assessing the influence of government and donors on the PAM
What was the influence of donors and of government on the PAMs, i.e. to what extent are 
the respective priorities reflected in the contents of the matrices, 2005-08? How did this 
come about? Extent of pre-meetings among donors and degree of harmonization of 
priorities/concerns, discussions with government officers: which officers, how many 
meetings and how long? What instruments were used? 
Sources: JFA plus matrices, interviews with donors and government officers involved. In 
interviews with government officers: why were donor concerns accepted (if so): expert 
knowledge brought in by donors, or power of the money? Is the PAM perceived as owned?
4. Influence on actual policies and institutions
Actual influence may occur through three channels: direct contacts with government officers 
(what level on both sides?), attempts at influencing policies via the process indicators in the 
PAM, and attempts at influencing outcomes via the output and outcome indicators in the 
PAM. The question is whether these three types have been effective in influencing actual 
policies and outcomes and to what extent. I will look for concrete examples of influence.
Sources: Mid-year and annual evaluations of GBS and donor responses to these government 
reports. But also broader evidence of actual policies and institutions via own data collection, an 
analysis of fiscal accounts to examine poverty reduction expenditure,79 using PEFA indicators 
for analysing PFM, using documents such as IGR, PER, Doing Business, Poverty Assessment and 
Progress Reports on PRSP; and interviews with key informants in and outside government.
EvaluationQuestion3:Intermediateeffects
 
1. Strengthening government systems
a) Have government systems for planning, procurement, implementation and monitoring 
changed since 2005? Focus on health and education ministries. To what extent was this due 
to GBS or SBS? To the extent there was a move from project aid to GBS, SBS or basket 
funding, did this help for bringing about the observed changes?
b) Have public financial management systems (budgeting, reporting, auditing) changed 
since 2005? In particular at the Ministry of Finance but also in health and education 
ministries and in decentralization: budgeting, reporting and auditing at municipal level. To 
what extent are changes due to GBS or SBS?
Sources: PERs 2001 and 2008, IGR, other documents; plus interviews with (former) 
government officers in different ministries and municipalities, donors.  
79 It is important to also look at the definition of poverty reduction expenditure as it has changed over 
time (Guimarães and Avendaño 2008).  
Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua 2005-2008
| 109 | 
2. Transaction costs80
Transaction costs are the costs of making a transaction, in this case aid; i.e. the costs of 
preparing an aid contract (information and search costs), negotiating it, and of monitoring 
of and bonding for the aid contract (Hazeu 2000). The evaluation question is whether 
transaction costs have been reduced. Should actual transaction costs be compared with the 
situation of before GBS, so 2004? Or should GBS transaction costs be compared with project 
aid transaction costs? I propose to focus on the latter, but to use its outcome, together with 
an assessment of the extent of changes in aid modalities since 2004, in order to estimate 
whether transaction costs have been reduced between 2004 and 2008. For the assessment of 
changes in aid modalities some work has already been done (Dijkstra and Komives 2008). 
Table 1      Overview of transaction costs of aid, for donor and recipient, project aid and budget  
                     support by type of costs
Project aid GBS
Donor Recipient Donor Recipient
Information 
and search
Priority setting at 
HQ and in country; 
preparatory visits 
or missions to the 
field
Defining 
“supportable” 
projects and 
programs, selecting 
appropriate donors 
for them
Determining 
criteria for GBS at 
HQ; Assessment of 
quality of PRSP, 
governance, PFM, 
macro-economic 
stability (e.g. via 
“track records”)
Finding out donor 
criteria for GBS and 
trying to comply 
with them; e.g. 
writing PRSP;
negotiating and 
maintaining IMF 
agreement; 
cooperating with 
TA in PFM
Negotiation Negotiation with 
particular agency 
involved
Negotiation with 
particular donor 
involved
Discussion on JFA, 
preamble and 
annual matrices; 
among donors and 
with government
Discussion on JFA, 
preamble and 
annual matrices
Monitoring and 
bonding
Financing 
executing agency 
and/or monitoring 
unit; monitoring in 
embassy and at 
HQ; mid-term and 
final evaluations
Reporting, auditing 
and monitoring as 
required by the 
donor
BSG meetings; 
Mid-term and 
annual meetings
Writing progress 
reports for mid-
term and annual 
meetings; 
participation in 
those meetings;
Writing Annual 
Progress Reports 
on PRSP
80 The measuring of transaction costs is not the highest priority within this evaluation. Rigorous data 
collection would probably take too much time from the evaluator but also from government officers. 
Estimates will be made.
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Transaction costs should be related to the value of the aid contract; ideally its ultimate 
benefit, so its impact. Impact is a result of both the effect of the aid money and of the 
attempt to influence government policies and institutions. It can be assumed that the latter 
is larger with GBS, so both in comparison with before GBS and in comparison with project 
aid. For the moment, I assume that impact of different types of aid is proportional to the 
amount of aid money involved. If the results of the evaluation give reason to think 
otherwise (more effective budget support than project aid - or the reverse) then this 
assumption can be revised. This means that transaction costs will be related to the amount 
of money involved in the respective aid contracts. Applying the three types of transaction 
costs to GBS and to project aid, and looking at costs at both sides, results in Table 1.
Transaction costs will be calculated via an estimate of the amount of time spent. Time can 
be converted in money by taking the opportunity costs of, say, an hour spent; usually this 
will be the value of an hour’s salary of the person involved. I propose to focus on 
transaction costs for the recipient and to attempt to estimate time involved in the three 
types of transaction costs during a specific period. The number of hours involved will be 
broken down by level of the government officer involved, in three broad groups: minister or 
higher, senior officers, and junior or lower officers.
For project aid, transaction costs can be estimated for the (one) Dutch project in health 
(Direct support to a project aiming at the prevention of cervical carcinoma, implemented by 
both government and an NGO) and projects in private sector support. For projects, 
transaction costs must be estimated over the life cycle of the project (not annually) and 
compared with the full project amount. Alternatively annual transaction costs can be 
compared with annual disbursements, but the disadvantage is that preparation costs are 
not covered in that case.
3. Operational and allocative efficiency
Allocativeefficiency
According to IDD and associates (2006: 51),81 allocative efficiency is “the degree to which 
resources are allocated according to the strategic priorities of the government. …. greater 
allocative efficiency might involve reorienting expenditures towards PRSP priorities.” 
However, it cannot be taken for granted that PRSP priorities or pro-poor expenditures are 
strategic priorities of the government. Woll, for example, concluded for Ghana that 
Millennium Challenge Account investments were more in line with the government’s 
priorities than the pro-poor expenditure made for the GBS donors (Woll 2008).
It is difficult to know what the strategic priorities of the government are. It can be assumed 
that the availability of more discretionary (non-earmarked) resources will enhance the 
chance that the government can achieve its objectives - unless offset by possible negative 
effects of lack of predictability of donor disbursements (both during budget years and across 
years) and of donors requiring ring fencing of specific expenditure (e.g. pro-poor 
81 Apparently based on World Bank 1998, Public Expenditure Management Handbook. 
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expenditure), as donors generally do. The latter is precisely what the Uganda country report 
of the Joint Budget Support Evaluation found: the protection of the Poverty Action Fund led 
to greater unpredictability of resources for other spending and decreased allocative 
efficiency of the overall spending (IDD and Associates 2006).
In sum, I propose to not equalize allocative expenditure with increased pro-poor 
expenditure. This issue is investigated under EQ 2. Instead, allocative efficiency is improved 
if the government is more able to achieve its expenditure objectives. This is by definition 
the case if there is a larger amount of discretionary resources available, provided these 
resources are predictable. The higher chance to achieve government objectives includes the 
possibility to help improve the balance between capital and recurrent expenditure,82 
providing counterpart funds for donor investment projects or providing recurrent costs 
other than wages (school meals, maintenance) for the social sectors.83 It also has to be 
examined, however, to what extent donor demands for increased poverty reduction 
expenditure decrease allocative efficiency of expenditure.
Sources: analysis of actual expenditure 2004-2008 by capital and recurrent (wage and 
non-wage), preferably by sector; interviews with officers in Ministry of Finance and financial 
officers in line ministries.
Operationalefficiency
In line with (Leibenstein 1966), I define operational efficiency as the technical or 
X-efficiency of government expenditure, or the relation between inputs and outputs. A 
higher operational efficiency means that the same amount of money spent leads to a higher 
number of people served and/or to a higher quality of services or, conversely, the same 
number of beneficiaries and/or the same quality are achieved with a lower amount of 
money.  In this respect, a positive effect of GBS cannot be taken for granted and a negative 
effect due to abundant resources in some sectors is possible - and was in fact found for 
Uganda (IDD 2006) and Tanzania (Lawson et al. 2005). 
In fact, examining the quantity and quality of relevant services delivered is part of the 
investigation of the effects of government policies, and thus part of EQ 4. Operational 
efficiency can thus be determined after those results are available. However, under this third 
EQ data can be collected on the input side of the efficiency equation: data on expenditure by 
sector 2001-2008,84 in per cent of total expenditure, in percent of GDP, in real spending, and 
in real spending per capita. Sectors examined will be health, education, perhaps also water 
and sanitation, …?
82 Also in this case it is important to look at definitions, as investment proved to include a large amount of 
recurrent expenditure (World Bank 2008b). 
83 In IDD (2006) these aspects are included under operational efficiency but in my view this is not 
appropriate. 
84 The year 2001 is selected because the previous Poverty Assessment is of that year. In addition, it is one 
year before start of Bolaños government so a good benchmark.
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EvaluationQuestion4:Theeffectofgovernmentpoliciesoneconomicgrowth
andpovertyreduction
Only a preliminary assessment can be made of the effects of policies of the Ortega government 
(2007- ) but those of the Bolaños administration (2002-2006) can be examined fully.
For this EQ, many data on outcome and impact indicators will be collected. There are two 
methodological approaches to establishing the link between policies and outcomes. One is 
to start with policies (including expenditure, laws, decrees, etc.) and assess their outcomes, 
and the other is to start with outcomes and assess the influence of policies along with other 
possible influencing factors. I propose to do both.
Assessingtheimpactofpolicies
Targetingofexpenditureandincidenceoftaxes
How much did the poor benefit from government expenditure and how much is the relative 
contribution of the poor to government revenues? This implies carrying out a benefit 
incidence analysis and a tax incidence analysis. The former can be found in the latest 
Poverty Assessment (World Bank 2008a). Estimates will have to be made of distributional 
effects of expenditure changes made after 2005 (the year of the household survey reported 
in the Poverty Assessment). 
Sources: unfortunately, there does not seem to be a tax incidence analysis available. An 
assessment will have to be made of the distributional consequences of tax measures 
implemented since 2005 (or 2002?).
Establishingarelationshipbetweenexpenditurebysectorandsectoroutcomes
Expenditure data have been collected (see under EQ 3).For education, relevant output and 
outcome indicators include enrolment rates, completion rates, pupils by teacher, dropout 
and repetition rates, measures (tests) for quality of education (if available); separate for 
primary, secondary and tertiary education if possible; For health: number of doctors, 
nurses, drugs, health posts, number of clients served (use of health facilities), number of 
births attended by skilled employee, reduction of main diseases, weight for height, height 
for age, maternal mortality rate, infant and child mortality rates, vaccination rates, … For 
water and sanitation: new connections to water and to sanitation, households with 
improved water source, access to sanitation. All indicators for the years 2001-2008.
Sources: if possible, data will be collected for assessing the geographical targeting of 
government expenditure in the these three sectors, and compare it with outcomes per region.
PovertyExpenditureTrackingSurvey(PETS)
Unfortunately this has not been done yet in Nicaragua, so results cannot be used. It could be 
considered to carry out a PETS in the context of this evaluation. The objective is to trace the 
flow of resources from the central budget via regions (departments) and municipalities to the 
actual service providers. Apart from examining what share of the money actually arrives at 
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service delivery level, it also includes an assessment of transparency, timeliness, and possible 
regional and municipal disparities. It would indeed have to be a survey and possibly limited to 
one sector. Perhaps a local research institute can be commissioned for this research.
Theeffectofchangesinpoliciesandinstitutionsonoutputandimpactindicators
Following up on the analysis of changes in policies and institutions (see EQ 2) and including 
other, not donor-induced changes in institutions and policies, the possible effect on 
outcome and impact indicators can be assessed for each and every change. 
Indicators to be considered for the period 2001-2008:
• Time involved in setting up a new business, and other outcome indicators for the 
business climate (From Doing business in Nicaragua)
• Private investment
• Exports
• Economic growth
• Social indicators at outcome level (see above)
• Income poverty: (extreme) poverty headcount, poverty gap
• Gini index
Assessingoutcomesandtheircauses
 
What other factors - apart from government policies and institutions - can explain the 
changes in outcome and impact indicators as listed above? 
Use will be made of documents and studies commissioned by government and donors, of 
academic literature and of interviews with Nicaraguan researchers.
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Nolvia González, National Technical Coordinator Budget Support
Secretary of The Presidency (SEPRES)
Juan Carlos Sánchez 
Ministry of Finance  (MHCP)
Francisco Mena, Budget Director
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Inter-American Development Bank
Rafaela Varela, Senior country coordinator
Dougal Martin, Senior country economist
UNDP
María Rosa Renzi
European Commission
Mark Litvine, Operational manager
Debora Marignani, Officer for development cooperation, in particular budget support and 
institutional issues
Olga Viluce, Advisor for development cooperation
Sandra Mariela Peña, Advisor on macro-economic and institutional issues, and budget 
support
Netherlands Embassy
Lambert Grijns, Ambassador
Hans Wessels, Director development cooperation 
Jan Kees Verkooijen, Secretary for budget support and health
Jaime Remmerswaal, Secretary for governance 
Jan Bauer, Secretary for sustainable economic development
Silvia Porres , Advisor human and women’s rights 
María Jesus Largaestrada, Advisor health 
Switzerland (COSUDE)
Peter Bischof, Resident director for Central America
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General Budget Support (GBS) has been an 
important part of Dutch development coopera-
tion to Nicaragua over the years 2005-2008, 
representing about one-third of total bilateral aid 
to Nicaragua. This report aims to asess whether 
the outcomes of General Budget Support to 
Nicaragua have been in line with the expectati-
ons for this aid modality. It is the first publication 
of a new serie of IOB evaluations on General 
Budget Support. 
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